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Leading the fight against the 
pandemic: Does gender ‘really’ 
matter?1
Supriya Garikipati2 and Uma Kambhampati3
Date submitted: 1 June 2020; Date accepted: 3 June 2020
Since the start of the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, the relationship 
between national female leaders and their effectiveness in handling 
the COVID-crisis has received a lot of media attention. In this paper 
we scrutinise this association more systematically. We ask if there 
is a significant and systematic difference by gender of the national 
leader in the number of COVID-cases and deaths in the first quarter 
of the pandemic. We also examine differences in policy responses by 
male vs. female leaders as plausible explanations for the differences 
in outcomes. Using a constructed dataset for 194 countries, a variety 
of socio-demographic variables are used to match nearest neighbours. 
Our findings show that COVID-outcomes are systematically better in 
countries led by women and, to some extent, this may be explained 
by the proactive and coordinated policy responses adopted by them. 
We use insights from behavioural studies and leadership literature 
to speculate on the sources of these differences, as well as on their 
implications. Our hope is that this article will serve as a starting 
point to illuminate the discussion on the influence of national leaders 
in explaining the differences in country COVID-outcomes.
1 We are grateful for research support provided by Antara Mandal. Any errors remain the responsibility of the 
authors.
2 Reader, University of Liverpool.
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Leading the Fight Against the Pandemic: Does Gender ‘Really’ Matter? 
I. Introduction
National responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and their outcomes have been avidly compared
across the world. Given the importance of leadership in times of crisis, national leaders have
also been in the spotlight. Have leaders been slow in recognising the risks? Have they engaged
with the science? Have they weighted the economic costs more heavily than the loss of lives?
In this context, much has been written about the performance of women leaders (e.g., Taub,
2020; Friedman, 2020; Wittenberg-Cox, 2020). Much of the media analysis however, has been
about two high-profile female leaders (Angela Merkel and Jacinda Ardern) who have steered
their countries through the initial few weeks with less loss of life than their immediate
comparators in Europe.
In this paper, we consider the question of national leader’s gender and COVID-outcomes more 
systematically and discuss some of the plausible reasons for our findings. Using a 194-country 
dataset, specifically constructed for this purpose, we analyse two main questions. First, are 
there any significant and systematic differences in the COVID-outcomes of male and female 
led-countries in the first quarter of the pandemic? Second, can we point to any differences in 
policy measures adopted by male and female leaders that might explain the differences in 
outcomes? In particular, we consider the timing of lockdown in these countries. 
The paper relates to various branches of literature that examine gender-differences in 
behaviour. Closely related is the literature on gender-differences in attitudes to risk and 
uncertainty. Studies in this area are largely focused on analysing decision-making in 
experimental settings. There is strong evidence within this literature that women, even those in 
leadership roles, appear to be more risk-averse than men (e.g., Croson and Gneezy, 2009; 
Charness and Gneezy, 2012). While this headline result is far from canonical (Nelson, 2015), 
especially given the role that cultural and contextual modulators play (see Finucane et al., 2000; 
Schubert, 1999), there is a high level of consistency in the frequency with which it surfaces. 
For example, Charness and Gneezy (2012) assemble 15 different studies that report findings 
from one underlying investment game, carried out in different countries, with different 
instructions, durations, payments and subject pools. They find a very consistent result that men 
invest more, and thus appear to be more risk taking than women. Indeed, in the current crisis, 
several incidents of risky behaviour by male leaders have been reported in the press. 
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“a little flu or a bit of a cold”, while attending an anti-lockdown protest in April and Britain’s 
Boris Johnson’s statement, “I was at a hospital where there were a few coronavirus patients 
and I shook hands with everybody” (as reported in Lewis, 2020). Given the consistent result 
on women’s relative aversion to risk and anecdotal reports of risky behaviour by male leaders, 
it is tempting to draw simplistic conclusions. A reliable conclusion on the issue however 
requires more systematic investigation.  
The second strand of literature that our paper relates to is that on the role of leaders in national 
outcomes. The question of national leadership has given rise to a voluminous literature that 
lends texture to two conceptually extreme opinions: the idea that powerful leaders are simply 
a social myth, created to satisfy our psychological needs (Gemmill and Oakley, 1992) vs. the 
view that, a handful of influential leaders could be seen as determining the course of history 
(Keegan, 2003). In their seminar work, Jones and Olken (2005) use death of a leader as an 
exogenous variation in leadership and find that individual leaders can play a crucial role in 
shaping the growth of nations. Building on this, Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2011) 
find that more competent leaders (specifically in terms of education and skills) result in better 
national outcomes. The skill and attainment of the leader is also found to matter in other general 
settings, like that of organisational performance (Goodall, Kahn and Oswald, 2011).  
The performance of female leaders in the COVID pandemic offers a unique global experiment 
in national crisis management where various issues, including that of effectiveness of 
leadership, can be examined across countries. There are very few studies about the impact of 
leader’s gender in a national crisis, partly at least, because there are so few female leaders. In 
our sample of 194 countries, we have just 19 (<10%) female leaders. This lack of female 
leadership has given way to ‘single-sex’ conjectures that support the ‘Great Men’ view of 
history, within which, events are determined by the instrumental and causal influence of a small 
number of men. For example, Keegan (2003) writes that the political history of the last century 
can be found in the biographies of six men: Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao, Roosevelt, and 
Churchill. However, if a leader’s attributes have explanatory power, as much of the literature 
concludes, then it is a natural next step to ask whether the gender of the national leader, that 
may represent inherent proclivity for certain type of policy making, exerts an influence on 
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A note of caution before we begin. The pandemic is still in its early stages and therefore our 
analysis relates only to the initial responses of national leaders and initial outcomes of the 
pandemic. Given the fast-evolving situation, much will change over the next few months. 
Despite this, the first quarter reactions and outcomes are revealing because they capture 
immediate policy responses during an emergency. They therefore highlight the significance of 
early and effective management in a crisis.  
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. The next section discusses construction of the 
dataset and methodology. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 uses insights from risk and 
leadership literature to speculate on the sources of these differences. Section 5 concludes.    
II. Data and Methodology
Data construction
This paper uses a dataset specially collected by the authors for the purpose of this enquiry. We
gathered information on total deaths and total cases due to COVID up to May 19th from the
Worldometer site. We merged this data with a range of socio-demographic and economic data
obtained from the World Development Indicators and UNDP’s Human Development
Indicators for 194 countries. We collated data on current female leaders from various websites.
If countries have more than one head of state, we made a distinction between the executive
head (de facto head) and the titular head (de jure or nominal head) based on the characteristics
of the political system. We followed the general rule that: in parliamentary regimes, the prime
minister is the executive leader while in presidential systems, it is the president, and in
communist states, the chairman of the party is the executive head of state. We use this dataset
to analyse first, if there is a systematic difference by gender of the national leader in the total
number of deaths and cases experienced due to COVID-19. We also use it to consider the
national policy responses to the pandemic, particularly the timing of lockdown.
The first step of our analysis centres around two outcome variables – the total number of 
COVID cases and total deaths. There are several problems with the quality of data currently 
available. In particular, the number of cases depends on the amount of testing that a country 
has been able to undertake. With the shortage of test kits, most countries have undertaken less 
than optimal testing. Over time, the amount of testing being undertaken is increasing as more 
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who are symptomatic, data on deaths is likely to be more reliable though there are concerns 
about its comparability across countries. In some countries, if a COVID-positive individual 
dies, the death is registered as a COVID-death, irrespective of any other previous illness (like 
tuberculosis, cancer). But this is not standard or mandatory, so practice varies across countries. 
Our analysis is based on the best and most comprehensive data available but it is subject to 
these limitations. As time progresses better COVID data will become available and this 
analysis can be updated.  
One other issue that needs to be highlighted is the fact that we are still very much at the start 
of the pandemic. There is the expectation that the pandemic will last for another 12-18 months, 
until we find a vaccine or develop herd immunity (Gallagher, 2020). Our analysis therefore is 
only about the immediate reaction to the first wave. Outcomes by the end of the pandemic will 
depend on a range of other issues including the impact of other institutions, the cultural norms 
prevalent in countries and the impact of the lockdown on the economy, health and well-being 
of individuals.  
Methodology 
As mentioned above, any investigation involving female leaders suffers from the problem of 
small sample size, with only 19 out of 194 countries being led by women in our data. In 
addition, countries that select female leaders may have specific characteristics which enable 
them to respond to such crises better. They may be richer, less populous or have better gender 
relations. Countries that select female leaders may also be more ‘modern’ and ‘equitable’ and 
therefore perform better during crises. Thus, OLS estimation could suffer from two problems 
– that of a small number of female-led countries and the potential problem of selection. To
correct for these two problems, we use the nearest neighbour matching method wherein we 
compare a unit in the treated group (female-led countries) with a unit in the control group that 
is as similar to it as possible along a range of covariates. Matching is a quasi-experimental 
technique that provides a more reliable way of comparing two groups when sample sizes are 
heavily imbalanced and where they may be selection issues (see Durrant, 2009; Stuart, 2010).  
The nearest neighbour matching method pairs each female-led country in our sample with its 
closest comparator and estimates the effect of being female-led on the dependent variables 
(COVID-cases and deaths). The initial matching is done based on four socio-demographic and 
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per capita (current USD), Population, Population in Urban agglomerations and Population over 
65 Years. We use these variables to match for a range of reasons. First, we include GDP per 
capita as both the impact of COVID-19 and the ability to respond to it are likely to be influenced 
by how rich or poor a country is (Barnett-Howell and Mobarak, 2020). Second, the population 
variable helps us to control for differences in population size and the statistical impact it may 
have on numbers and spread. Third, we include Population in urban agglomerations as a 
matching variable because it has been remarked that COVID-19 spreads faster in densely 
populated regions (Zhang, et.al., 2020). Finally, we include population over 65 because one of 
the few clear patterns of COVID-19 deaths across the world is that it is especially fatal amongst 
older individuals, with the death rates climbing steeply for the over 60s (Nikolich-Zugich, 
et.al., 2020; Zhang, et.al., 2020).  
We follow this core analysis by testing for robustness across the sample as well as across 
matching variables. In our estimation, we consider not only the nearest neighbour but also two 
nearest, three nearest and five nearest neighbours to consider how robust the effect is. We also 
extend our matching variables to include three other characteristics – Annual Health 
Expenditure per capita, Number of Tourists entering the country and Gender Equality. Each of 
these variables allows us to control for a range of differences that could be significant in 
determining the outcome variables.  
We may expect that countries that have a better equipped health system are likely to perform 
better in the ongoing crisis. We hence extend our matching model by including the annual 
expenditure on health in each country (current USD). We match by openness to tourism 
because the more open a country is to international travel, the harder it will be to control the 
initial importation of the pandemic. It has been mooted that countries that have more gender 
equitable institutions might well be those that elect women leaders and that, it is their gender 
equality more generally rather than their women leaders that have facilitated their differentially 
better outcomes (e.g., Champoux-Paillé and Croteau, 2020). This may not only mean that 
women find gaining power easier in these countries, but that women in power may also enjoy 
greater trust and support from a political and social context that perpetuates the acceptance of 
female leaders, and may find it easier to champion cautious policies, if they choose to do so. 
Indeed, the COVID-19 experience of a group of Scandinavian countries may well fall in this 
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these differences between the women-led countries and their comparators and to identify the 
impact of a country being female-led more precisely.  
III. Results
COVID-cases and deaths by gender of leader
Table 1 below presents summary statistics for the matching covariates and dependent variables
by gender of the country’s leaders. Although these are raw statistics and not useful to draw
inferences, it is clear that female-led countries have fared better in terms of absolute number of
COVID-cases and deaths, with male-led countries having nearly double the number of deaths
as female-led ones.
Table 1: Summary statistics for matching covariates and dependent variables by gender of leaders 
Female-led (N=19) Male-led (N=172, unless stated otherwise) 
Study variable Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
First stage matching covariate 
   GDP pc (current USD) 34,902 29,810 0 82,797 12,960 22,321 0 185,741 
   Population 2.017e+07 4.084e+07 38,717 1.647e+08 4.233e+07 1.564e+08 30,231 1.439e+09 
   Pop in urban agglomerations  24.56 29.16 0 100 15.04 16.89 0 72.25 
   Population 65 years and over 13.52 6.764 0 21.72 7.826 6.331 0 27.58 
Extended matching covariate 
   Avg annual pc health expenditure  2,150 2,469 0 7,375 659.9 1,207 0 7,456 
   Number of international tourists  7.554e+06 1.042e+07 0 3.888e+07 7.212e+06 1.473e+07 0 8.932e+07 
   Gender Inequality Index 2017 0.189 0.179 0.0390 0.542 0.365 (N=139) 0.185 0.0440 0.834 
Dependent variable 
    Total COVID-cases 19,064 41,040 12 177,289 26,468 (N=171) 127,125 8 1.550e+06 
    Total COVID-deaths 1,107 2,681 1 9,080 2,021 (N=148) 9,104 1 91,981 
 Source: Dataset constructed by authors from various sources.  
Table 2: OLS results for COVID-cases and deaths 


























Observations 190 167 
R-squared 0.137 0.142 
Note. Standard errors in parenthesis 
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- COVID-outcomes (first step matching)
To get around the small sample size problem while also controlling for various characteristics, 
we use the nearest neighbour matching method. This method matches each of the 19 female-
led countries in our sample with their nearest neighbour using four matching characteristics - 
GDP per capita, population, population in urban agglomerations and size of elderly dependants. 
To test the robustness of our results, we also match with two, three and five nearest neighbours. 
Table 3a presents the results for matched estimations for both total COVID-cases and deaths. 
Our matched estimations show a definite and consistent pattern, confirming that the number of 
deaths is lower in women-led countries than in countries led by men. This is also true of the 
number of cases, though here the significance of the treatment variable decreases as we increase 
the number of matches. This suggests that controlling for GDP per capita, population, size of 
urban population and of elderly, female-led countries perform significantly better than male-
led countries.  
Table 3a: Comparing COVID-outcomes in female-led countries with nearest neighbours (first step matching) 













Note. Standard errors in parenthesis. Results for five nearest neighbours are similar. 
 ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
- COVID-outcomes (extended matching)
As mentioned earlier, to test the robustness of our results, we extend the matching to include 
three other variables that are likely to have  an impact on COVID-outcomes are: the condition 
of the country’s health care systems which will impact on its ability to fight the pandemic; 
openness to tourism which has been professed to affect the rate and speed of transmission, 
especially in the first quarter before the lockdown; and finally, more liberal and equitable socio-
cultural norms which may support policy making and compliance in times of crisis.  
Table 3b presents the results for these extensions to the results. As before, we estimate the 
extension matching models for the nearest neighbours, for two, three and five nearest 
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we present results only for the nearest neighbour. Overall, we find that both cases and deaths 
continue to be lower for female-led countries when we match using the three extension 
variables.  
With respect to health expenditure, conceptually speaking, we might expect this variable to 
both influence the number of deaths as well as the readiness with which a country is willing to 
shut down. In particular, countries with worse health infrastructure may choose to shut down 
quicker for fear of inability to cope with the impact of the virus. This has, in fact, been the case 
in many developing countries like India and South Africa. Empirically, however, we find that 
female-led countries with relatively good health care systems like Germany and Taiwan have 
led the decision to lockdown. After controlling for this, we find that female-led countries have 
significantly fewer deaths and also spread of COVID-19 than countries led by men. 
There has been some concern that countries that are open to international travel are likely to 
be more badly affected by the virus, especially in the weeks before countries started closing 
borders. Our results show that, after controlling for such openness to travel, though female-led 
countries continue to have an advantage in COVID-19 deaths, they do not experience 
significantly lower cases. This is interesting as it confirms that women-led countries faced 
similar numbers of cases as other countries but they experienced fewer deaths. This seems to 
point to better policies and compliance in these countries. 
When we match also by a gender equality measure (GII) (to consider the fact that countries 
that elect women are generally more equal and therefore likely to have better resilience), we 
find that, even after matching for gender-equitability indicators, female leadership provides an 
advantage.  
We carry out one further test to check the robustness of our results. We drop the nations that 
have been in the COVID-spotlight - USA, Germany, and New Zealand - from our sample to 
see if they might be driving the results and we note that these changes in the sample only 
strengthen the results (Table 4). Finally, it is worth noting that Taiwan (a female-led country) 
has had a very good response to the crisis. However, we have been unable to include it because 
the World Bank no longer provides data for it separately from China. Given its exceptional 
performance during the COVID crisis, its inclusion in our data would reinforce our results 
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Table 3b: Comparing COVID-outcomes in female-led countries with the nearest neighbour (extended matching) 
Dependent variable Health expenditure  Openness to tourism  Gender equality 
COVID-cases  















Note. Standard errors in parenthesis. Results for up to five nearest neighbours are similar. 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Table 4. Comparing COVID-outcomes in female-led countries without nations in the spotlight 













Note. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
** p<0.05.  
Policy responses to COVID-19 by gender of leader 
Our results so far confirm that women-led countries performed better in terms of the number 
of COVID-deaths experienced and also (though less significantly) in the number of cases. We 
now turn to consider whether these differences are caused by the immediate policy responses 
of the leaders. In particular, we are interested in whether female leaders locked down countries 
systematically more quickly than male leaders. The rate of transmission and deaths are likely 
to have been lower in countries which locked down early. Testing is another strategy that is 
likely to have helped with ‘track and trace’ type of strategies used to contain the pandemic. 
Given the global shortage of testing kit and associated equipment, we decided not to analyse 
the testing strategies of leaders. However, raw statistics indicate that the total number of tests 
is slightly higher in countries led by women and tests per million are significantly higher in 
countries led by women.  
- Policy responses (first step matching)
We turn now to consider whether countries led by women locked down systematically more 
quickly than those led by men. The total deaths at lockdown in female-led countries are 22 
fewer than male-led countries. Our matching estimates presented in Table 5a indicate that 
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led countries did close down significantly more quickly than countries led by men when 
considering number of deaths at lockdown.  
Table 5a. Comparing timing of lockdown in female-led countries with nearest neighbours (first step matching) 
Dependent variable (N=128) Nearest neighbour Two Nearest Three Nearest 












Note. Standard errors in parenthesis. Results for five nearest neighbours are similar. 
*** p<0.01.  
- Policy response (extended matching)
Extending our lockdown model to match for annual health expenditure, openness to tourists 
and GII, we find that the women-led countries locked down earlier (at lower number of deaths) 
than countries led by men (Table 5b). This means women leaders reacted more quickly and 
decisively to the crisis. Better initial outcomes in female led countries when compared to male 
led ones was because of this difference in responses. However, our results also make clear that 
the decisive factor was the number of deaths and not the number of cases at lockdown. There 
is no significant difference in the number of cases at lockdown for men and women led 
countries.  
Table 5b. Comparing timing of lockdown in female-led countries with nearest neighbours (extended matching) 
Dependent variable (N=128) Nearest neighbour Two Nearest Three Nearest 












Note. Standard errors in parenthesis. Results for five nearest neighbours are similar. 
*** p<0.01.  
Why did women leaders respond differently to the COVID-crisis from male leaders? What 
might explain the difference in the behaviour of women leaders as compared to their male 
counterparts? In the next section, we will consider some ideas from behavioural economics and 
leadership literature to speculate on the sources of these differences, as well as on their 
implications.  
IV. Discussion
Our results above clearly indicate that women leaders reacted more quickly and decisively in
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in similar circumstances. While this may have longer-term economic implications, which we 
cannot test here, it has certainly helped these countries to save lives, as evidenced by the 
significantly lower numbers of deaths in these countries. Why have women been quicker to 
lockdown? As discussed earlier, one idea that might have a bearing on our result is that there 
are gender-differences in attitudes to risk and uncertainty (e.g., Croson and Gneezy, 2009; 
Charness and Gneezy, 2012). However, this basic hypothesis has to be nuanced to highlight 
that women were less willing to take risks with lives but were more willing to accept risks in 
relation to the early lockdown of economies. We also consider learnings from the leadership 
literature to understand differences in leadership behaviours evidenced by men and women. 
Gender differences in attitudes to risk  
While risk aversion may explain why women leaders chose to close down their countries 
significantly early (in terms of the COVID-deaths at lockdown) when compared to their male 
counterparts, it does not explain the significant risk that women leaders were prepared to take 
with their economies by locking down early. Clearly, we need to look beyond the simplistic 
headline result. It could be that risks manifest differently in different domains – human life vs 
economic outcomes. If this were true, then women leaders could be seen as being significantly 
more risk averse than male leaders in the domain of human life, though, in the domain of the 
economy, these women leaders were clearly prepared to take more risk than male leaders.  
We find some support for this idea in studies that examine risk taking behavior when lotteries 
are framed as losses. For example, Schubert et al. (1999) find that men are more risk averse 
than women when lotteries are framed as financial losses rather than gains. A similar result is 
also reported by Moore and Eckel (2006) who find that in the loss-domain gambles, men are 
more risk-averse and less ambiguity-seeking than women. It could well be that the relatively 
late lockdown decisions by male leaders may reflect male risk aversion to anticipated losses 
from locking down the economy.  
Another strand of the risk literature that is of interest to us is one that considers risk-taking 
decisions by leaders on behalf of others in their group. Ertac and Gurdal (2012) observe that 
in terms of risk attitudes, the women who like to lead and decide for the group are no different 
from women who do not wish to lead. For men, however, they find that the ones who would 
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confidence and associated behaviour among men and women find that while both men and 
women are often overconfident, men are more overconfident of success in uncertain situations 
than women (Barber and Odean, 2001; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). 
Evidence in psychology also indicates that men and women react very differently to negative 
experiences. Women are seen to respond more strongly and intensely than men when 
anticipating negative outcomes (see Fujita et al., 1991; Kring and Gordon, 1998). This can 
affect their utility of a risky choice and hence their decision. For example, if a negative outcome 
is anticipated as being worse by women than by men, they will be more risk averse when facing 
a risky situation, like the current pandemic. Men are also found to respond with anger to 
negative experiences and anger is seen to make them less cautious about future gambles, but 
women respond with caution, making them more prudent in their beliefs and restrained in their 
actions (Lerner et al. 2003).  
The neuroscience literature, in its turn, indicates that there could be sex differences in feelings 
of empathy which cannot be fully explained as cultural derivatives of socialisation alone but 
have deeper neurobiological drivers. Examining the neurobiological underpinnings of male and 
female feelings of empathy, Christov-Moore et. al., (2014) find that there are important 
quantitative gender differences in the basic networks involved in affective and cognitive forms 
of empathy, as well as a qualitative divergence between the sexes in how emotional information 
is integrated to support decision making processes (see also Eckel and Grossman, 2002). When 
combined with the findings from the risk literature and psychology, we begin to see how 
women leaders could have been risk-averse about anticipated losses to human life, while at the 
same time taking risk with negative financial outcomes associated with early lockdown.     
Gender difference in leadership styles 
It is likely that leadership characteristics other than risk attitudes may also systematically differ 
between men and women. The early literature on leadership associated leaders with attributes 
that are characteristic of the stereotypic male. For example, Rost (1991) examines 221 
definitions of leadership from the last century and concludes that leadership has most 
frequently been described as “rational, management-oriented, male, technocratic, quantitative, 
cost-driven, hierarchical, short-term, pragmatic and materialistic”. Of course, women can 
display these supposedly ‘male’ management traits and vice versa. For example, both Ardern 
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to communicate sensitively with minority groups (Lewis, 2020). Despite this, is it possible that 
male and female leaders are inherently different? Do male and female leadership styles differ?  
Eagly and Johnson (1990) conduct a meta-analysis of research that compares male and female 
leadership styles and conclude that evidence can be found for both the presence and absence 
of differences between the sexes. While research in organisational studies found little 
difference between male and female leadership styles, laboratory experiments and assessment 
studies found evidence to suggest that leadership styles were somewhat gender stereotypic with 
men likely to lead in a ‘task-oriented’ style and women in an ‘interpersonally-oriented’ manner. 
Consistent with this finding, women tended to adopt a more democratic and participative style 
and a less autocratic or directive style than men. These attributes have been seen as key in a 
number of studies, especially in managing a crisis (Marcus, Dorn and Henderson 2006; Waugh 
and Streib 2006; Van Wart and Kapucu 2011). In line with this, Zheng, Kark and Meister 
(2018) propose that effective women leaders may adopt a paradoxical mindset that 
simultaneously embrace the dual demands of their role as leaders and their gender identify to 
build a more resilient leadership style. 
Indeed, the decisive and clear communication styles adopted by several female leaders have 
received much praise in the ongoing crisis (e.g.,  Henley and Roy, 2020; McLean, 2020; Taub, 
2020).  Thus, Norway’s Prime Minister, Solberg, spoke direct to children answering their 
questions, while the New Zealand Prime Minster, Ardern, was praised for the way in which 
she communicated and for checking in with her citizens through Facebook Live. Evidence also 
suggests that good communications skills are important for women to be chosen as leaders 
(Lemoine, Aggarwal, Steed, 2016).  
There seems to be some evidence therefore that being risk averse with respect to loss of lives 
and having a clear, empathetic and decisive communication style made a significant difference 
to immediate outcomes of the COVID pandemic in women-led countries.  
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we ask if there is a significant and systematic difference by gender of the national
leader in the number of COVID-cases and deaths in the first quarter of the pandemic. We also
examine differences in policy responses by male vs. female leaders as plausible explanations
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our analysis. Our findings show that COVID-outcomes are systematically and significantly 
better in countries led by women and, to some extent, this may be explained by the proactive 
policy responses they adopted. Even accounting for institutional context and other controls, 
being female-led has provided countries with an advantage in the current crisis. 
Examining what is already known about the gender differences in behaviour from a variety of 
disciplines gives us some insights into observed differential behaviour of female and male 
leaders in tackling the current pandemic. The factors affecting the pandemic outcomes in 
various countries are likely to be complex. However, the gender of leadership could well have 
been key in the current context where attitudes to risk and empathy mattered as did clear and 
decisive communications. It is clear that many of these factors will need to be considered in 
the months and years ahead as the outcomes of the pandemic mature and the impacts on the 
economy become apparent across countries. Our analysis relates to the immediate responses of 
world leaders, wherein women leaders seem to have emerged highly successful.  
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We estimate the impact of non-pharmacological interventions (NPIs) 
on COVID-19 deaths in Scandinavia. We exploit policy variation 
between Denmark and Norway on the one hand and Sweden on the 
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latter did not.  Our difference-in-differences models show that stricter 
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1. Introduction
Do lockdowns lead to fewer deaths from COVID-19? We contrast two types of non-
pharmacological interventions (NPIs). Denmark and Norway have pursued a strict lockdown 
policy in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  This includes widespread business and school 
closure, as well as travel restrictions. In contrast, Sweden implemented a less strict NPI, based 
more on community trust and far fewer business and school interruptions. In our statistical model 
we assign Denmark and Norway to the treatment group and Sweden to a control group based on 
their use of different NPIs. We then estimate a difference-in-differences model to identify the 
(potentially causal) effect of lockdown NPIs on COVID-19 deaths.  We use daily data from March 
2020 to the end of May 2020.1 
Why is the research question important? Many major countries have employed strict lockdown 
policies. These NPIs include closing businesses, closing schools and imposing stay-at-home or 
shelter-in-place orders.  Government imposed shutdowns have led to sharp declines in growth, 
massive dislocations in capital and product markets, and surging levels of unemployment.  So, 
how do NPI policies save lives?2 To satisfactorily answer that question, one needs an appropriate 
comparison group.  Namely, do lockdowns reduce COVID-19 deaths comparatively and if so, 
compared to what? We exploit the fact that ex ante Denmark, Norway and Sweden are very similar 
societies (i.e. a deep enduring Scandinavian tradition and culture) but ex post Sweden diverged 
1 Ultimately, we only have observational data. The ‘gold standard’ of random assignment to 
treatment/control groups is not possible.  But the three sample countries are sufficiently similar, ex ante, to 
make the allocation reasonable and then evaluate ex post the policy response to an exogenous 
supply/demand shock caused by the novel coronavirus. 
2 See Haushofer& Metcalf (2020) on which interventions work best during a pandemic.  See Kraemer et. 
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from Denmark and Norway by not engaging in strict lockdowns. Accordingly, Sweden emerges 
as a potentially reasonable control group to evaluate the efficacy of ‘lockdown policy’ in the 
treatment countries. 
 
2. Institutional Context 
Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is the novel coronavirus that 
causes the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).3  The disease primarily impacts the lower 
respiratory system. However, SARS-CoV-2 also affects the heart, kidneys and brain.4 The case 
fatality rate is highest among older people (>60 years of age) and those with comorbidities (pre-
existing medical conditions such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease).5 SARS-CoV-2 is highly 
infectious (more so than influenza).  
 
COVID-19 originated in China and Asia in December 2019, and then spread to Europe and the 
United States in early 2020. The World Health Organization (WHO) declared the disease a global 
pandemic on Wednesday 13 March 2020.  There is currently no vaccine for SARS-CoV-2. There 
is no herd immunity in the community because SARS-CoV-2 is novel. The world is, at the time of 
writing, in a race to develop an efficient and safe pharmacological vaccine to treat SARS-2. 
 
3 See Gorbalenya et. al. (2020). 
 
4 See Puelles, et. al. 2020 on how COVID-19 can be thought of as a whole-body disease, even though the 
SARS-CoV-2 primary effect is on the lower respiratory system. 
 
5 According to the Worldometer (2020) data, the crude mortality rate of COVID-19 is less than 0.5% for 
50 years or younger, 1.3% for 50-59 years old, 3.6% for 60-69 years old, 8.0% for 70-79 years old, and 
14.8% for 80+ years old. The mortality rate is 10.5% for those with cardiovascular disease, 7.3% for those 
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Recorded global cases from COVID-19 at the end of May 2020 exceed six million people, 
including more than 350,000 deaths. 
In the absence of pharmacological solutions, the primary global response has been non-
pharmacological interventions (NPIs). These strategies include closing businesses, closing schools 
and educational establishments, and restrictions on the number of people who can gather at any 
one time. A new phrase entered the English language overnight: Social Distancing.  And, in a 
stroke, many previously enjoyed civil liberties were suspended. Importantly, do NPIs targeted at 
modifying human behavior lead to fewer deaths? 6 
Why Scandinavia?  In the absence of randomized controlled trials, we are compelled to use 
observational data to test the efficacy of NPIs on COVID-19 deaths.  Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden share sufficient similarities so that when faced with an exogenous policy intervention in 
one country, we can split these countries into a ‘treatment’ and a ‘control’ group. This allows a 
direct test of strict lockdowns, compared to an otherwise similar control group without it. 
Table 1 shows that the three economies are small. Denmark and Norway have populations of 
approximately five million people, and Sweden is about twice as large. Our econometric models 
below normalize on country size. Denmark and Sweden have approximately the same GDP per 
capita (about $48,000) and Norway is higher (about $65,000) — all measured at constant PPP US 
dollar. 
6 Van Bavel et. al. (2002) discuss how behavioral science can help align human behavior with best practice 
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Table 1: Summary Data on Country Characteristics 
 
 Denmark Norway Sweden 
    
Population1 5,790,172 5,416,936 10,093,210 
GDP per capita PPP2 $47,673 $65,441 $ 47,194 
Trust most other people – “Yes”?3  83.0% 73.8% 63.8% 
Hospital beds per 1000 people4 2.5 3.6 2.2 
Medical doctors per 1000 people4 4.27 5.53 4.32 
Nurses per 1000 people4 11.24 20.83 11.49 
ICU beds per 1000 people4 246 343 234 
Number of cases on 03/13/205 676 621 620 
Confirmed cases per million people on 03/13/205 116.7 114.6 61.4 
Number of recorded deaths on 03/13/205 0 1 1 
Number of recorded deaths per million on 03/13/205 0 0.18 0.09 
Number of tests per million6 33.7 25.1 9.1 
Notes: 
1 Population data: https://worldpopulationreview.com/ 
2 GDP data: https://tradingeconomics.com/ GDP data for each country. 
3 Trust data: https://ourworldindata.org/trust and originally the World Value Survey. The Danish trust 
data are estimated from the Eurostat data reported by Esteban Ortiz-Ospina and Max Roser on  
https://ourworldindata.org/trust. 
4 Hospital & healthcare capacity data: https://tradingeconomics.com/ health indicators for each country. 
5 COVID-19 data: https://ourworldindata.org/.   




The World Values Survey data show that Scandinavian countries are characterized by very high 
and persistent levels of trust. The percentage of people agreeing with the statement ‘most people 
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(around 83%) in Denmark.7  There is little evidence, however,  that Sweden is more trusting vis-
a-vis its Nordic neighbors.   
Table 1 shows that health service capabilities are broadly similar across the three countries.  This 
is measured by the number of doctors, nurses, hospital beds and intensive care unit facilities.  At 
a top level, there is little evidence to suggest that the health care systems cannot respond in similar 
ways to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, Juranek and Zoutman (2020) show that if Denmark 
and Norway had followed Sweden’s more lenient policy, hospitalizations and ICU cases would 
have been significantly higher. 
The data show, too, that each country has shared experience of the COVID-19 disease when the 
World Health Organization (WHO) announced a pandemic on 13 March, 2020.  There were about 
the same number of cases reported in each country (about 650); the population-adjusted number 
being lower in Sweden compared to Denmark and Norway. The number of recorded case fatalities 
from COVID-19 was zero or one. 
2.1 Scandinavian NPI Policy Response to COVID-19. 
We study the Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway and Sweden.  Broadly, Denmark and 
Norway introduced ‘strict’ non-pharmacological interventions (e.g. closing schools, travel 
restrictions and businesses). Sweden introduced ‘less-strict’ NPIs, based on trust and individual 
responsibility.8  Interestingly, the Danish Health Authority (2020) essentially recommended a 
7 In comparison, the United States has lower trust levels.  Less than 40% of people surveyed say that most 
people can be trusted. 
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Swedish strategy in early March, but was overridden by the Danish government, which instructed 
its Head Søren Brostrøm to apply “a principle of extreme caution” in communicating about the 
epidemic (Politiken, 2020). Ex ante, it was unclear that Denmark, Norway or Sweden would 
choose the intervention they did.  This gives credence to the idea that the NPI strategies pursued 
by each country were, prior to the pandemic shock, largely exogenous. The implicit reasoning is 
that both types of intervention (stringent/less stringent) modify human behavior and interaction. 
The binary classification of NPIs is, of course, somewhat crude as each country displays nuanced 
features.  The mapping into strict and non-strict NPIs suffices for our purposes. 
 
Table 2 shows Scandinavian interventions, using the classification schema developed by the 
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of Washington. Among the six 
categories, Denmark and Norway implement three: closing educational facilities, restrictions on 
gatherings, and various forms of business closure.  Sweden implements only one: restrictions on 
gatherings.  Note that stay-at-home orders, closure of all non-essential businesses and complete 
travel restrictions are not imposed in any of the three countries, although Denmark and Norway 
did close their borders to non-essential travel while keeping them open for returning citizens.9  The 
final row shows the mean value of the Government Response Stringency Index.  This is a 
composite measure (based on 9 response indicators including school closures, workplace closures, 
and travel bans, etc.) ranging from 0 to 100 (100 = strictest response).  As shown, Denmark and 




9 Other European economies did completely lock down, deploying stay-at-home orders, closing all non-
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Table 2: Scandinavian COVID-19 Government Interventions 
Type of Social 
Distancing 
Intervention 
Denmark Norway Sweden 
Educational 
facilities closed1,2
Start 16 March 2020 Start 12 March 2020. 
Schools, kindergartens 
closed, but gradually 
reopened starting from April 
20 
Never fully implemented. 
Preschools or elementary 
schools not closed 
Any gathering 
restrictions1, 2
Start 13 March 2020. 
18 March 2020 ban 
on > 10 people. 
Fines for violations. 
Start 12 March 2020. Sports 
and cultural events and 
gatherings on >50 people are 
banned.  
Start 11 March 2020 ban 
on > 500 people. On 27 






Never fully implemented Never fully implemented 
Any business 
closure1










Never fully implemented Never fully implemented 
Stringency Index3
– range 0 to 100
(low to high)
69.4 63.0 32.8 
1 Sources: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, University of Washington. 
https://covid19.healthdata.org/denmark, https://covid19.healthdata.org/norway, 
https://covid19.healthdata.org/sweden 
2 Sources: Wikipedia pandemic pages. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_pandemic_in_Sweden. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_pandemic_in_Denmark. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-
19_pandemic_in_Norway. 
3 Government Response Stringency Index: Composite measure based on 9 response indicators including 
school closures, workplace closures, and travel bans, rescaled to a value from 0 to 100 (100 = strictest 
response).  Mean response reported for the sample period.  Source is the Oxford COVID-19 Government 
Response Tracker, Blavatnik School of Government 
We do want to stress, though, that there are important nuances in the responses of the respective 
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Norway, yet neither country went as far as for example Italy or the United Kingdom.  So, the term 
‘lockdown’ in this paper refers to Sweden relative to Denmark and Norway.  At the same time, the 
‘softer’ or ‘less strict’ measures implemented in Sweden (including encouraging work-from-home, 
avoiding social contact for high-risk groups etc.) also appeared to influence human behavior and 
social distancing.  This could imply that there was more public fear of contacting or spreading the 
SARs-2-CoV virus.  We note that Google (2020) community mobility data (reported on May 25, 
2020) show a clear decline in transit station and workplace mobility in Sweden.  The same 
magnitude of relative decline is observed in Denmark and Norway.10  
Moreover, Sweden stands out in other nuanced ways compared to Denmark and Norway. Sweden 
was not only less strict in its policy implication but also later in implementing them. For example, 
gatherings of more than 50 people were allowed until March 29th (gatherings with 500 or more 
were allowed until March 11th) and visits to relatives in elderly homes were allowed until April 
1st. (see Table 2). Lastly, we note that Sweden has done less testing compared to Norway and 
Denmark (See Table 1). The number of tests per million people has been increasing over time, but 
the average in Sweden remains below that of the other two countries. 
3. Econometric model and data
We estimate a simple difference-in-differences (DiD) model to identify the lockdown effect on 
death rates: 
10 For example, workplace mobility was down 25% relative to the baseline estimate in Sweden. It declined 
26% in Norway and was down 24% in Denmark.  Mobility trends for places of public transport hubs 
including subway, bus, and train stations were down 27% in Denmark, 26% in Norway and 25% in Sweden. 
The percentage changes are based on the 6 weeks before the report date.  In the future, we think such data 
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𝑦 = 𝛽! + 𝛿!𝑑𝑃 +	𝛽"𝑑𝑇 + 𝛿"𝑑𝑃 × 𝑑𝑇 + 	𝜖 
Where y is the outcome variable. dP is a dummy equal to one for the post-policy time period, and 
zero indicating the pre-policy era.  dT is a dummy equal to one for countries in the treatment group 
(Denmark/Norway) and zero referring to the control group (Sweden). 𝛿" measures the effect of the 
NPI policy, which is simply: 
𝛿!" = $	𝑦",$ −	𝑦!,$( −	(	𝑦",% −	𝑦!,%)		
Namely, it is the difference in means for the treatment group [T] over time from period 1 to period 
2 compared to the difference in mean outcomes for the control group [C] over the same time period.  
The dependent variable, y, is measured as recorded deaths from COVID-19 per million of the 
population. The data are sourced from “Our World in Data”. The github repository is 
https://github.com/owid/COVID-19-data. The original data are published by the European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).  Our model uses daily data from 6 March 2020 to the 
25 May 2020.11 
There is a reasonable debate as to whether the dependent variable is measured with error or not. 
For instance, deaths might be over-stated if a person dies with the disease but not directly from the 
disease because of some other comorbidity. Conversely, people might die at home rather than in 
hospital and there is a failure to count a COVID-19 death. Measurement error can go both ways. 
We acknowledge but sidestep these issues in the current paper. To make progress, we work with 
the data currently available to the scientific community. 
11 Our approach differs from Born et. al. (2020) who compare Sweden to a synthetic control group.  They 
find that “… infection dynamics in the doppelganger since the lockdown do not systematically differ from 
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The treatment group [T] is Denmark and Norway (i.e. the ‘lockdown’ NPI).  The control group 
[C] is Sweden, who favored trust-based social distancing measures (i.e. ‘non-lockdown’ NPI).  The 
interaction term in the model identifies the policy effect of the lockdown in the treated group. 
Within the potential outcomes framework (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), this is simply the average 
treatment effect of the treated (ATT). In expectation, the sign is negative and significant. 
Lockdowns lead to fewer deaths from COVID-19 post intervention. 
 
There is a question as to the exact date on which to split the data into a ‘before’ and ‘after’ period. 
Scandinavian countries implemented varying degrees of NPIs around the 13 March 2020. 
However, there is a time lag between infection and recovery (including death) which could well 
exceed many weeks.  This means we might not observe an immediate policy effect since there is 
an infection event, followed by an incubation period (e.g. about ten days on average), and then a 
further illness period (e.g. another ten days on average) when the person either recovers or dies. 
 
How do we deal with this?  We follow a simple strategy.  We first estimate the difference-in-
differences (DiD) model setting the time period t equal to the 18 March 2020. We then move the 
splitting date forward in increments of two week (fourteen days) to account for possible lag effects.  
So, model 1 defines the break at time (t) equal to 03/18/20.  At this date we estimate the difference-
in-differences model using a 15-day window from (t-7) to (t+7) surrounding the break time. Next, 
model 2 defines the new break at time (t) equal to 04/1/20. At this new date, we again estimate the 
difference-in-differences model using a 15-day window from (t-7) to (t+7).  And so on, in equal 
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country effects is not statistically identifiable due to lack of cross-sectional data.12  It also has the 
advantage of not using overlapping data. As the results below show, the empirical findings are 




Figure 1 shows Scandinavian deaths per million people from the 6 March 2020 through the end of 
May 2020.  The vertical line is set at 18 March 2002, the date when Scandinavian countries started 
non-pharmacological interventions to combat COVID-19. The next vertical lines are spaced at 14-
day intervals.  At each of these dates (i.e. dashed line) we estimate the difference-in-differences 
model using data 7 days before and 7 days after. The data illustrate our main point, formally shown 
in the DiD estimates below.  Prior to the NPI all countries were broadly similar. Post NPI COVID-
19 case fatalities in Denmark and Norway move broadly together, whereas deaths per million in 
Sweden rise sharply. 
 
 
12 Country N=3, Daily T= # of days in the event window. Therefore, degrees of freedom are used up rapidly 
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data.csv. Original data published by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). 
The first dashed vertical line is the date when countries are assumed to begin interventions.  The next lines 
are spaced at 14-day intervals.  At each of these dates (i.e. dashed line) we estimate the difference-in-
differences model using data 7 days before and 7 days after. See Table 3 below for results. 
 
 
Implicit in Figure 1 is that the change in the COVID-19 growth rate is lower in Denmark and 
Norway compared to that in Sweden. This means that the number of additional daily deaths is 
fewer in the lockdown treatment group.13  This result is confirmed in Figure 2 where a seven-day 












	so cumulative deaths are rising more slowly in the treatment group [T] 
relative to the control group [C].  
 
14 A seven-day moving average is calculated to smooth the data.  Deaths at time d(t)= !
)
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all three countries. The daily new deaths per million are consistently higher in Sweden relative to 
figures in Denmark and Norway.  Also, the rate of increase is higher for Sweden, with the peak in 
new deaths happening later in the nation than in Denmark and Norway.  
Figure 2: Scandinavian COVID-19 New Deaths per Million People 
Notes and data sources: A seven-day moving average is calculated to smooth the data.  Deaths at time 
d(t)= !
)
∑ 𝑑(𝑡 − 𝑖))*+,
Data source: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/owid/COVID-19-data/master/public/data/owid-covid-
data.csv. Original data published by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). 
The first dashed vertical line is the date when countries are assumed to begin interventions.  The next lines 
are spaced at 14-day intervals.  At each of these dates (i.e. dashed line) we estimate the difference-in-
differences model using data 7 days before and 7 days after. See Table 3 below for results. 
We also note that there can be a lag in Sweden’s reporting of deaths (Altmejd, 2020). The lag 
seems to be substantial for two weeks and nontrivial for three weeks. The reported and actual dates 
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this study reflected reported but not actual death dates. Part of the drop toward the end in Sweden’s 
death stats (Figure 2) may be due to such reporting effects. Overall, though, we contend that this 
does not change the main pattern of results. 
 
Table 3 shows the main results from estimating the difference-in-differences models. Bootstrap 
standard errors (50 reps) are reported.  The coefficient of interest is the Diff-in-diff in the first row. 
Column 1 shows the change in deaths per million people in Denmark and Norway relative to the 
change in deaths per million people in Sweden around the 15-day event window surrounding the 
18 March 2020.  The coefficient is not statistically significant, meaning that the policy introduction 
in Denmark and Norway had no immediate effect on deaths relative to Sweden.  This is likely due 
to lag effects.  
 
Columns (2) to (5) use different dates to mark the pre/post period.  These are set at 14-day intervals 
after the initial cutoff date of 3/18/20.  At each date we estimate the difference-in-differences 
model using a 15-day window from (t-7) to (t+7). The results show that the change in case fatality 
rates in Denmark and Norway is significantly lower compared to the change in case fatality rate 
in Sweden.  Estimates indicate that Denmark and Norway have 16 to 48 people per million fewer 
deaths in a 15-day window, relative to the control group of Sweden. Multiplying this number to 
the Swedish population of 10 million, non-strict lockdowns may result in 160 to 480 more deaths 
in Sweden every 15 days after the COVID-19 outbreak compared to its Scandinavian neighbors. 
The constant shows the mean in the control group of Sweden in the (7-day) pre-estimation period. 
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Table 3: Scandinavian COVID-19 Deaths per Million People: Difference-in-differences 
Estimates 










t = 18 March 
2020 
t = 1 April 
2020 
t = 15 April 
2020 
t = 29 April 
2020 
t = 13 May 
2020 
Diff-in-diff -0.00 -16.17*** -48.17*** -47.19*** -44.36***
(0.498) (5.660) (11.504) (11.211) (13.355)
Constant 0.20** 8.40*** 79.86*** 205.60*** 307.11***
(0.087) (1.520) (4.389) (7.264) (6.279) 
Observations 45 45 45 45 45 
R-squared 0.460 0.617 0.866 0.955 0.971 
Mean control t(0) 0.198 8.402 79.864 205.602 307.109 
Mean treated t(0) 0.117 6.181 29.733 51.643 63.758 
Difference at t(0) -0.081 -2.222 -50.132 -153.959 -243.350
Mean control t(1) 1.807 35.597 140.666 260.254 355.744
Mean treated t(1) 1.721 17.201 42.369 59.108 68.030
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Difference-in-differences estimates.  Dependent variable is deaths per million people.  Treatment 
group = Denmark/Norway. Control group = Sweden. Each column defines the break line for pre and post 
policy (i.e. accounting for lags).  Terms t(0) and t(1) refer to pre and post treatment respectively.  Models 
estimated using diff package in Stata 16. Bootstrap standard errors (50 reps) reported.  At each date t, the 
difference-in-differences model is estimated using data in the event window (t-7, t+7). 
4.1 Discussion 
The speed that COVID-19 has ravaged the global economy is unprecedented in modern times.  It 
is important to stress that our analysis is based on the limited data and time that we have had to 
probe one focused research hypothesis. However, the results must be seen in the light of a very 
fluid and fast changing set of events, that will likely throw more light on the claims raised in this 
paper.  We consider a few of these. 
First, the (inverse) welfare measure used in this paper is the cumulative deaths from COVID-19. 
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possibility of more infections in the community but also more antibody protection.  In the longer-
term, is the change in antibody protection in Sweden greater than the change in immunity in 
Denmark and Norway? And, if so, is it sufficient to create overall herd immunity? 
 
Second, our analysis is based on the currently available data (from March to May 2020).  What 
are the possible long-term effects when Denmark and Norway open up to Swedish levels? Will 
death rates in Denmark and Norway converge to Swedish levels? If so, lockdowns might still be 
justified to prevent bottle necks in the hospital system.  However, our estimates provide an 
assessment of the short-term impact of lockdowns. The long-term impact might differ because the 
COVID-19 virus could spread again once an economy is opened up (i.e. a ‘second wave’). In fact, 
the Swedish strategy is deliberately directed at the long term.   
 
The Economist (2020) addresses these points: “Sweden chose this path because it looked at the 
longer term, says Johan Giesecke, an epidemiologist advising the authorities. Full lockdowns are 
stop-gap measures, he says, and European governments rushed to put them in place without plans 
for what would replace them….Mr Giesecke reckons that Stockholm will reach “herd immunity”, 
the 40-60% rate of infection needed to halt the spread of the coronavirus, by June. He thinks that 
when European countries count deaths a year from now their figures will be similar, regardless 
of the measures taken and the numbers now. The economic damage in Sweden, however, may be 
smaller.” However, we note that the current situation is fluid and predictions of herd immunity 
have yet to be substantiated.  A recent study by the Swedish Public Health Authority (2020) 
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implies that herd immunity has yet to be achieved.  As the number of new cases decline over time, 
the challenges to reach herd immunity increase even more. 
Table 4: Projected GDP Growth in Scandinavia 







2018 2019 2020 2021 
Denmark 355 2.4 -5.9 5.1 
Norway 434 1.2 -6.1 5.0 
Total for Denmark and 
Norway 789 1.7 -6.0 5.0 
Sweden 554 1.2 -6.1 4.3 
Sources: European Commission (2020). SEB Group (2020). 
Third, there is a sharp trade-off between economic activity and positive health outcomes during 
the sample period.  Are there potential economic benefits from leaving the Swedish economy 
partially open?  Future research might want to model GDP growth to evaluate the GDP economic 
benefits (or costs) of the Scandinavian NPI strategy. As Anderson et. al. (2020) remark: 
“Governments will not be able to minimize both deaths from coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-
19) and the economic impact of viral spread.”  Table 4 shows that projected GDP growth rates in
Denmark, Norway and Sweden are very similar. In fact, GDP in Denmark and Norway is 
forecasted to fall slightly less than in Sweden in 2019 and to increase slightly more in 2021.  This 
does not indicate that lockdowns are associated with worse economic outcomes.  However, the 
Swedish economy grew slower already in 2019 and economic growth was forecasted to decline 
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the decline in economic activity would have been even worse if Sweden had instituted a strict 
lockdown.  
 
Fourth, deaths in several Asian economies including South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Singapore and 
China have been low.  The fewer deaths seem correlated to robust strategies for testing, tracing 
and isolation. Similar investments in Scandinavia might, therefore, mitigate the need for universal 
‘one-size-fits all’ lockdowns. Relatedly, comparisons with normal influenza show similar or lower 
COVID 19 death rates in people below 70 compared to a normal influenza (Statens Seruminstitut 
SSI, 2020), but much higher death rates in people above 70, which indicates that governments 
might want to focus on protecting the sick and elderly rather than locking down the whole 
population. 
 
The importance of lockdowns versus testing, tracing, and isolation is highlighted in Figure 3.  In 
contrast to the approach adopted in Scandinavian nations, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and 
other Asian economies used test, trace, isolate strategies more aggressively (perhaps due to 
historical experience with SARS).15 This has been far more successful in terms of lower average 
deaths during the pandemic.   Also, test, trace, and isolate have the capability of both keeping the 
number of total deaths low and keeping economies open. The strategy is seen as central to slow 
the spread of COVID-19 (World Economic Forum, 2020).  Finally, looking at a snapshot of 
 
15 Japan did relatively little testing but focused on contact tracking (New York Times 2020). Taiwan used 
aggressive contact tracing (The Guardian 2020). South Korea publicly disclosed detailed location 
information of individuals that tested positive for COVID-19 (Argente, Hsieh and Lee 2020). Singapore 
actually implemented a kind of lockdown through the so-called circuit breaker (stay-at-home) order 
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Worldometer data on 29 May 2020, we note that the death rates per million in Sweden (431), 
Denmark (98) and Norway (44) are still much higher than in Japan (7) and Singapore (4). 
 





Notes: Height of the bar is the average deaths per million in each location.  The date range is the 1 




Lastly, we remark on the interconnection between economics, politics and ethics. Strict non-
pharmacological interventions involve reduced travel, mobile phone tracking, shelter-in-place 
orders, or limitations on the number of people who can meet in person.  Such measures reduce 
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the same time strict NPIs buy time and potentially protect against the COVID-19 disease, 
especially for older and vulnerable people.16 Striking the optimal balance between competing 
societal welfare objectives is key.  Our paper has not accounted for the potentially very important 
costs associated with (temporarily) reduced freedoms (Mello and Wang, 2020, Thorp, 2020). 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigated the effect of lockdowns on COVID-19 deaths in Scandinavian countries.  
Denmark and Norway are assigned to a treatment group (lockdowns) and Sweden to the control 
(non-lockdowns).  Ex-ante the three economies are similar in terms of economics, healthcare 
capacity, trust and culture. This allows us to identify a causal lockdown effect on COVID-19 
deaths using difference-in-differences estimators.  We appreciate, though, that there are nuances 
across countries in their different responses to the coronavirus. 
 
The paper’s findings are as follows. First, around the announcement date of the pandemic (March 
13, 2020), the recorded number of COVID-19 cases and deaths were approximately the same in 
all three countries.  So, too, was the upward trend in total cases.  Second, the lockdown policy in 
the treatment group is associated with fewer total COVID-19 deaths in the estimation period 
relative to the control.  The number of deaths per million people is significantly lower in Denmark 
and Norway compared to Sweden. Denmark and Norway pursued a relatively hard lockdown 
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We would remark that research on the optimal response to the COVID-19 pandemic is ongoing. 
On 3 June 2020 Sweden’s chief epidemiologist Dr. Anders Tegnell underscored the complexity 
involved in maintaining an open society and economy as well as saving lives.  He conceded that 
Sweden’s response to the coronavirus had resulted in too many deaths and the policy could be 
improved given what has been learned (Sverigesradio, 2020). 
 
This paper has provided one piece of empirical evidence on how heterogeneity in interventions 
affects deaths in Scandinavia.  But it is only one piece of a very large jigsaw.  Before anyone can 
conclude that strict non-pharmacological interventions are a ‘success’, the other effects of NPIs 
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This paper derives a Model-Inferred DIStancing (MIDIS) measure 
using an extended version of the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-
Recovered-Deceased (SEIRD) framework. The paper argues that, 
when a disease has an incubation period, explicitly accounting for 
the exposed compartment is necessary in this class of epidemiological 
models. An important advantage of the proposed identification 
strategy lies in its ease to put into practice by other researchers 
because it employs a relatively simple model and readily available 
data. When MIDIS is taken to data, results exhibit cross-country and 
over-time heterogeneity in social distancing during the COVID-19 
pandemic. Furthermore, MIDIS is highly correlated with the mobility 
data, and it embeds both governmental and behavioral responses to 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, as an application, the paper uses 
MIDIS to explain output losses experienced during the pandemic, 
and there exists a robust positive correlation between the two|with 
sizable economic effects.
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1. Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has already enveloped the planet in its entirety and triggered a
wide range of containment or distancing measures in almost all parts of the world. These
measures have resulted in a serious economic downturn with the potential to dwarf the
Great Depression. As of June 1, 2020, the disease claimed nearly 375,000 lives, and the case
numbers reached more than 6 million worldwide with no vaccine or antiviral therapy in close
sight.
The only available instrument to slow down the rate of infection was and continues to be
social distancing, which can be loosely defined as a set of non-pharmaceutical interventions
(NPIs) to reduce person-to-person contact. These interventions can be taken by governments
or individuals and serve the objective of “flattening the epidemiological curve,” a plot of
the number of new cases per day. Theoretical reasoning suggests that the social return to
distancing exceeds its private return, thereby necessitating policy interventions (e.g., Bethune
and Korinek, 2020; Farboodi et al., 2020).
Social distancing to “flatten the curve” unequivocally creates a plethora of economic
shocks. But which countries have experienced the highest rates of increase in social dis-
tancing, and what is the extent of social distancing? These questions are imperative for
understanding what triggers economic tremors felt all over the world, yet we know remark-
ably little about social distancing that has the power of creating major economic downturns.
Why? Because, it belongs to a set of intrinsically latent variables which are typically well
understood but rarely rigorously defined (Kmenta, 1991). Unlike a proxy variable, an intrin-
sically latent variable is unobserved and never characterized by just one measurable factor.
Hence, it can only be inferred from other observable variables using formal (mathematical)
theory that provides identification restrictions.
This paper sheds light on these issues by developing a way of identifying unobserved
social distancing and aims to contribute to the vivid debate on “flattening the curve,” cross-
country heterogeneity in the effectiveness of governmental and behavioral responses, and
economic costs of the pandemic.
In the first part of the paper, we derive a Model-Inferred DIStancing (MIDIS) mea-
sure using an extended version of the workhorse Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered-
Deceased (SEIRD) framework.1 In the typical SEIRD model, there is a nonlinear dynamical
system that explains the spread and eventual containment of an infection over time. In this
paper, we extend the simple SEIRD model with a time-varying and country-dependent social
distancing term. The core idea of our paper is to identify this distancing term, MIDIS, for
each country and each day by exploiting the fact that the pure probability of transmission
and the average incubation period are constant and common across countries. The resulting
solution expresses MIDIS as a function of observable epidemiological data and thus provides
a model-inferred measure of a latent variable that can be tracked over time. An important
1 The model was originally proposed as a SIR model by Kermack and McKendrick (1927) and, later,
various extensions with stochastic specifications and more compartments were produced. We briefly
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advantage of our identification strategy lies in its ease to put into practice by other re-
searchers because it employs a relatively simple epidemiological model and readily available
data.
To the best of our knowledge, Fernández-Villaverde and Jones’s (2020) paper is the clos-
est one to ours with respect to identification. These authors also use a compartmental
model (the SIRD version) and daily epidemiological data, and their identification strategy
of recovering time-varying transmission rate using observables is similar to our identifica-
tion of distancing. However, there are four substantial differences. First and the foremost,
our model has the exposed compartment between the Susceptible and Infected compart-
ments whereas Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020) implicitly assume that the exposed
individuals are in the Susceptible compartment. Second, while both papers use the daily
epidemiological data on the numbers of deceased and recovered individuals, we use observed
data of country-dependent and time-varying recovery and fatality rates in identification. In
contrast, Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020) assign fixed and country-independent values
to several model parameters (but of course do so rigorously). Third, our approach exploits
the fact that the pure probability of transmission is fixed and common across countries and
thus identifies the unobserved distancing term directly for each country and day. Fernández-
Villaverde and Jones (2020), however, identify the effective transmission rate directly, and
they do not put an effort to differentiate the distancing term from pure probability of trans-
mission. Finally, our paper focuses on the identification, causes, and economic consequences
of distancing, but Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020) use their model and the recovered
sequences of time-varying transmission rates to understand the evolution of death rates and
the progression of the pandemic in the near future. We believe that explicitly accounting for
the exposed compartment is necessary since COVID-19 has a strictly positive average incu-
bation period. Besides, our approach of utilizing observed changes in recovery and fatality
rates allows us in understanding the evolution of distancing during the pandemic.
One advantage of our identification strategy is that MIDIS captures a wide range of social
distancing components. These include not only policy interventions (school/work closures,
bans on traveling and mass gatherings or stay-home orders) but also behavioral responses
such as fear, trust, or reciprocity which cannot be measured in a straightforward way. As
underlined by Toxvaerd (2020), modeling how people behave during a pandemic (under
the presence of distancing interventions) by exogenously given diffusion parameters is not
sufficient for the analysis of disease control. There exists an endogenous response of human
behavior to a highly contagious disease—embodied in every day social interactions—that
needs to be accounted for in epidemiological models.
While it would be the first-best to collect direct data on different components of social
distancing, this is hardly likely in practice due to severe data limitations. The data on policy
measures taken to curb the spread of the disease may not always be readily available for
a number of countries on a daily basis, let alone the daily data for behavioral responses.
MIDIS derived in this paper eschews this problem by providing researchers a measure that
is easy to construct. It can be useful not only for studying economic costs but also for other
applications that require a time-varying measure of social distancing.
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measurement errors in the observed data. For the latter problem, it is known that countries
are not equally successful in testing and tracking, and data manipulation by official bodies
in some countries could cause quantitative results to be misleading to some extent. For the
former issue, one of the most serious problems of SEIRD models is the weak identification
of model parameters (Avery et al., 2020). As Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020) have
underlined as well, different constellations of model parameters that have similar fits in
the short run—days to weeks—may imply significantly diverse outcomes in the long run—
months to years. Our imperfect remedy for this problem is to check the sensitivity of our
results, and we show that the evolution of MIDIS is considerably robust under alternative
parameter values. Another issue is parameter stability under the presence of policy changes
as underlined by Chang and Velasco (2020) with reference to the Lucas critique. Since we
do not pursue counterfactual policy analyses, parameter stability is not a central concern
for us. The last but not least, the simple models with homogeneous individuals inhabiting
a single society may be misleading because of (i) population heterogeneity in age structure,
exposure risk, and health status, (ii) the regional differences within a country, and (iii) spatial
linkages among the localities. However, currently available data do not allow us to pursue
such intriguing dimensions for the moment.
In the second part of the paper, we take MIDIS to the data compiled by Johns Hopkins
University (JHU, 2020) and compute it for 44 countries with a total number of confirmed
COVID-19 cases that exceeds 10,000 as of May 11, 2020. For the immediate 30-days in the
aftermath of the 500th case, our results show that countries exhibit considerable variation
with respect to initial social distancing levels. With the exceptions of the US and Spain,
countries start with an initial social distancing level that is larger than the Chinese bench-
mark. Furthermore, in a large number of countries, there is a minor decline of MIDIS within
the first week that is followed by a slow yet persistent increase later on. South Korea is the
country that sustains the highest average level of distancing, and the US is the least effective
country. That there is considerable cross-country variation in social distancing levels and the
South Korean success relative to the European countries are consistent with the SIR-based
empirical evidence presented by Chudik et al. (2020).
We, then, compare MIDIS values to the mobility data supplied by Apple and Google
that have now been used in the burgeoning COVID-19 literature—sometimes as a proxy
for social distancing.2 Our results indicate a highly significant negative correlation between
MIDIS values and different components of mobility. The advantage of MIDIS over the
mobility data is its wide coverage at country-day detail as long as the epidemiological basic
data are available.
In the third part of the paper, we try to identify the cross-country heterogeneity in MIDIS
that might be a result of differences in governmental response, behavioral response and a
plethora of country-specific factors. We argue that behavioral response to a pandemic is at
least as important—if not more—as governmental response in explaining the variation in
MIDIS across countries and time. As expected, our results show that our social distancing
2 See Alfaro et al. (2020), Coven and Gupta (2020), Durante et al. (2020), and Doganoglu and Ozdenoren
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measure varies positively with containment measures taken by governments and people’s
reaction to the pandemic in a robust manner. Indeed, the impact of behavioral response
measured by the numbers of deceased on the previous day is stronger than the impact
of containment measures. Almost all country-specific variables we use are unsuccessful in
explaining the variation in MIDIS. This last result may indicate that the virus—hence social
distancing—does not differentiate between developed or otherwise and can manifest itself in
unexpected ways compared to our conventional wisdom.
In the final part of the paper, we use our model-inferred social distancing measure to
study the economic costs of social distancing during a pandemic. While doing so, we stay
oblivious to supply or demand side dynamics of these economic costs and focus on their
outcome in terms of output loss only. Our daily measure of output loss is derived from the
peak-hour electricity consumption data, generously provided by McWilliams and Zachmann
(2020). Our results indicate a significant negative output response to social distancing during
the COVID-19 pandemic. In other words, in countries with higher levels of MIDIS, there is
a higher level of output loss in the 30-days following the 500th case. Indeed, a 10 percent
increase in social distancing causes up to a 3.7 percent increase in output loss.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
introduces the model and our identification strategy. Section 4 summarizes the main pat-
terns of distancing using the identified MIDIS values and validates MIDIS through mobility
data. Section 5 investigates the cross-country differences in MIDIS using various explanatory
variables. Section 6 then investigates whether and to what extent distancing during the pan-
demic is related with output losses. Section 7 concludes the paper with some final remarks.
We present the results of sensitivity analyses in Appendix A, and variable definitions, data
sources, and statistical summaries in Appendix B. Computer codes and MIDIS data can be
accessed at the MIDIS website.
2. Related Literature
There is now a large and growing literature studying various economic aspects of the COVID-
19 pandemic. As of May 31, 2020, there exist over 70 COVID-19-related research papers
documented by the NBER, all written in the last few months.3 There also exist other outlets
where researchers share their recent works on the COVID-19 pandemic. Covid Economics:
Vetted and Real-Time Papers, published by the Centre for Economic Policy Research since
March 2020, has now 24 completed issues containing dozens of papers on the COVID-19
pandemic.
Our purpose in this section is to present a discussion of the related literature by focusing
on the papers that are most directly related to ours. Compartmental models such as SIR,
SEIR, or SEIRD are useful tools in the mathematical study of infectious diseases. Originally
developed by Kermack and McKendrick (1927) in the form of SIR, the (stochastic versions
of) models with more compartments (e.g., with the Quarantined or the Hospitalized ones)
have been proposed to make the analysis more realistic (e.g., Chowell et al., 2003; Zhou
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et al., 2004; Lekone and Finkenstädt, 2006; Feng, 2007). Most recently, researchers esti-
mated such realistic versions with the Chinese COVID-19 data (Tang et al., 2020; He et al.,
2020). In this paper, we focus on the simplest version of a compartmental model that fits
our purposes. Hence, we build on a deterministic version that explicitly accounts for the ex-
posed compartment and extend it with time-varying and country-dependent (unobservable)
distancing.
Recent work by economists is related to our paper in two respects. First, several papers
embed a compartmental epidemiological model (within a dynamic equilibrium framework) to
tackle a diversity of research questions. Second, another set of papers empirically investigate
the causes and consequences of social distancing, identified or measured/proxied in one way
or another.
In the first strand where researchers use a version of a compartmental model, they gen-
erally focus on how governmental and behavioral responses affect the progression of the
pandemic through distancing. Other than Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020) that we
have discussed above, there is a large number of papers in this category, and we choose to
discuss only some of them for space considerations.
Building on the SIR model, Toxvaerd (2020) designs an optimal control problem at the
individual level to solve for daily equilibrium dynamics of social distancing. The model im-
plies that there exists an episode during which the number of infections does not increase
as a result of optimal behavioral responses. In a similar fashion, Cochrane (2020) shows
simulations of a SIR model where distancing behavior depends on the infection rate or the
increase in the death toll as people decrease their exposure under the presence of increasing
infection rates or deaths. Acemoglu et al. (2020) extend the SIR model with three age groups
that face different levels of mortality risks and show that targeted policies are more effective
than uniform policies in terms of both economic costs and health outcomes. Authors also
emphasize the sizable positive effects of group distancing that isolates the most vulnerable
from the rest of the society. Alvarez et al. (2020) also use the SIR model and study the
optimal control problem of lockdown policies. The optimal policy they find depends on the
fractions of susceptible and infected individuals, and it prescribes a severe initial lockdown
and a gradual withdrawal of it in months. Berger et al. (2020) extend a SEIR model with
incomplete information, testing, and quarantine policies. They find that targeted quaran-
tine policies with higher testing rates are effective in mitigating the adverse economic and
epidemiological effects. Eichenbaum et al. (2020) embeds the SIR model within a typical
dynamic macroeconomic model to study the effects of various policy responses. In their SIR-
macro model, individuals’ distancing decisions that decrease their consumption and labor
supply have positive health impacts but increase the size of economic downturn. Another
modeling exercise pursued by Kaplan et al. (2020) incorporates the SIR model within a New
Keynesian model with heterogeneous agents (HANK). Authors underline the differential im-
pact of the pandemic across different types of consumer goods and occupations, and they
also show that the ownership structure of liquid versus illiquid assets matters because the
group of individuals that are most exposed to economic risks have lowest liquidity.
Our paper benefits from this literature in motivating the roles of governmental and be-
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and behavioral responses drive effective distancing—have a strong theoretical basis. How-
ever, our approach differs from all these papers in two respects: First, a vast majority of the
papers ignore the role of the exposed compartment but realistic epidemiological studies of
the COVID-19 pandemic necessitates a S“E”IRD framework (He et al., 2020; Tang et al.,
2020). Second, instead of investigating whether a particular policy or behavior is optimal,
we remain agnostic about such a counterfactual question and assume that the observed epi-
demiological data reflect the decentralized equilibrium of distancing. The presumption that
the observed data must be consistent with a SEIRD model then allows for the identification
of distancing during the pandemic.
The second strand of literature we discuss here focuses more on the empirics of distancing
and disease progression, and more specifically on whether governmental and/or behavioral
responses are statistically associated with increased distancing and decreased mobility.
Chen and Qiu (2020) and Castex et al. (2020) investigate the role of governmental re-
sponses on the infection rates by recovering the daily infection rates from a SIR model. The
former paper designs different scenarios using NPIs for nine countries and shows that school
closures, mask wearing, and centralized quarantine measures are effective in reducing the
transmission rates. Authors also show that these three measures have quantitatively similar
effects when compared with a strict lockdown. The latter paper implements the analysis for
a large number of countries and finds that GDP per capita, population density, and surface
area decrease policy effectiveness.
Doganoglu and Ozdenoren (2020) investigate the role of trust and social norms on behav-
ioral responses to the pandemic. They first isolate the effects of (i) policy measures using the
Stringency Index of Hale et al. (2020), (ii) the number of infections, and (iii) the tempera-
ture on people’s mobility using the Google (2020) data. They then estimate the role of trust
on the country fixed effects that cannot be explained by policies, infections, and tempera-
ture. Their results indicate that, while policies and infections decrease mobility levels, trust
has a positive impact on mobility. Alfaro et al. (2020) also focus on behavioral responses
motivated by fear, altruism, and reciprocity, and they investigate the effects of both policy
measures and these traits. Their empirical results that utilize Apple (2020) mobility data
show that the effects of policy measures is less pronounced if people are more patient and
more altruistic and if they exhibit a lesser degree of negative reciprocity.
The empirical literature also shows that partisanship may be an important dimension in
guiding people’s distancing behavior. Painter and Qiu (2020) use geolocation data for the
US counties to show that people in Democratic counties are more responsive to policy inter-
ventions, and Engle et al. (2020) estimate that an official stay-at-home restriction decreases
mobility by more than 7 percent in the US. In a separate study (on the US counties), Brzezin-
ski et al. (2020) confirm that the effect is indeed close to 8 percent. In another interesting
paper related with partisanship effects, Argentieri Mariani et al. (2020) demonstrate—using
an event-study approach and regional variation of vote shares in Brazil—that the president’s
public disrespect for the recommendations of health authorities has increased the infection
rates.
Empirical studies demonstrate that policies are effective in reducing the infection rates
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ever, estimates also show that people respond to the pandemic by decreasing their mobility
to some extent even in the absence of policy interventions (Brzezinski et al., 2020). This
result (for the US) has also been supported by the mobility data of Google (2020) in a paper
by Maloney and Taskin (2020). These authors also estimate that the effect of voluntary
distancing is larger than that of policy interventions for a large number of countries.
Our empirical results are consistent with the main lessons of this literature, namely that
both governmental and behavioral responses are significantly associated with distancing and
mobility. We should also note that our approach is closer to those of Chen and Qiu (2020),
Castex et al. (2020), and Alfaro et al. (2020). Differently from the latter paper, we use
a distancing measure originating from an epidemiological model, and, contrary to the first
two of these papers, we explicitly account for the exposed individuals in identifying our
distancing measure, MIDIS.
3. A SEIRD Model with Distancing
We consider J countries indexed by j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}. The model time, denoted by t, is
discrete, and the length of a period is a day. For all countries, the model horizon is the
first 30 days after the 500th COVID-19 case is confirmed. Hence, time periods are not
synchronized across countries with respect to the calendar time.
The need to restrict our analysis to the period after the 500th case for each country
originates from the fact that the official COVID-19 statistics for China starts with 548 cases
on January 22, 2020. Furthermore, we choose to restrict the analysis to the first 30 days
after 500th case to disregard the effects of partial removal of NPIs.
3.1. Compartments and the Laws of Motion
Following Degue and Le Ny (2018), we study a deterministic version of the SEIRD model
where the size of each compartment is expressed as a fraction of population in each country.
In this model, susceptible (S) individuals transit to the exposed (E) compartment after being
infected, but they stay in the exposed compartment until they become infectious. Individuals
in the infected (I) compartment transmit the virus to susceptible individuals, and they either
recover (R) or die (D).
Importantly, we extend the basic model with a time-varying transmission rate that is































































































t , and D
j
t denote the fractions of susceptible, exposed (but not infectious),
infected (and infectious), recovered, and deceased individuals in country j on day t. By the
Law of Large Numbers, each denotes the probability that any given individual is in the









t = 1 (6)
for all j and t.
The fixed parameter β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the pure probability of transmission; it is the
probability that an infected individual transmits the virus to a susceptible individual if the
two get into contact. However, the probability of contact depends on effective (or de facto)
distancing, or MIDIS, denoted by djt ∈ [0, 1]. If both susceptible and infected individuals
utilize social distancing instructions, then the probability that a susceptible individual and







If a country can completely isolate susceptible and infected individuals with djt = 1, then no
individuals migrate from the susceptible to the exposed compartment. This is the quadratic,
one-parameter (µ), one-variable (dt) formulation that is now familiar in the related literature
(Acemoglu et al., 2020; Alvarez et al., 2020). However, the present formulation is slightly
different from those of Acemoglu et al. (2020) and Alvarez et al. (2020) since our model
features the exposed compartment as well. Here, µ > 0 allows us to identify djt for all
countries and all days within the unit interval.4
4 In both Acemoglu et al. (2020) and Alvarez et al. (2020), the effect of distancing is introduced via
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Another fixed parameter that is also common across countries is α ∈ (0, 1) that denotes
the inverse of the average incubation period of the virus in days. This parameter determines
the fraction of exposed individuals that migrate to the infected compartment on any day.
Finally, time-varying fractions of individuals in the infected compartment move to the
recovered and deceased compartments on any day. These fractions are denoted by γjR,t ∈
(0, 1) and γjD,t ∈ (0, 1), respectively. Figure 1 pictures the compartments and transitions
rates in the SEIRD model.
3.2. Identification
Our purpose is to use the above model and observed epidemiological data to achieve a
numerical identification of djt for all (j, t). The strategy builds on the notion that, while the
pure probability of transmission (β) and the inverse of the average incubation period (α)




t ). Hence, the
observed data and the model must be consistent with each other for some realization of djt .
In other words, we use the model and data to recover djt for any (j, t).
5
Since whether an infected individual recovers or dies does not matter for djt , we define




















































The unobserved state variable that is central to our identification strategy is the ratio of




t . Notice that (10) and (11) allow
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5 JHU (2020) shares daily data of cumulative confirmed cases (Cjt ) and the cumulative numbers of recov-
ered (Rjt ) and deceased (D
j
t ) individuals. We calculate the daily number of actively infected individuals
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Table 1: Confirmed Cases of COVID-19 as of May 11, 2020
Country Cases Country Cases Country Cases
USA 1,347,881 Netherlands 42,788 Poland 16,326
Spain 227,436 Saudi Arabia 41,014 Austria 15,882
United Kingdom 223,060 Mexico 36,327 Japan 15,847
Russia 221,344 Pakistan 32,081 Bangladesh 15,691
Italy 219,814 Switzerland 30,344 Ukraine 15,648
France 175,479 Chile 30,063 Romania 15,588
Germany 172,576 Ecuador 29,509 Indonesia 14,265
Brazil 169,594 Portugal 27,679 Colombia 11,613
Turkey 139,771 Sweden 26,670 Philippines 11,086
Iran 109,286 Belarus 23,906 South Korea 10,936
China 84,011 Singapore 23,822 South Africa 10,652
Canada 71,247 Qatar 23,623 Dominican Rep. 10,634
India 70,768 Ireland 23,135 Denmark 10,513
Peru 68,822 UAE 18,878 Serbia 10,176
Belgium 53,449 Israel 16,506
Source: JHU (2020)
Under the assumptions that fixed parameters are known and that djt takes values between 0








X,t) for all (j, t).
The model allows us to uniquely identify all of these inputs: (12) identifies γjX,t for all




t ). Then, (11) identifies e
j
t for all (j, t)
as a function of observed variables (Ijt+1, I
j
t ) and γ
j
X,t. Finally, (6) and (8) identify S
j
t as a
function of observed variables (Ijt , X
j
t ) and e
j
t .
4. MIDIS in Selected Countries
We apply our identification strategy to a set of countries that are most seriously affected
by the COVID-19 pandemic. At the first step, we select the countries with a total number
of confirmed COVID-19 cases that exceeds 10,000 as of May 11, 2020. The source of our
daily epidemiological data is the John Hopkins University’s COVID-19 data repository (JHU,
2020). The sample includes J = 44 countries listed in Table 1.
Next, we apply the Gaussian filter to smooth the original epidemiological data we obtain
from JHU (2020). Smoothing is a commonly followed approach in the related literature and
necessary for two related reasons: First, since the model we use is deterministic, it is not
suitable to capture the noise in the actual data sequences. Second, without smoothing, the
identified sequences of ejt and γ
j




Finally, we assign values to the fixed parameters of the model, i.e., (α, β, µ). For α,
we borrow the benchmark value from He et al. (2020) and Tang et al. (2020). Both of
these papers estimate stochastic versions of a multi-compartment epidemiological model
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taken as a benchmark value that corresponds to an average incubation period of 7 days.
The estimation results of He et al. (2020) additionally show that the pure probability β
of transmission is equal to β = 0.111 with a standard deviation of 0.0015; we adopt this
value for our benchmark results. Finally, for the scaling parameter µ, we adopt a value that
normalizes the initial value of effective distancing in China to dCHN0 = 0.5. The associated
value of µ satisfies µ = 0.2381.
MIDIS values identified using this strategy are not much sensitive to the imposed pa-
rameter values; the qualitative properties of MIDIS sequences are not altered for plausible
changes in parameters. We present a detailed analysis implemented with alternative param-
eter values in Appendix A.
In the remainder of this section, we present and discuss two figures. The first one pictures
the absolute values of MIDIS in each of the 44 countries in our sample whereas the second





for all (j, t). Here, we take the Chinese case as a benchmark for two related reasons: First, the
COVID-19 pandemic has started in China, and there is no better way to compare MIDIS
across countries. Second, and more importantly, the pandemic has nearly completed its
progression in China in the first half of May 2020. For instance, the smoothed sequence of
confirmed cases for China indicates that, for the week ending on May 11, 2020, the average
daily growth rate of confirmed cases is equal to 0.0001%.
Figure 2 shows that countries in our sample exhibit considerable variation with respect
to initial values and later evolution of MIDIS during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The first thing to note is that most countries with the exceptions of the US and Spain
start with an initial value that is larger than the Chinese benchmark of dCHN0 = 0.5. The
initial value of the US is nearly 10 percentage points lower than the Chinese level.
The countries that achieve the highest MIDIS values at t = 0 of their respective samples
include South Africa (0.83), Japan (0.82), Denmark (0.81), and Singapore (0.79). Initial
MIDIS values lie between 0.70 and 0.79 for 14 countries, and between 0.60 and 0.69 for 19
countries. Interestingly, for some of the European countries most seriously affected from the
COVID-19 pandemic, initial MIDIS values are less than 0.60. These countries are France
(0.596), United Kingdom (0.586), Turkey (0.563), and Germany (0.503).
Countries differ with respect to the evolution of MIDIS during the first 30 days after
the 500th case is confirmed. In some countries, MIDIS remains largely stable; these include





















































































































































































































































Figure 2: MIDIS: Absolute Values




















































































































































































































































Figure 3: MIDIS: Relative to China
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Table 2: MIDIS: Summary Statistics
Country init. val. avg. std. dev. max. min. acf(1)
South Africa 0.835 0.799 0.030 0.835 0.756 0.908
Japan 0.821 0.728 0.054 0.821 0.667 0.927
Denmark 0.813 0.767 0.040 0.847 0.715 0.879
Singapore 0.794 0.674 0.068 0.794 0.584 0.886
Dominican Rep. 0.768 0.784 0.037 0.837 0.735 0.951
Sweden 0.766 0.743 0.035 0.811 0.689 0.902
Qatar 0.762 0.703 0.027 0.762 0.657 0.804
Saudi Arabia 0.761 0.695 0.031 0.761 0.655 0.874
Pakistan 0.757 0.736 0.021 0.766 0.700 0.902
Colombia 0.755 0.770 0.026 0.804 0.727 0.944
Indonesia 0.746 0.747 0.040 0.823 0.692 0.919
Ecuador 0.746 0.725 0.026 0.791 0.688 0.748
Ukraine 0.740 0.745 0.054 0.864 0.679 0.890
Serbia 0.728 0.783 0.071 0.894 0.697 0.937
Mexico 0.726 0.662 0.018 0.726 0.633 0.681
Poland 0.718 0.763 0.062 0.849 0.680 0.946
Ireland 0.711 0.736 0.048 0.843 0.691 0.892
Romania 0.707 0.764 0.059 0.844 0.682 0.941
Chile 0.697 0.741 0.043 0.789 0.677 0.957
Philippines 0.694 0.798 0.063 0.862 0.690 0.923
Belarus 0.692 0.738 0.071 0.888 0.658 0.891
Bangladesh 0.690 0.781 0.092 0.930 0.673 0.925
UAE 0.678 0.736 0.058 0.817 0.653 0.936
Brazil 0.670 0.672 0.034 0.719 0.620 0.965
South Korea 0.669 0.852 0.103 0.958 0.669 0.924
Portugal 0.665 0.776 0.087 0.887 0.651 0.935
Israel 0.649 0.788 0.092 0.891 0.645 0.929
India 0.645 0.668 0.063 0.748 0.575 0.956
Netherlands 0.637 0.709 0.088 0.835 0.594 0.944
Belgium 0.635 0.680 0.091 0.812 0.562 0.947
Austria 0.633 0.785 0.119 0.926 0.615 0.940
Russia 0.633 0.628 0.060 0.739 0.553 0.925
Canada 0.623 0.693 0.073 0.787 0.585 0.944
Peru 0.622 0.596 0.082 0.696 0.464 0.946
Switzerland 0.620 0.753 0.104 0.889 0.604 0.934
Italy 0.602 0.628 0.104 0.811 0.511 0.931
Iran 0.600 0.667 0.046 0.751 0.594 0.879
France 0.596 0.635 0.072 0.740 0.548 0.946
United Kingdom 0.586 0.644 0.091 0.799 0.533 0.934
Turkey 0.563 0.696 0.105 0.857 0.557 0.925
Germany 0.503 0.637 0.122 0.830 0.482 0.929
China 0.500 0.725 0.169 1.000 0.500 0.916
Spain 0.499 0.628 0.128 0.831 0.475 0.931
USA 0.401 0.538 0.158 0.781 0.327 0.938
Notes: Authors’ calculations using the identification methodology explained in Section 3 and
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A pattern observed in a large number of countries features a (minor) decline of MIDIS
within the first week that is followed by a persistent (slow) increase later on. Austria, Bel-
gium, France, Germany, India, Italy, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Russia, Spain, Switzerland,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the US exhibit such a pattern. For the US,
the initial decrease in the first five days of the sample is the fastest. Hence, the US is not
only the country that records the lowest initial MIDIS value; on the fifth day in the sample,
the MIDIS value of the US converges to the minimum of the entire sample at 0.327. The
maximum MIDIS value for the fifth day is equal to 0.834 and observed in South Africa.
The evolution of MIDIS in countries that attain the highest initial values is notably
different. In Japan and South Africa, MIDIS keeps decreasing at a slow rate during the
entire sample period. In Denmark and Singapore, however, there is a clear U-shaped pattern
where MIDIS takes its lowest values around the middle of the 30-day period.
We observe the most distinguished pattern of MIDIS during the 30-day period in South
Korea. Starting at a moderately high value of 0.67, MIDIS in South Korea increases fast and
converges to over 0.90 on around the 15th day. In the second half of the episode, the country
sustains a high level of MIDIS. In that second half, the average MIDIS value in South Korea
is 0.93. The country also attains the highest full-sample average of 0.85 across 44 countries.
Table 2 presents a detailed account of MIDIS statistics for all countries.
Figure 3 pictures the evolution of MIDIS relative to China. Some interesting messages
follow from this figure as well. The common pattern is a persistent decrease below unity.
Decreases are more visible in countries with larger initial MIDIS values, as expected.
An interesting observation is that there is no country that records MIDIS values larger
than the Chinese levels for the entire sample. Hence, if China truly serves as a benchmark for
distancing, then no country in our sample of 44 countries sustain distancing more effectively
than China in the 30-day episode that follows the 500th confirmed case. The initial success
in distancing is not continued, and MIDIS values decreases below unity somewhere in the
second half of the 30-day episode.
The US, with an initial MIDIS value less than the Chinese benchmark, cannot forge
ahead China during the entire sample period. Put differently, relative MIDIS values for the
US remain lower than unity for all t. The situation is similar for Spain, Germany, Italy, Peru,
and the UK whose MIDIS values decrease below the Chinese level within the first week of
the sample. Hence, it is fair to state that several Western countries, most notably the US,
perform least effectively in terms of distancing during the sample period.
Before concluding this section, we investigate whether the daily mobility data from Apple
(2020) and Google (2020) validate our distancing measure MIDIS. In Table 3, we document
various regression results where MIDIS is the dependent variable and a mobility indicator
from Apple (2020) or Google (2020) is the independent variable. In these regressions, we
match the calendar dates for each country, and each row presents the results of a separate
regression. Clearly, the results we document here cannot be interpreted as a sign of a
causal mechanism because both the mobility indicators and MIDIS quantify the very same
phenomenon.
The results show that the mobility indicators are strongly correlated with MIDIS and
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Table 3: Validating MIDIS through the Mobility Data
Independent Var. Parameter Robust S.E. # of Countries # of Obs. R-squared
A-Driving -0.184*** 0.043 35 1,050 0.0778
A-Transit -0.203*** 0.041 18 540 0.0913
A-Walking -0.161*** 0.041 35 1,050 0.0810
G-RetailRecreation -0.180*** 0.039 40 1,200 0.0629
G-GroceryPharmacy -0.131*** 0.038 40 1,200 0.0535
G-Parks -0.058* 0.035 40 1,200 0.0020
G-TransitStations -0.221*** 0.046 40 1,200 0.0662
G-Workplace -0.198*** 0.046 40 1,200 0.0583
G-Residential 0.377*** 0.108 40 1,200 0.0349
Notes: The reported R-squared is the overall R-squared measure. Superscripts ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. See Table B.1 for variable
definitions and data sources.
dential places are positively associated with MIDIS (the last row), and all the other mobility
indicators that represent mobility in public places have a strong, inverse relationship with
MIDIS. Among the indicators from Apple (2020), we estimate the largest effect for transit
stations, and the magnitude of the estimated slope parameter is close to those we obtain
for the mobility indicators measured for transit stations and workplace indicators using the
Google (2020) data. In absolute value terms and for the nine indicators we focus on, we
estimate that the largest effect originates from the mobility in residential areas, and the
smallest one from mobility in parks.
5. Cross-Country Heterogeneity in MIDIS
To examine how our social distancing measure varies with a number of country characteristics
along governmental, behavioral, and developmental dimensions, we estimate the following
regression at the country-day level, (j, t), with each country being j and each day being t:6
MIDISj,t = φ0 + φ1Gj,t−1 + φ2Bj,t−1 + φ3Dj + εj,t (16)
Here, MIDISj,t is the social distancing measure we construct in this paper at (j, t) level. We
rescale this variable to vary between 0 and 100 in regressions. The next two variables are to
control for the effect of NPIs on MIDIS: Gj,t−1 is governmental response to the pandemic,
and Bj,t−1 is behavioral response to the pandemic by individuals. We use the lagged values
of these variables to account for the time-lapse in social distancing as a response to various
NPIs. Dj is a vector of country-specific indicators of comparative development.
First, the data for governmental response are from the Oxford COVID-19 Government
Response Tracker (OxCGRT), which collects information on a multitude of containment
6 We avoid using time fixed effects in (16) since they were already taken into account in the construction
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measures taken by 201 countries and territories around the globe.7 These measures are
school closures, workplace closures, cancellation of public events, bans on public transport,
domestic and international travel, government information campaigns, contact tracing and
extended testing. All but the last two are used to construct the COVID-19 Government
Response Stringency Index, which varies between 0 and 100. We use the lagged values of
this index, stringencyj,t−1, in (16) to proxy for governmental response to the COVID-19
pandemic, Gj,t−1.
Second, we use JHU (2020) epidemiological data components as proxies for behavioral
response to the pandemic. It would not be hard for anyone, who consciously experienced
the COVID-19 pandemic, to recall that they had to drop everything to get the news of
the numbers of infected, deceased, and recovered for the COVID-19 cases in their cities,
countries, and the world every day to prepare for the next day. In other words, people use
daily epidemiological data, particularly the numbers of infected or deceased individuals, that
headlined all types of news outlets to inform their behavior on the next day. Therefore, we
utilize the lagged values of infected and deceased people, infectedj,t−1 and deceasedj,t−1, to
explore the effect of behavioral response on social distancing.8 These variables are expressed
in thousands in (16).
Finally, we investigate how social distancing varies with a range of country characteris-
tics borrowed from the comparative development literature to understand the importance
of cross-country heterogeneity in geography as well as economic, social, and cultural devel-
opment (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 1997; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Alesina et al., 2003; Ashraf
and Galor, 2013). In particular, we use GDP per capita (loggdppcj), human capital index
(humancapj), social progress index (spij), ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ethnofracj),
and continent dummies. The definitions and data sources of all the variables used in the
regressions are compactly presented in Table B.1, and Table B.2 reports the summary statis-
tics.
Table 4 displays the regression results of different specifications of (16) by progressively
adding variables. Column (1) explores the impact of governmental response to the pandemic.
The variable stringencyj,t−1 has a significant positive impact on the level of social distancing.
As governments adopt more stringent containment measures, social distancing proliferates.
Indeed, a 1 point increase in stringency increases MIDIS by 1/3 of a point.
7 A detailed description of the data is provided by Hale et al. (2020) and the dataset is available at
https://covidtracker.bsg.ox.ac.uk.
8 As in Alfaro et al. (2020), we have also used variables such as “risk taking,” “patience,” “reciprocity,”
or “altruism” from the Global Preferences Survey of Falk et al. (2018) and Falk et al. (2016). However,
most probably due to very low variation in these variables for our sample of 44 counties, we could not
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Columns (2) and (3) explore behavioral responses only. The former uses the number of
people infected whereas the number of deceased due to the COVID19 is utilized in the latter.
Both have a positive and significant impact on the level of social distancing. While 1,000 more
infected people increases MIDIS by 0.25 points, 1,000 more deceased people increases MIDIS
by 3.9 points. Considering the much grimmer impact of the rise in the number of deaths,
it is natural to expect a higher behavioral effect from the number of deceased compared
to the number of infected. In the remaining specifications, we use deceasedj,t−1 to gauge
for the behavioral response; however, our results with infectedj,t−1 are qualitatively similar
and available upon request. Column (4) reports governmental and behavioral dimensions
together, and both parameters stay positive and significant.
In columns (5)-(8), we add the variables humancapj, spij, loggdppcj, and ethnofracj one
by one since these are highly correlated with each other as shown in Table B.3. Except for
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, none of these variables are significant in explaining MIDIS.
Very little cross-country variation in these variables in our 30-day sample with only 44
countries may be the culprit here. However, it may also indicate that the virus—hence
social distancing—does not differentiate between developed or otherwise and can manifest
itself in unexpected ways compared to our conventional wisdom. When we add continent
dummies in column (9), however, it is seen that while the level of social distancing in Europe
and North America is lower compared to Asia (the excluded category), it is higher in Sub-
Saharan Africa. This is in line with results discussed in Section 4.
Variables measuring governmental and behavioral responses to the COVID-19 pandemic
are robustly positive and significant in columns (5)-(9). The last specification reported in
the column (10) of Table 4 shows that, even when we use country fixed effects, the effects
of governmental and behavioral responses on MIDIS remain to be robust. As expected, the
fixed effects model returns a much higher R-squared value.
6. MIDIS and Output Loss
This section presents an application for the use of the social distancing measure, MIDIS,
constructed in this paper. We focus on the economic costs of social distancing triggered by
the COVID-19 pandemic.
Baldwin and Weder di Mauro (2020a) clearly explain the types of economic shocks cre-
ated by the COVID-19 pandemic that cause reduced economic activity. Among these, we
concentrate on output loss. Following these authors’ general guidelines, we can say that, on
the one hand, even with no response at all to the pandemic, there is output loss due to sick
people not being able to produce (a medical shock). On the other hand, social distancing
caused by governmental and behavioral responses to the pandemic creates distances between
workers and work as well as consumers and consumption, which results in further output
losses.
The link between output loss and social distancing can best be explained by the help of
a diagram that is now familiar to many. Figure 4 shows the epidemiological curves—bell
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Figure 4: Social Distancing, Epidemiological Curve and Output Loss
Source: Authors’ elaboration, inspired by Baldwin and Weder di Mauro’s (2020b) illustration
distancing in the top panel, and the corresponding output loss curves in the bottom panel.
Considering the fact that COVID-19 is an extremely infectious killer that causes higher
death rates when the patients are not well cared for, it is obvious that social distancing
does not directly save people from dying but saves their lives by preventing congestion in
healthcare facilities. So, the top panel of Figure 4 implies that COVID-19 kills many people,
but it kills less with social distancing. This is what is meant by “flattening the curve” by
epidemiologists. The bottom panel, however, illustrates that existence and/or stringency of
social distancing measures proliferates output losses during a pandemic (Gourinchas, 2020).
Even though in our subsequent analysis we choose to stay oblivious to the exact channels
of output loss during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is important to briefly mention them
here for the sake of argument. There are demand and supply side components of output
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a direct hit to aggregate demand components due to the medical shock as well as social
distancing and (ii) an expectation shock to consumption and investment due to wait-and-see
type delays by consumers and firms. The main channels of supply disruptions are (i) a direct
hit to aggregate supply through reduced production capability resulting from the medical
shock as well as social distancing and (ii) a supply-chain contagion as the disease jumps from
one country to the other against the background of internationally fragmented production
structure across the globe.
6.1. Proxying for Output Loss
Unlike epidemiological data, it is impossible to come by daily data for output, which makes
using a proxy instead a necessity. Therefore, we use the Bruegel Electricity Tracker (BET) of
COVID-19 Lockdown Effects compiled and calculated by McWilliams and Zachmann (2020)
to approximate output loss experienced during the pandemic based on the premise that much
economic activity heavily relies on the use of electricity. BET reports the temperature-
adjusted daily sums of peak-hour electricity consumption (08:00-18:00) as a measure of
economic activity owing to the intensity of economic activity within these hours. BET
sample spanned 20 countries9 between March 4-May 13, 2020 in the time of writing this
paper.10
Let relative output be the ratio of daily peak-hour electricity consumption in 2020 to







Here, we calculate relative output for country j on day t by aligning each week in 2020
with the corresponding week in 2019. In our analysis, we include only working days (ignoring
weekends and public holidays from our sample of 30 days for which MIDIS is calculated),
which leaves us with 20-22 days for each country.
Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of relative output (blue points) and MIDIS (black points)
in these 30 days along with a hypothetical red line that shows the case of no output loss by
crossing the vertical axis at the value of 100.
The first observation from Figure 5 is that, with the exceptions of Denmark, Japan, and
Sweden, all countries experienced a visible decline in their output levels relative to 2019. For
many countries in the sample, there is output loss either for the entirety or the majority of
the days considered. In Austria, India, Netherlands, Poland, and Switzerland, for instance,
relative output is less than 100 percent for all the days in their respective samples.
The closer inspection of Figure 5 also reveals that there might exist a scale effect from
MIDIS to relative output in the sense that output losses remain minuscule as long as MIDIS
remains sufficiently low. The cases of the US, Spain, Germany, and Italy—and of the UK to
9 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Por-
tugal, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the UK and the US.
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Figure 5: MIDIS and Relative Output
a lesser extent—suggest that countries that enter the 30-day episode with a MIDIS level less
than or very close to 50 percent do not face (sizable) drops in relative output. In all of these
countries, the decline of relative output seems to have required sufficiently large increases in
MIDIS after a particular date.
Figure 5 also shows that the relationship between MIDIS and relative output is not
uniform across countries and days. Some countries such as France, Italy, and Spain exemplify
the strong negative association, but the relationship turns out be less visible in some countries
after a particular date. For instance, in Austria, there seems to be a counterintuitively
positive association between relative output and MIDIS after the 10th day. The same is true
for Spain for the fourth quarter of the 30-day episode. In some countries, the continuing
increase in MIDIS within a particular episode is observed along with a trendless movement
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Table 5: MIDIS and Output Loss
Weekends Excluded Weekends & Holidays Excluded
MIDIS 0.233*** 0.372*** 0.342*** 0.219*** 0.358*** 0.366***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.061) (0.035) (0.037) (0.059)
Country FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared 0.072 0.535 0.590 0.066 0.578 0.638
# of Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20
# of Obs. 425 425 425 407 407 407
Notes: The reported R-squared is the adjusted R-squared measure. Superscripts ***, **, and
* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. See Table B.1 for variable
definitions and data sources.
50 percent to 80 percent but relative output fluctuates within the proximity of 80 percent.
We observe an example of non-uniformity from the other direction as well. In Ireland, the
trendless movement of MIDIS within the neighborhood of 70 percent for the entire episode is
accompanied by successive episodes of slow increase, slow decrease, stability, sharp decrease,
and sharp increase.
Overall, however, there exists a moderately strong, inverse relationship between MIDIS
and relative output. For each country, the correlation coefficient is negative. These correla-
tion coefficients range between −0.21 and −0.73, with an average of −0.36, and all of them
are statistically significant at 5 percent confidence level.
6.2. Estimation Results
To explore the relationship between social distancing and output loss, we estimate a very
basic regression specification at the country-day level, (j, t), with each country being j and
each day being t:
output lossj,t = φMIDISj,t + ηj + δt + εj,t (18)
where output lossj,t = 100 − relative outputj,t, and ηj and δt denote country and day fixed
effects, respectively. Here, φ can be interpreted as the social distancing elasticity of output
loss given that both MIDIS and output loss are expressed in percentages.
Table 5 reports the estimation results for (18) using different fixed effects structures. The
left panel is for the sample excluding weekends and the right panel for the sample excluding
both weekends and public holidays. The results indicate a robust positive impact of MIDIS
on output loss. In other words, an escalation in social distancing increases output loss.
Indeed, the social distancing elasticity of output loss vary between 0.22 and 0.37 depending
on the specification. Put it another way, a 10 percent increase in social distancing causes
2.2-3.7 percent increase in output loss, which is large in any account.
In short, the social distancing measure implied by the SEIRD model and daily epi-
demiological data explains output losses experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic in a























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
not identify the structural mechanisms, but the regression serves as a reduced-form device
that allows us to see the quantifiable output impact of distancing.11
7. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we make a first attempt to identify a social distancing term for each country
and each day within the framework of the SEIRD model to be able to construct a distancing
measure with minimum data requirements. This is critical in the context of the current
COVID-19 pandemic because until a vaccine or an effective antiviral treatment is developed,
policymakers as well as individuals will be in the midst of the tension between necessity and
tolerability of social distancing. On the one hand, there is a need to sufficiently contain
the spread of the disease through social distancing to prevent an overrun on the healthcare
facilities. On the other hand, it will be impossible to continue social distancing—either
through governmental or individual measures—indefinitely, since people’s livelihoods depend
on being able to work. As a result, to inform their decision making process, it would be
desirable for policymakers as well as individuals to have access to a relatively reliable and
robust distancing measure with a minimum requirement of high-frequency data. The social
distancing term we identify in this paper (MIDIS) may be a candidate for that role.
When we take MIDIS to data, our results successfully exhibit the cross-country and over-
time heterogeneity in social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic. We also show that
MIDIS is highly correlated with the mobility data, and it embeds both governmental and
behavioral responses to the pandemic. Furthermore, when we use MIDIS to explain output
losses experienced during the pandemic, we are able to show a robust positive correlation
between the two—with sizable economic effects.
In sum, we consider our paper as an initial attempt to improve the SEIRD model and a
contribution to the intense debate on the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. We expect our
qualitative results to be informative and useful. However, due to the highly stylized nature
of the underlying epidemiological model we use to construct MIDIS, we urge our readers to
interpret our quantitative results with care. Since the world governments are taking steps in
easing lockdown restrictions in the time of writing this paper, we can safely say that there
is much to change in the near future in regards to social distancing and its diverse effects on
the lives of people. Our hope is to continue this line of work to incorporate what we miss in
the current version and the new developments in the pandemic as they arise.
11 The strong relationship between distancing and output loss is expected to hold in the very short run,
e.g., a month, and it may weaken and be reversed in the longer run. This is because both the central-
ized/optimal distancing policies and decentralized/individual distancing practices are time-dependent—
changing daily—as demonstrated in the related literature (Bethune and Korinek, 2020; Farboodi et al.,
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Appendix A. MIDIS under Alternative Parameter Values
In this appendix, we investigate whether and to what extent the distancing measure MIDIS
we identify is sensitive to the parameter values adopted for the benchmark results. We
present results for China, South Korea, and the US for space considerations. We choose to
focus on South Korea and the US since these are the countries with the highest and lowest
average MIDIS values, respectively. The full set of sensitivity results are available upon
request.
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Figure A.1: MIDIS under Alternative (α, β) Values: µ is re-calibrated
Notes: This figure pictures the evolution of MIDIS for China, South Korea, and the US under
alternative values of α and β and with a re-calibrated value of µ in each case. For α, the
lower and higher values are 1/9 and 1/5, respectively. These correspond to 9 and 5 days of
incubation. For β, the lower and higher values are β − 2σ̂β = 0.1080 and β + 2σ̂β = 0.1140,
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Figure A.2: MIDIS under Alternative (α, β) Values: µ is not re-calibrated
Notes: This figure pictures the evolution of MIDIS for China, South Korea, and the US under
alternative values of α and β. For α, the lower and higher values are 1/9 and 1/5, respectively.
These correspond to 9 and 5 days of incubation. For β, the lower and higher values are
β− 2σ̂β = 0.1080 and β+ 2σ̂β = 0.1140, respectively, where β = 0.111 is the benchmark value,
and σ̂β = 0.0015 is the standard error, both being estimated by He et al. (2020).
Recall that the model has three parameters; β as the pure probability of transmission,
α as the inverse of average incubation period, and µ as a free parameter that we adjust by
normalizing the initial MIDIS value of China to dCHN0 = 0.5. The benchmark values of these
parameters are β = 0.111, α = 1/7, and µ = 0.2381.
For all the scenarios we consider here, we set lower and higher values for both α and
β. For the former, the lower value is characterized by 9 days of incubation, and the higher
value by 5 days. For the latter, we use the standard error estimated by He et al. (2020)
in assigning the lower and higher values to β. Specifically, with the estimated benchmark
value of β = 0.111 and the estimated standard error of σ̂β = 0.0015, we assign the lower and
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and β + 2σ̂β = 0.1140.



























Figure A.3: MIDIS under Alternative dCHN0 Values
Notes: This figure pictures the evolution of MIDIS for China, South Korea, and the US under
alternative values of the normalized initial value for China, i.e., dCHN0 = 0.5. Hence, the figure
re-calibrates µ for each of the cases. For dCHN0 = 0.4, the re-calibrated value is µ = 0.2857,
and, for dCHN0 = 0.6, it is equal to µ = 0.1904.
In the first stage of the sensitivity analysis, we run the algorithm for four different sce-
narios:
• α = 1/9 and β = 0.1080
• α = 1/5 and β = 0.1080
• α = 1/9 and β = 0.1140
• α = 1/5 and β = 0.1140
Figures A.1 and A.2 picture the results of these scenarios under two sub-scenarios. In the
former, we re-calibrate µ to normalize the initial MIDIS value of China to dCHN0 = 0.5 as in
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and µ4 = 0.2650, respectively. In Figure A.2, however, we allow d
CHN
0 to be different from
0.5 by keeping µ at its benchmark value of µ = 0.2381.
Both figures show that the evolution of MIDIS is not much sensitive to the changes in
parameter values. In fact, when we re-calibrate µ, this sterilizes the effect of changes in β,
and only the value of α matter for the evolution of MIDIS.
Inspecting Figure A.2 also reveals that the separate effects of α and β on the magnitude
of MIDIS for any t are closer to each other in size, but the effect of α is slightly larger.
In the second stage of sensitivity analysis, we investigate whether the normalized MIDIS
value for China at t = 0 has an effect on the identified MIDIS sequences. In this exercise, we
keep α and β at their benchmark levels, but change the target level of dCHN0 and re-calibrate
µ. The resulting values of µ for dCHN0 = 0.4 and d
CHN
0 = 0.6 are µ5 = 0.2857 and µ6 = 0.1904,
respectively.
Figure A.3 pictures the associated MIDIS values along with the benchmark sequence.
Once again, the evolution of MIDIS for the selected countries are qualitatively similar with
that of the benchmark. For the three countries considered here, effects are symmetric with
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Appendix B. Statistical Appendix
Table B.1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Variable Definition
Source
stringency Stringency Index, score, (0-100)
a composite of various government responses
Source: Hale et al. (2020)
infected Total number of confirmed COVID-19 cases
deceased Total number of individuals deceased because of COVID-19
in 1,000s
Source: JHU (2020)
humancap Human Capital per person, indexed, 2017 values
based on years of schooling & returns to education
Source: Feenstra et al. (2015)
spi Social Progress Index, score, (0-100)
based on more than 50 development indicators
Source: SPI (2019)
gdppc GDP per capita, 2018 values
purchasing power parity, constant 2017 international dollars
Source: World Bank (2020)
ethnofrac Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization, score, (0-100)
probability that two randomly drawn individuals within
a country are not from the same ethnic group
Source: Drazanova (2019)
A-Driving Map requests for driving route directions (relative to Jan 13, 2020, %)
A-Transit Map requests for transit directions (relative to Jan 13, 2020, %)
A-Walking Map requests for walking route directions (relative to Jan 13, 2020, %)
Source: Apple (2020)
G-RetailRecreation Mobility trends for places like restaurants, cafes, shopping centers,
theme parks, museums, libraries, and movie theaters
(relative to Jan 3-Feb 6, 2020, %)
G-GroceryPharmacy Mobility trends for places like grocery markets, food warehouses, farmers
markets, specialty food shops, drug stores, and pharmacies
(relative to Jan 3-Feb 6, 2020, %)
G-Parks Mobility trends for places like local parks, national parks, public beaches,
marinas, dog parks, plazas, and public gardens
(relative to Jan 3-Feb 6, 2020, %)
G-TransitStations Mobility trends for places like public transport hubs such as subway,
bus, and train stations
(relative to Jan 3-Feb 6, 2020, %)
G-Workplace Mobility trends for places of work
(relative to Jan 3-Feb 6, 2020, %)
G-Residential Mobility trends for places of residence
(relative to Jan 3-Feb 6, 2020, %)
Source: Google (2020)
Relative Output Peak-hour daily electricity consumption in 2020
(relative to 2019 values, %, excluding weekends and holidays)
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Table B.2: Summary Statistics
Variable # of Obs. # of Countries mean std. dev. min max
MIDIS (%) 1,320 44 71.62 9.97 32.69 100.00
stringency 1,290 43 78.75 17.32 14.29 97.14
infected (in 1,000s) 1,320 44 11.98 26.65 0.50 366.32
deceased (in 1,000s) 1,320 44 0.51 1.46 0.00 13.89
humancap 1,290 43 3.05 0.52 1.77 3.97
spi 1,320 44 76.39 11.31 49.18 89.97
gdppc 1,320 44 35,776.08 23,690.32 4,441.42 96,477.22
ethnofrac 1,320 44 45.02 24.54 1.90 95.80
europe 1,320 44 0.43 0.49 0 1
northamerica 1,320 44 0.05 0.21 0 1
latinamerica 1,320 44 0.16 0.36 0 1
ssafrica 1,320 44 0.02 0.15 0 1
A-Driving 1,050 35 46.17 24.41 9.82 161.59
A-Transit 540 18 36.06 29.04 7.04 155.51
A-Walking 1,050 35 41.84 24.46 5.82 178.42
G-RetailRecreation 1,320 44 47.40 28.62 3.00 117.00
G-GroceryPharmacy 1,320 44 74.13 24.48 3.00 146.00
G-Parks 1,320 44 70.67 37.63 9.00 288.00
G-TransitStations 1,320 44 46.08 26.28 5.00 108.00
G-Workplace 1,320 44 57.12 24.42 8.00 104.00
G-Residential 1,320 44 119.42 11.20 98.00 153.00
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We nowcast the economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and related 
lockdown measures in the UK and then analyse the distributional 
and budgetary effects of the estimated individual income shocks, 
distinguishing between the effects of automatic stabilisers and those 
of the emergency policy responses. Under conservative assumptions 
about the exit strategy and recovery phase, we predict that the rescue 
package will increase the cost of the crisis for the public budget by an 
additional £26 billion, totalling over £60 billion. However, it will 
allow to contain the reduction in the average household disposable 
income to 1 percentage point, and will reduce poverty rate by 1.1 
percentage points (at a constant poverty line), with respect to the pre-
Covid situation. We also show that this progressive effect is due to 
the increased generosity of Universal Credit, which accounts for only 
20% of the cost of the rescue package.
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1. Introduction  
The objective of this paper is to nowcast the effects of the Covid-19 lock-down on the UK economy, in 
terms of lost income, budgetary impact, and distributional consequences. 
On Monday March 23, 2020, the UK Government followed a long list of countries and enforced drastic 
lock-down measures to limit and delay the spread of Covid-19. These included home confinement but 
for a limited list of exceptions, bans of public gatherings of more than two people, and closure of all 
retailers selling non-essential goods (essential shops include food retailers, pharmacies, hardware stores, 
corner shops, petrol stations, shops in hospital, post offices, banks, newsagents, laundrettes and pet 
shops). Schools were ordered to close a few days before, taking effect on that same Monday. The first 
phase of strict lock-down continued until May 13, when the Government allowed workers unable to 
work from home to return to their workplace provided social distancing was ensured at work, among 
other measures (HM Government, 2020). 
There are no doubts that the effects of this forced breaks imposed on the economy, for the UK as well 
for the other countries following similar trajectories will be massive. Expert forecasts – reviewed in 
Hughes et al. (2020) – vary around a central estimate of around 2% GDP loss for each month of strict 
lock-down (see also OECD, 2020). The Office for Budget Responsibility’s own forecasts lie on the 
pessimistic side, with a projected drop in the second quarter GDP of 35%, for a three-month lock-down 
(OBR, 2020).  
In order to cushion the effects of the lock-down, the Government has introduced emergency income-
support measures. These include a Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, covering 80% of the wage costs 
of furloughed employees up to a maximum of £2,500 a month, a Self-Employment Income Support 
Scheme, allowing to claim a taxable grant worth 80% of trading profits up to a maximum of £2,500 a 
month, plus modified conditions for Universal Credit and Local Housing Allowance, among other 
auxiliary measures. The furlough scheme was extended at the end of the first phase of the lock-down 
until the end of October, with part-time working allowed from August.  
The OBR forecasts that the impact of reduced economic activity and increased spending on the public 
budget will amount to around £220 billion (OBR, 2020), or 12% of GDP, split between £130 billion of 
lower receipts (a reduction of 15% with respect to the Budget), and almost £90 billion of increased 
spending (+9% with respect to the budget).  
In this paper we go beyond these aggregate estimates, characterise the groups most affected by the lock-
down, identify who benefits from the emergency support measures and by how much, and the 
consequences in terms of poverty and the government budget. We do this by using UKMOD, the 
EUROMOD-based tax-benefit model for the four UK nations developed at ISER, University of Essex.1 
Tax-benefit microsimulation models apply the fiscal legislation to an observed input population, 
typically coming from survey data (the Family Resource Survey for UKMOD). The most recent input 
data for UKMOD is for the financial year 2017/18. To model the effects of the lockdown, these data 
need to be updated. Lacking timely data on sectoral activity and employment, we employ an input-
output (IO) model based on the supply-use tables published by the Office for National Statistics and 
referring to 2016, parameterised with the results of a consensus analysis of the opinions of a large 
number of UK-based economists. We allow the lock-down measures to impact final demand by sector, 
and also model supply-side constraints originating from the government guidelines. An important result 
from our IO model is that 75% of the effect originates from demand-side constraints originating from 
restrictions preventing final consumers from physically visiting sellers in lock-down, reduction in the 
demand from importers, or difficulties to get the goods and services through the border. Supply-side 
constraints, due to social distancing and smart working measures reducing the output of intermediate 
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goods and services, which producers sell to other producers, account for only 25% of the overall macro 
effect of the crisis according to our estimates.  
Overall, our baseline scenario predicts a loss of 7.3 million jobs (22.3% of the total), once the economy 
is in the lock-down equilibrium. This is in line with other forecasts indicating a contraction of 25% of 
GDP approximately after a two-month lock-down (e.g. Pichler et al., 2020). In our analysis we assume 
that the economy rapidly adjusts downwards to the Covid-19 shock, consistently with the preliminary 
evidence available. We also assume that the first phase of the crisis lasts for 2 months, followed by a 
further two months where the shock is reduced to 50%, and another four months where the shock is 
reduced to 25%. After that, we make the conservative assumption –in terms of the estimated impact of 
the crisis– that the economy goes back to the previous equilibrium.  
The IO model allows us to differentiate the employment effects of the lock-down by industry. To 
distribute the income shock to workers within industries, we estimate individual relative probabilities 
of transitioning from employment to non-employment, on LFS data. We then analyse the effects of the 
estimated individual income shocks with UKMOD.  
We show that the rescue package will add a net £26 billion bill to the £35 billion cost that the crisis 
would have entailed for the public budget, totalling £61 billion. However, it will allow to contain the 
reduction in the average household disposable income to 1 percentage point, and will reduce poverty 
rate by 1.1 percentage points (at a constant poverty line), with respect to the pre-Covid situation. We 
also show that this progressive effect is due to the increased generosity of Universal Credit, which 
accounts for around one fifth of the cost of the rescue package. 
In our analysis we assume that there are no behavioural responses to the income shocks, with respect to 
labour supply behaviour. This is of course a simplification, which however is probably less dramatic 
than one would expect given the size of the shocks. This is because the crisis unfolded very rapidly and 
the emergency measures caught the economy entirely by surprise, being unconceivable just a few weeks 
before they were implemented. Moreover, they are coercive in nature and left very limited room for 
individual adjustment. Finally, they are generally understood to be limited in time. Hence, we argue 
that behavioural responses can be largely ignored, at least during the acute phase of the crisis.  
Our paper belongs to a growing number of exercises trying to understand the distributional 
consequences of Covid-19.2 Other contributions include Figari and Fiorio (2020), who perform the 
analysis on Italy, Beirne et al. (2020) for Ireland, O’Donoghue et al. (2020) also for Ireland, and we are 
aware of ongoing work in other countries. Figari and Fiorio use a legislation-based approach to identify 
what occupations should be affected by the regulation. Beirne and co-authors consider arbitrary 
employment scenarios. O’Donoghue et al. also start from a scenario analysis for sectoral shocks, and 
then distribute these shocks based on an income generation model.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our dynamic IO model. Section 3 
presents our parameterisation and quantification of the macroeconomic shock for the UK. Section 4 
discusses the estimation of the employment transition model. Section 5 applies UKMOD and derives 
our main results. Section 6 summarises and concludes. 
 
2. The macro model 
Attempts to predict the macro-effects of the lockdown are more numerous than those looking at 
distributional consequences. Most exercises rely on aggregate macro models (e.g. Eichenbaum et al., 
2020), with fewer making use of input-output (IO) models, often also fairly aggregated (e.g. to two 
sectors as in Bodenstein et al., 2020). IO models are typically of the Leontief (1936) or Gosh (1958) 
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type. In the Leontief model, output depends on final demand, and a shock to demand for one sector 
reverberates its effects upwards in the production process through sectoral interdependencies. In the 
Gosh model, output depends on value added, and a shock to productivity in one sector reverberates its 
effects downwards in the production process through sectoral interdependencies.3 
In both cases, standard applications assume that no substitution among inputs is possible in the 
production of any good or service (Christ, 1955): production is then scaled up or down to meet final 
demand or supply constraints using the same optimal production plan, with a fixed mix of inputs in 
nominal terms.  
Applications of the Leontief model to disaster impact assessment have led to the so-called Inoperability 
IO model, which follows a very similar logic (Dietzenbacher and Miller, 2015). The Inoperability model 
assumes that, when an entire sector or sub-sector is shut down or drastically impacted, the demand for 
that sector is picked up by imports. As such, the assumption that there is only one process used for the 
production of each output is maintained.4 An alternative to assuming perfect substitutability between 
domestic intermediate inputs and imports is to consider a Cobb-Douglas specification with constant 
returns to scale both for production functions (supply side) and utility functions (demand side), as in 
Acemoglu et al. (2016).5 This assumption ensures that income and substitution effects exactly offset 
each other, and the optimal mixes of intermediate inputs and final demand depend only on technological 
and utility parameters respectively, and not on prices nor quantities. Acemoglu et al. show that, under 
those assumptions, demand shocks are only propagated upwards and supply shocks only propagated 
downwards. 
Both approaches allow in principle for contemporaneous demand and supply shocks, but are not 
particularly well suited for analysing the disruptions caused by Covid-19. Starting from the 
Inoperability model, the assumption that imports can compensate for shortfalls of intermediate inputs 
looks unsatisfactory, given that imports are also affected, either by lock-down measures in the 
producing countries or by trade restrictions.  The Cobb-Douglas assumption is also problematic in the 
Covid context, as it implies constant expenditure shares. This means, for instance, that if a company 
routinely uses low fare airlines to allow its managers to visit production facilities, and airlines cease to 
operate, it will hire a private plane to allow at least some managers to visit some plants, some of the 
time, so that the proportion of the budget that goes to travelling remains unchanged. This seems 
implausible in the current circumstances. 
Most contributions trying to predict the effects of Covid-19 on the economy follow the standard IO 
literature without optimisation. They typically deal with the problem of reconciling demand and supply 
shocks by computing the effects of the two shocks separately, and then considering the biggest of the 
two. This is for instance the approach of del Rio-Chanona et al. (2020), who construct their own measure 
of supply shocks for the US based on detailed occupation-specific considerations, while taking the 
Congressional Budget Office scenarios for the demand shocks.6 Dorn et al. (2020) supposedly follow a 
similar approach in providing growth estimates for Germany, although they do not fully describe their 
 
3 The dual nature of the demand-driven Leontief model and the supply-driven Gosh model and their mathematical 
equivalence between the Leontief and Gosh model has been proposed (Dietzenbacher, 1997) and, while debated 
(de Mesnard, 2009), is generally accepted in the literature (see also Manresa and Sancho, 2019).  
4 Again, the implicit assumption that prices do not change or that they are perfectly offset by changes in quantity 
is made. 
5 To be noted, Acemoglu et al. do not estimate production function and utility parameters, but rather use their 
theoretical framework to inform a reduced form econometric specification, estimated using past shocks (variation 
from the exogenous components of imports from China, changes in federal government spending, total factor 
productivity shocks and variation in foreign-industry patents). 
6 The OECD (2020) works out its scenarios in an even simpler manner, by either looking at supply shocks (i.e. 
reductions in production) or demand shocks (i.e. reductions in sales), without working out their effects throughout 
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methods. On the other hand, Pichler et al. (2020) allow for a reorganisation of production plans by 
adopting a hybrid Leontief + linear production function, where they distinguish between essential and 
non-essential inputs in production based on ad-hoc survey of market analysts. They also allow 
substitutability in household final demand by estimating consumption functions. Here we develop an 
IO model that – although less sophisticated than Pichler et al. (2020), also considers the joint effects of 
demand side and supply side shocks. Interestingly, we get to similar results in terms of the 
macroeconomic effects of the crisis. 
Let 𝑦 = [𝑦𝑖] be the total output of each industry, 𝑍 = [𝑧𝑖,𝑗] the matrix of intermediary inputs supplied 
by industry i to industry j, and 𝑓 = [𝑓𝑖] the final demand for each industry. We have 
𝑦 = 𝑍 + 𝑓, (1) 
 
where y is supply (production), and Z + f is demand (sales). Inventories (included in the final demand) 
guarantee that the accounting identity production = sales holds, from which we obtain the familiar 
expression 
𝑍 = 𝐴𝑦 (2) 
where A is a matrix of technical coefficients, assumed to remain constant. In a standard IO approach, a 
change in the final demand Δ𝑓 is transmitted upwards and leads to a change in total production equal 
to  
Δ𝑦 = (1 − 𝐴)−1Δ𝑓, (2) 
 
while a change in production of Δ𝑦 is transmitted downwards and leads to a change in final demand 
equal to  
Δ𝑓 = (1 − 𝐴)Δ𝑦. (2’) 
 
There is however no way to allow contemporaneous demand and supply shocks to all industries. The 
fundamental problem is that if the equation demand = supply is to hold, one of the three terms A, y or f 
needs to be endogenously determined. We solve this problem by allowing A to change endogenously. 
Ideally, this could be rationalised under the assumption of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
production functions, to be separately estimated by sectors. CES production functions nest the three 
cases of Leontief (no substitutability), Cobb-Douglas (constant shares) and linear production functions 
(full substitutability). However, CES production functions are not simple to estimate on UK data, and 
estimates for many sectors do not converge (Richiardi and Valenzuela, 2020). We therefore proceed by 
making the extreme assumption of full substitutability. While this assumption might work for some 
inputs, that are dependable at least in the short term (think of air travels), it is clearly inadequate for 
others, which are essential in the production process (for instance, iron ore for metalwork). We defend 
it with two arguments: first, Covid-19 restrictions mostly involve the production and consumption of 
non-essential goods and services; second, our approach puts us on the safe side, by providing a lower 
bound of the estimated effect of the lock-down on the UK economy. 
Our modelling assumptions are best described in dynamic terms. We assume a linear production 
function in intermediate inputs z, imports m and labour l: 
𝑦𝑖
𝑆 = ∑ 𝑧𝑗,𝑖
𝐽
𝑗=1 +𝑚𝑖 + 𝑙𝑖. (3) 
Production is sold to other industries and final customers (including households, government, foreign 
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𝑦𝑖
𝐷 = ∑ 𝑧𝑖,𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝑓𝑖. (3) 
 
Because of the disruptions caused by Covid-19, final demand is reduced to 𝑓?̂? = 𝛼𝑖𝑓𝑖.7  We assume that 
in a first period production plans are potentially affected by disruptions in supply, but otherwise 
continue unchanged even in the face of reduced final demand. Disruptions in supply, due to either an 
inability of firms to buy all the intermediate inputs originally planned, or to a diminished productivity 
of labour, reduce production to ?̂?𝑖
𝑆 = 𝛽𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑆. In absence of supply-side constraints, a reduction in final 
demand leads to over-production, which goes to inventories.8 On the other hand, in absence of demand 
effects, a reduction in supply leads to under-production. We make the assumption that intermediate 
customers are served first, so that under-production leads to a reduction in sales to final customers. 
Now, the subsequent dynamics is very different depending on whether there is over- or under-
production in any given industry. In the first case, production is reduced to bring it in line with sales, 
meaning that the demand of all intermediate inputs is proportionally and uniformly reduced. This 
triggers further effects, as it worsen supply constraints in industries that are net buyers from industry i, 
and worsen demand constraints in industries that are net sellers to industry i. 
Note that the symmetry between demand and supply shocks is broken because production is not allowed 
to expand in presence of supply-side constraints. Note also that supply-side constraints interact with 
final demand constraints by making the adjustment faster: if supply is reduced at the same time when 
demand is reduced, the economy remains closer to an equilibrium, although at a lower level of activity. 
Finally, our model maintains the original input mix as far as demand shocks are considered. It’s only 
supply shocks that affect the composition of intermediary inputs.   
 
3. Scenario assumptions and the size of the employment shocks 
Equipped with our dynamic IO model, we need scenario parameters for the supply and demand shocks. 
We get these from a consensus analysis of an ad-hoc survey of 2,644 economists with UK affiliations 
and complete personal profiles in RePEc, realised between April 24 and May 1, 2020. The questionnaire 
asked for the expected change, at the industry level, in (i) household demand (which we assumed 
representative of all final demand with the exclusion for the demand for exports), (ii) supply of 
intermediate goods and services, and (iii) exports. Final demand is affected because consumers face 
limitations to buy certain goods or services. For instance, in strict lock-down beers can be ordered take-
away from the local pub, and cars can be bought online without visiting a dealer, but fewer people are 
doing this. Supply is constrained due to the social distancing measures that producers have to put in 
place, or because productivity goes down due to working from home arrangements. In some sectors, 
distinguishing between reduction in demand and reduction in supply is difficult. This is particularly true 
for services requiring a personal contact: for instance, consumers can’t buy a haircut in lock-down, 
while hairdressers cannot sell it. The distinction is more meaningful in manufacturing, wherever social 
distancing can be achieved in factories. Our approach is more sophisticated than some other early 
attempts to model the macro effects of the Covid-19 lockdown, but still disregards to a large extent 
substitution effects by households and producers. As discussed above for labour supply, we motivate 
this simplifying assumption with the consideration that the shock was large, exogenous, unexpected, 
and likely of short duration (a few months), hence limiting the opportunities for reorganizing production 
and consumption plans. 
 
7 We assume that in a first period intermediate demand remains unchanged. Relaxing this assumption poses no 
problems (but also makes very little difference to our empirical results). 
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Filling in scenario assumptions on all the three dimensions cited above for the 64 industries used by the 
IO tables provided by the Office for National Statistics would have required asking for 192 different 
values. We have therefore opted for selecting key industries only: 23 industries most relevant for 
household demand, and 11 industries most relevant for exports and intermediate inputs (Appendix 1, 
Table A1). This brought down the number of industries on which the respondents were asked to focus 
to 34, and the single values on which they were asked for an opinion to 45. We obtained a 378 valid 
responses, for a response rate of 14.3%. Removing surveys in which no questions were answered and 
surveys in which respondents did not consent to the study, we obtain a sample of 257 responses with 
81% of complete responses (208 completed surveys and 49 partially completed surveys).9 The 
distribution of the responses are reported in Appendix 1, Figures A1-A3. 
We then created a mapping between the 192 parameters required, and the 45 obtained (Appendix 1, 
Table A2). On the basis of this mapping, we identify a baseline scenario with median values of the 
responses: feeding the IO model with these parameters leads to reduction in GDP of 22.6%, in the lock-
down equilibrium. Our baseline is consistent with preliminary estimates showing that the UK economy 
contracted by 6% in March 2020. Given that lock-down was in place only in the last week of March, 
this points to a total effect close to one quarter of GDP, in equilibrium, not far away from our 22% 
figure. 
The combination of demand and supply side constraints, as discussed in Section 2, also helps to produce 
a rapid adjustment. The effects of such a dramatic contraction in production on employment however 
depend crucially on how firms respond – their specific HR policies at a time of a national emergency. 
The presence of quite generous government schemes, in this respect, undoubtedly takes some pressure 
to cushion employment responses away from companies. As a first approximation, we assume a 
decrease in employment proportional to the decrease in production. This leads to an equivalent of 7.3 
million jobs (-22.3%), in the lock-down equilibrium.10 Our estimated job losses are slightly more 
conservative than the figure of almost 8 million workers released by HM Treasury on May 20, 2020 – 
the advantage of the macro model of course being that our estimates are disaggregated by sector.  
Figure 1 reports the predicted employment losses by macro-sectors. Sector I - Accommodation & food 
services is the most badly hit, with an estimated reduction in lock-down of more than 80%, followed 
by H - Transport & storage with -40% and C - Manufacturing (almost -30%). The least affected sectors 
are L - Real estate activities, A - Agriculture, forestry & fishing, Q - Human health & social work and 









9 More information on the study is available at www.euromod.ac.uk/covid-19/consensus. 
10 The results of a low-impact scenario with the p25 values, and a high-impact scenario with the p75 values are 
available on request, together with their distributional and budgetary consequences. In the aggregate, the 
employment losses go down to just above 3 million jobs (-9%) in the low-impact scenario, and shoot up to almost 
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Figure 1: Employment effects by macro-sectors, baseline scenario. 
 
Source: Our computation 
The detailed employment effects predicted by our IO model by industry, which we use to adjust the 
input data of UKMOD, are reported in Table 1. Note that the estimated effects differ sometimes 
significantly from the input values obtained from the scenario analysis. For instance, final household 
demand for industry 39 - Telecommunication services was projected to go up 20% in the consensus 
analysis, but overall output and employment is estimated to go down 9% from our IO model. This is 
because of inter-industry linkages in the supply and demand of intermediate inputs.   
Interestingly, if we shut down supply constraints we obtain a modified Baseline scenario where the 
contraction in employment is reduced to 5.5 million jobs, or 16.9% of total employment. Supply side 









11 Pichler et al. (2020) show that the role of supply side vis-a’-vis demand side constraints is sensitive to the 
assumptions about the production function used. In particular, assuming some degree of substitutability between 
inputs as we do lowers, ceteris paribus, the overall economic effects of the initial shock, and also the role of 
supply side constraints. As already noted however, the aggregate results we get from our model are quite in line 
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Table 1: Estimated employment effects in the Baseline, High-impact and Low-impact scenarios. 
 
Change in Employment (%)
Baseline High-impact Low-impact
Industry median p25 p75
1 A Products of agriculture, hunting and related services -9 -24 -2
2 A Products of forestry, logging and related services -43 -65 -19
3 A Fish and other fishing products; aquaculture products; support services to fishing -13 -26 -2
4 BDE Mining and quarrying -37 -57 -19
5 C Food products, beverages and tobacco products -17 -30 -5
6 C Textiles, wearing apparel and leather products -34 -50 -17
7 C
Wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; articles of straw and 
plaiting materials -28 -46 -8
8 C Paper and paper products -23 -44 -2
9 C Printing and recording services -41 -58 -25
10 C Coke and refined petroleum products -27 -45 -11
11 C Chemicals and chemical products -22 -37 -4
12 C Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations -12 -30 -2
13 C Rubber and plastics products -32 -51 -14
14 C Other non-metallic mineral products -26 -47 -3
15 C Basic metals -41 -61 -20
16 C Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment -33 -52 -15
17 C Computer, electronic and optical products -15 -35 -1
18 C Electrical equipment -27 -45 -8
19 C Machinery and equipment n.e.c. -41 -56 -28
20 C Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers -53 -79 -31
21 C Other transport equipment -30 -48 -12
22 C Furniture; other manufactured goods -40 -65 -16
23 C Repair and installation services of machinery and equipment -17 -37 0
24 BDE Electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning -18 -39 0
25 BDE Natural water; water treatment and supply services -16 -34 -1
26 BDE
Sewerage; waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery; 
remediation activities and other waste management services -16 -35 -2
27 F Constructions and construction works -21 -42 0
28 G Wholesale and retail trade and repair services of motor vehicles and motorcycles -44 -72 -23
29 G Wholesale trade services, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles -13 -34 -1
30 G Retail trade services, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles -22 -43 -9
31 H Land transport services and transport services via pipelines -34 -59 -12
32 H Water transport services -49 -64 -30
33 H Air transport services -89 -96 -74
34 H Warehousing and support services for transportation -39 -60 -23
35 H Postal and courier services -10 -22 -4
36 I Accommodation and food services -82 -94 -51
37 J Publishing services -15 -41 0
38 J
Motion picture, video and television programme production services, sound recording 
and music publishing; programming and broadcasting services -26 -40 -21
39 J Telecommunications services -9 -27 -1
40 J Computer programming, consultancy and related services; information services -8 -25 -1
41 K Financial services, except insurance and pension funding -11 -26 -8
42 K
Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding services, except compulsory social 
security -12 -26 -9
43 K Services auxiliary to financial services and insurance services -9 -22 -4
44 L Real estate services excluding imputed rents -10 -27 0
45 L Imputed rents of owner-occupied dwellings -8 -25 0
46 M
Legal and accounting services; services of head offices; management consulting 
services -13 -28 -6
47 M Architectural and engineering services; technical testing and analysis services -24 -40 -18
48 M Scientific research and development services -3 -18 0
49 M Advertising and market research services -14 -30 -6
50 M Other professional, scientific and technical services; veterinary services -10 -27 -2
51 N Rental and leasing services -12 -31 0
52 N Employment services -12 -31 -3
53 N Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation services and related services -92 -92 -92
54 N
Security and investigation services; services to buildings and landscape; office 
administrative, office support and other business support services -12 -29 -3
55 O Public administration and defence services; compulsory social security services -14 -32 -2
56 P Education services -15 -35 -7
57 Q Human health services -11 -29 -2
58 Q Social work services -11 -32 -3
59 RST
Creative, arts and entertainment services; library, archive, museum and other cultural 
services; gambling and betting services -23 -54 -2
60 RST Sporting services and amusement and recreation services -63 -86 -34
61 RST Services furnished by membership organisations -10 -33 -4
62 RST Repair services of computers and personal and household goods -20 -42 -16
63 RST Other personal services -11 -34 -6
64 RST
Services of households as employers; undifferentiated goods and services 
produced by households for own use -20 -50 0
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4. The employment transition model 
Having obtained from the IO model the expected contraction in employment in each of the 64 industries 
(as % change from the original level of employment), we need to assign the employment shocks at the 
individual level. Our assumptions distinguish between self-employment and dependent employment. 
For the self-employed, we simply assume that income is homogenously reduced proportionally to the 
industry-level shock. For employees, we assume that some workers remain unscathed, while others go 
down to 0 hours (whether because they are dismissed or furloughed, see Section 5 below). To identify 
the employees that make the transition to 0 hours, we model the probability of transitioning from 
dependent employment to non-employment between two consecutive quarters as a function of a set of 
individual observable characteristics X, the change in the industry-level aggregate employment ∆𝐸𝑗, 
and a full set of industry dummies. We use the two-quarter longitudinal version of the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS). Due to a relatively small number of observations making the transition in any single file, 
we pool 11 two-quarter longitudinal datasets to cover the period from April 2014 to September 2019.12 
Removing observations with missing values in any of the variables included in 𝑋 we obtain a sample 
of 175,475 observations on 128,702 unique individuals, all dependent employees in the first quarter 
observations, for a total of 4,160 transitions from employment to non-employment. Table 2 reports the 
estimated coefficients from a logistic regression.  
Table 2: Employment transition model: Estimated coefficient (logistic regression) 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors reported are clustered at individual level.  
Source: Our computation on LFS two-quarter longitudinal data, April 2014 to September 2019. 
 
12 Descriptive statistics for our sample are reported in Appendix 1, table A2. 
  Coef.  St.Err.  
Sex of respondent (1= male) 0.011 0.039  
Age in years -0.205 0.008 *** 
Age in years squared 0.003 0.000 *** 
% change in employment in sector -0.096 0.008 *** 
 2014 (omitted) 0.000 .  
 2015.year -0.010 0.060  
 2016.year -0.045 0.062  
 2017.year -0.142 0.063 ** 
 2018.year -0.131 0.063 ** 
 2019.year -0.135 0.065 ** 
Hours worked weekly 
Occupation: 
-0.028 0.002 *** 
 Managers (omitted) 0.000 .  
 Professionals 0.000 0.070  
 Technicians -0.059 0.069  
 Clerks 0.133 0.068 * 
 Sales -0.003 0.068  
 Trade and crafts -0.169 0.092 * 
 Plant operators 0.189 0.088 ** 
 Elementary 0.139 0.072 * 
Public sector -0.087 0.055  
Marital status:    
 Single (omitted) 0.000 .  
 Married -0.317 0.048 *** 
 Separated -0.481 0.128 *** 
 Divorced -0.250 0.073 *** 
 Widowed -0.308 0.123 ** 
Education level:    
 Low (omitted) 0.000 .  
 Medium -0.011 0.049  
 High 0.089 0.062  
Tenure in months -0.002 0.000 *** 
Industry dummies Yes   
Constant 1.558 0.248 *** 
Mean dependent var 0.024 SD dependent var  0.152 
Pseudo r-squared  0.082 Number of obs   175,475 
Chi-square   3644.319 Prob > chi2  0.000 
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5. Distributional and budgetary consequences 
We finally analyse the distributional and budgetary consequences of the employment shocks estimated 
above, and of the associated policy responses. 
We utilise the tax-benefit microsimulation model UKMOD, the UK component of EUROMOD 
(Sutherland & Figari, 2013; Sutherland 2018). We use UKMOD version A1.5+, released in April 2020 
to calculate disposable (net) household incomes, given individual (gross) market incomes and 
personal/household characteristics.13 UKMOD runs on the Family Resources Survey (FRS), the latest 
data available being the 2017/18 wave with the different income components uprated to 2020 values.  
UKMOD A1.5+ includes the changes announced in the Scottish and UK budgets of this year as well as 
Covid-19 policy measures, except for the Job Retention Scheme (JRS) and the Self-employment Income 
Support Scheme (SEISS), which we jointly label Market Income Support Schemes (MISS) and simulate 
directly.14 Besides MISS, the main policy changes in response to the Covid-19 crisis are: 
• an increase in the yearly basic element of the Working Tax Credit (WTC) of £1,045; 
• an increase in the weekly housing benefit disregard of £20; 
• an increase in the monthly standard Universal Credit (UC) allowance of £86.67; 
• the removal of the minimum income floor for self-employed within the UC calculation; 
• an increase in the weekly local housing allowance of £14.86 (on average across regions and 
accommodation types). 
We modify the input data to simulate the effects of the Covid-19 income shock (see Appendix 2). With 
respect to the size of the income shock, we distinguish, as described in Section 4, between self-employed 
and dependent employees. For self-employed, we consider a homogenous reduction in earnings 
proportional to the projected reduction in output of their respective industry; for employees, we 
randomly put workers to 0 hours on the basis of the estimated probabilities coming out of the 
employment transition model.15 With respect to the duration of the income shock, we assume 2 months 
of strict lock-down at 100% of the estimated effects, 2 months of partial lock-down at 50% of the 
estimated effect, and a further 4 months of recovery phase at 25% of the estimated effect. In the recovery 
phase, self-employed see a reduction in their income loss, while a proportion of the dependent 
employees that were sent to 0 hours are allowed to get back to their previous employment status. 
Our analysis is based on a comparison between three counterfactuals: 
1. A “pre-Covid” scenario (referred to as ‘Scenario 1’), corresponding to the income distribution 
and fiscal position that would have occurred in the absence of the Covid-19 crisis and related 
policy changes; 
2. A “post-Covid employment, pre-Covid policies” scenario (referred to as ‘Scenario 2’), 
corresponding to the impact of the Covid-19 crisis in the absence of policy changes, where 
only the automatic stabilisers already embedded in the tax-benefit system operate. In this 
scenario, the employed individuals who would stop working in lock-down receive 
 
13 More information can be found in the UKMOD country report available at 
https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/files/projects/UKMOD/EUROMOD_country_report.pdf.  
14 The JRS covers employment income, employer National Insurance contributions and employer pension 
contributions. UKMOD does not simulate the latter, which are therefore excluded from our impact assessment.   
15 Because of the non-linearity of the logistic model, and given that the projected Covid-19 shocks are much larger 
than the observed quarter-to-quarter employment changes, we further normalise the individual predicted 
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contribution-based Job’s Seekers Allowance (Cb-JSA) and other pre-Covid benefits, if they 
become eligible.16 
3. A “post-Covid employment, post-Covid policies” scenario (referred to as ‘Scenario 3’), 
corresponding to the combined impact of the Covid-19 crisis and all policy changes.  
Comparing Scenario 2 with Scenario 1 gives the un-mitigated socio-economic impact of Covid-19, and 
the cost that this would have entailed for the public budget due to lower tax revenues and increased 
benefit payments. Comparing Scenario 3 with Scenario 1 gives the mitigated socio-economic impact of 
Covid-19, and its overall effect on the public budget. Comparing scenario 3 with scenario 2 gives the 
additional costs and benefits of the emergency measures.  
A crucial assumption in Scenario 3 concerns the take-up rate of MISS. We calibrate this using the latest 
data released by ONS on the number of people claiming benefits primarily for the reason of being 
unemployed (19 May 2020). These show an increase from 1.2 million in March 2020 to 2.1 million in 
April.17 Considering that the adjustment to the lock-down equilibrium – although fast – could have been 
still incomplete at the end of April, we assume that 1 million dependent employees become unemployed, 
rather than being furloughed, and are then checked for eligibility for the less generous contribution-
based and income-based JSA and Universal Credit.1819 On the other hand, we assume that all self-
employed have access to the Self-Employment Income Support Scheme for their lost profits.  
Comparing Scenarios 1 and 2, we see that in the absence of any policy change the Covid-19 crisis would 
have increased the number of claimants of unemployment benefits by 4.8 million, increased the poverty 
rate – at a constant poverty line – by 1.2 percentage points (pp), and decreased mean equivalised 
disposable income by 3%, with a more pronounced effect at the top half of the income distribution 











16 UKMOD checks the eligibility condition for contribution-based JSA by looking at the entire individual work 
history rather than the last two fiscal years, due to difficulties in approximating the amount of contributions paid. 
This makes it easier to become eligible for contribution-based JSA in UKMOD. We plan to improve on this 
approximation in future releases. 
17 The ONS Claimant Count (series K02000001 UK) is a combination of claimants of Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(JSA) and claimants of Universal Credit (UC) who fall within the UC ‘searching for work’ conditionality. 
18 This is more conservative than the 2 million unemployment figure considered by the Office for Budget 
Responsibility, which also considers a bigger contraction in GDP. Robustness analysis to this assumption is 
available upon request. 
19 Brewer and Handscomb (2020) show that the median effective replacement rate for the Job Retention Scheme 
is over 90%, compared to 53% for those who do not qualify (the reason why the replacement rate is over the 80% 
threshold is that many people will pay lower taxes after a 20 per cent fall in earnings, and might also qualify for 























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
 
Table 3: Distributional consequences of Covid-19 
 
Notes: Income figures are monthly averages over the year. Scenario 1 is our baseline and considers “pre-Covid” 
employment and policies. Scenario 2 is a counterfactual exercise that considers “post-Covid employment, pre-
Covid policies”. Scenario 3 is our estimate of the real effect of the Covid-19 crisis, with “post-Covid employment, 
post-Covid policies”. 
Source: Our computation based on UKMOD A1.5+. 
 
To understand the specific income components driving the changes, we decompose the percentage 
change in mean equivalised income for each decile looking at the contribution of different income 
sources (Figure 2). We find that the drop in market incomes (MI) hits proportionally harder at the top 
half of the income distribution: this is due to (i) many people not having market incomes in the first 
place, in the lowest deciles, (ii) the distribution of income by industries, and (iii) the distribution of the 
individual employment transition probabilities within industries.20 We also confirm that JSA tends to 









20 There is also a fourth, mechanical effect, as any given percentage drop in market income reduces household 
disposable income differently in different part of the income distribution, due to the rules of the tax-benefit system. 
The direction of this effect depends on the effective marginal tax rate, with losses for high incomes reducing taxes 
proportionally more than for low incomes, but triggering lower increases in benefits. 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Δ[2-1] Scenario 3 Δ[3-1]
Rate 17.4% 18.6% 1.2pp 16.3% -1.1pp
Fixed Poverty Line 982.10£    
Decile 1 613.02£    603.33£    -2% 630.20£    3%
Decile 2 935.34£    913.46£    -2% 955.82£    2%
Decile 3 1,129.70£ 1,106.59£ -2% 1,146.46£ 1%
Decile 4 1,322.55£ 1,288.74£ -3% 1,328.06£ 0%
Decile 5 1,529.15£ 1,486.79£ -3% 1,524.97£ 0%
Decile 6 1,757.29£ 1,694.99£ -4% 1,739.52£ -1%
Decile 7 2,025.91£ 1,955.69£ -3% 2,000.07£ -1%
Decile 8 2,359.14£ 2,273.16£ -4% 2,327.18£ -1%
Decile 9 2,859.04£ 2,752.04£ -4% 2,807.83£ -2%
Decile 10 4,554.44£ 4,394.29£ -4% 4,451.20£ -2%
All 1,908.28£ 1,846.64£ -3% 1,890.86£ -1%
Poverty
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Figure 2: Decomposition of percentage change in mean equivalised income by income component, 
effects of income shock only (difference between Scenario 2 and Scenario 1). 
 
Notes: Cb_JSA = contribution-based Job Seekers Allowance, UC = Universal Credit, CTC = Child Tax Credit, 
WTC = Working Tax Credit, MI = Market Income, MISS = MI Support Schemes. 
Scenario 1 is our baseline and considers “pre-Covid” employment and policies. Scenario 2 is a counterfactual 
exercise that considers “post-Covid employment, pre-Covid policies”. The figure reports a decomposition of the 
percentage change between Scenario 2 and Scenario 1. 
Source: Our computation based on UKMOD A1.5+. 
 
From the perspective of public finances (Table 4), this counterfactual scenario would have resulted in 
a drop in government revenues (taxes and social insurance contributions) of more than 28 billion pounds 
or 7.5% with respect to the baseline, and an increase in government expenditure on social transfers of 
more than 6 billion pounds. Due to the way eligibility conditions for contribution-based JSA are 
modelled in UKMOD (see footnote 17), this increase in social transfers is mostly concentrated in 
contribution-based JSA – as also visible in Figure 2 – while in reality we would expect more people 
falling into means-tested benefits such as Universal Credit, income-based Job Seekers Allowance and 
Income Support. 
Overall, the increase in expenditures and the decrease in revenues would have caused a 20% 
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Table 4: Budgetary consequences of Covid-19 (yearly, million £) 
 
Notes: Scenario 1 is our baseline and considers “pre-Covid” employment and policies. Scenario 2 is a 
counterfactual exercise that considers “post-Covid employment, pre-Covid policies”. Scenario 3 is our estimate 
of the real effect of the Covid-19 crisis, with “post-Covid employment, post-Covid policies”. 
Contribution-based Job Seekers Allowance is over-simulated due to lack of data in UKMOD. Claimants must 
have paid a minimum amount of National Insurance contributions in the two previous tax years. UKMOD does 
not have this information and approximates it using the number of years in work. Improving on this approximation 
would result in fewer unemployed individuals being entitled to this benefit and more households receiving other 
means-tested benefits such as Universal Credit, income-based Job Seekers Allowance and Income Support. 
Source: Our computation based on UKMOD A1.5+. 
 
Once we consider the policy changes in Scenario 3, we see that the effects of the Covid-19 crisis become 
progressive, with positive changes in equivalised household incomes up to the fifth decile, and negative 
changes in the deciles above (Table 3).21 The poverty rate consequently goes down from 17.4% in the 
baseline (Scenario 1) to 16.3%, travelling practically the same distance than in Scenario 2 (a change of 
1.1 pp) but in the opposite direction.  
The result that the policy response to the crisis reduces poverty is mainly driven by the increase in the 
means-tested Universal Credit (UC) in the lowest part of the distribution (Figure 3). Note that MISS, 
with their 80% baseline replacement rate, mirror the distribution of losses in market incomes (which 
are the same as in Scenario 2), but for the cap at £2,500 per month which introduces some progressivity 
(this can be seen looking at the ratio between MISS and MI which goes down in absolute terms in the 
highest deciles).  Because (i) MISS only covers 80% of the lost salaries and profits, (ii) some employees 
go into unemployment rather than being furloughed, and (iii) the rules for Universal Credit have become 
more generous, more people are now covered by the latter scheme. Moreover, people without labour 
income already on UC are net gainers from the Covid-19 crisis, as they benefit from the increased 






21 While inequality is reduced, changes in the Gini coefficients are too small to be noticeable. 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Δ[2-1] Scenario 3 Δ[3-1] Δ[3-2]
Total market incomes 1,104,502£ 1,044,386£ 60,116-£       1,044,386£ 60,116-£       -£             
... income from (self) employment 954,334£    894,218£    60,116-£       894,218£    60,116-£       -£             
... other sources 150,168£    150,168£    0£                 150,168£    0£                 -£             
Government expenditure supporting market incomes -£             -£             -£             32,939£       32,939£       32,939£       
Government expenditure on social transfers 205,315£    211,747£    6,433£         212,964£    7,649£         1,216£         
… contribution-based Job Seekers Allowance 164£             6,188£         6,024£         1,265£         1,101£         4,923-£         
… WorkingTax Credit 1,101£         861£             240-£             1,469£         367£             608£             
… Family Tax Credit 4,511£         4,184£         327-£             4,674£         163£             489£             
… Universal Credit 32,362£       32,958£       596£             38,123£       5,762£         5,165£         
… other benefits 75,807£       76,293£       486£             76,424£       617£             131£             
Government revenue through taxes and social insurance contributions 381,473£    352,832£    28,641-£       360,960£    20,513-£       8,128£         
... Direct taxes and (self) employee social insurance contributions 301,749£    279,721£    22,027-£       291,198£    10,551-£       11,477£       
... employer social insurance contributions (not part of disposable income) 79,725£       73,111£       6,614-£         73,111£       6,614-£         -£             
... employer social insurance contributions paid by Job Retention Scheme -£             -£             -£             3,349-£         3,349-£         3,349-£         
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Figure 3: Decomposition of percentage change in mean equivalised income by income component, 
effects of income shock and policy responses (difference between Scenario 3 and Scenario 1). 
 
Notes: Cb_JSA = contribution-based Job Seekers Allowance, UC = Universal Credit, CTC = Child Tax Credit, 
WTC = Working Tax Credit, MI = Market Income, MISS = MI Support Schemes. 
Employer National Insurance contributions paid by the government under the JRS are included as negative 
contributions (or credits) in the employer social insurance contributions category. 
Scenario 1 is our baseline and considers “pre-Covid” employment and policies. Scenario 3 is our estimate of the 
real effect of the Covid-19 crisis, with “post-Covid employment, post-Covid policies”. The figure reports a 
decomposition of the percentage change between Scenario 3 and Scenario 1. 
Source: Our computation based on UKMOD A1.5+. 
 
Finally, Figures 4 and 5 show the socio-economic groups most affected by the Covid-19 crisis in terms 
of both lost market incomes, and changes to household disposable income (lost market incomes are the 
same in Scenarios 2 and 3, while the change in equivalised household disposable income showed refer 
to Scenario 3, which includes the Government rescue package).  
The figures show that the most affected groups in terms of lost market income are low-skilled people 
and people in elementary occupations. In particular, the losses for professionals and clerks are half the 
size, in percentage terms, than the losses for elementary occupations, craft and trade workers. This is 
the combined result of (i) the distribution of earnings by industries, and (ii) the distribution of the 
individual employment transition probabilities within industries. The working of the tax-benefit system 
reduces the losses, and eliminates most differences between groups. The gender, age, household type 
and country of origin gradients are less pronounced, while with the exception of Northern Ireland 
(marginally less affected) there are no regional differences. Changes in after tax and benefits equivalised 
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include many individuals with no market incomes and already on Universal Credit, who as noted above 
are net beneficiaries from the increased generosity of the system.  
 
Figure 4: Mean income lost by education, gender, age and household composition. 
 
Note: To make market and household incomes more comparable, the means only include people with positive 
market incomes, except for inactive people in the chart by age (there are few under-18 and elderly people with 
market incomes, and they are excluded from the graph). 
. low skill = not completed primary, primary & lower secondary education, medium skill= upper secondary & 
post-secondary, high skill = tertiary. act. = working age with positive market income. couple+ = couple or more 
adults.  
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Figure 5: Mean income lost by country of origin, region and occupation. 
 
Note: To make market and household incomes more comparable, the means only include people with positive 
market incomes. The regions of England are put together.  
Source: Our computation based on UKMOD A1.5+. 
 
The lifeline that the Government has given to the economy obviously comes at a high cost for the 
budget, with the rescue package expected to cause an extra deficit of 26 billion pounds in 2020 with 
respect to Scenario 2 (Table 4, last column), bringing the overall reduction in total net revenues for the 
government due to the pandemic to over £60 billion (-35%). This is mostly due to MISS, with an 
expected direct cost of 36 billion pounds (£33 billion in income support plus £3 billion in employer 
social insurance contributions paid by the Government), partly offset by an increase in taxes and 
employee social insurance contributions (+11 billions).  
In Scenario 3 fewer people go on unemployment benefits with respect to Scenario 2, with a consequent 
reduction in expenditure from 6 billion to just over 1 billion. This expenditure however is replaced by 
an increased expenditure for Universal Credits, which are now more generous (+£5 billion).  
To be noted, this relatively minor component of the rescue package (£5 billion out of £25 billion, or 
20%) does the bulk of the work in reverting the distributional consequences of the crisis. This is not 
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6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have provided an assessment of the distributional and budgetary impact of the Covid-
19 crisis and associated policy responses, in the UK. Due to lack of timely data on the employment 
effects of the crisis, we have nowcasted the market income shocks by means of a dynamic IO model 
calibrated to the 2016 IO tables and parameterised with the results of a consensus analysis of over 250 
UK-based economists to predict macro effects by industry, and a probabilistic model estimated on LFS 
data to predict employment-to-non-employment transitions within industry. Our macro results point to 
a reduction in GDP/employment of almost 25% in the lock-down equilibrium, with demand-side 
constraints accounting for 75% of this effect and supply-side constraints for the remaining 25%. These 
macro effects are in line with most of the expectations and preliminary estimates available for advanced 
economies, which roughly point to a 2% yearly GDP loss per month of full lock-down. Having 
distributed this macro shock between industries, and within industries to each individual worker, we 
have used the UKMOD tax-benefit model to analyse the distributional and budgetary impact of the 
crisis, distinguishing between the impact of the shock per se, as cushioned by the tax-benefit system in 
its pre-Covid configuration, and the impact of the emergency measures put in place during the crisis. 
We have shown that the extra intervention has contained the reduction in the average household 
disposable income from -3% to -1%. More importantly, we predict that the rescue package has reverted 
the distributional impact of the pandemic, reducing poverty by more than 1 percentage point with 
respect to the pre-Covid situation. This is mostly due the increased role of Universal Credit, which 
however accounts only for 20% of the total cost of the emergency rescue package (£26 billion).  
A few considerations need to be made here.  
First, in this study we examine the income effects of the crisis, and we do not say anything with respect 
to the increased health inequalities that have been documented elsewhere (e.g. Bibby et al., 2020; 
Coronini-Cronberg et al., 2020) – nor with respect to how health inequalities interact with income 
inequality (Baker, 2019).  
Second, it is perhaps not surprising that at a time of a national emergency the country comes together 
and implements steps that reduce inequality, especially given that those more at risk from a health 
perspective come from more disadvantaged socio-economic group.23 This is often seen in wars, for 
instance (Obinger et al., 2018).  
Third, 80% of the emergency package goes to policy measures – the Job Retention Scheme and the 
Self-Employment Income Support Scheme – that are regressive for the lowest deciles and only mildly 
progressive at the top of the income distribution, while the bulk of the redistribution is operated by the 
increased generosity of Universal Credit, that accounts only for 20% of the rescue package. This does 
not mean that these Market Income Support Schemes are a bad use of public money, as they are 
explicitly motivated by a desire to maintain as much as possible the pre-Covid status quo. Indeed, in 
their absence the shock to disposable incomes would have caused significant distributional 
consequences, with workers in some sectors affected much more than in others, and an overall increase 
in poverty. Moreover, the Market Income Support Schemes might serve other purposes, for instance 
help the economy bounce back to the previous equilibrium quicker.  
Forth, and related, the issue of whether the Job Retention Scheme and the Self-employment Income 
Support Scheme will be maintained in place throughout the crisis is crucial. This is particularly true for 
some sectors, (e.g. hospitality and the travel industry) where the shock has been greater.  
 
23 Between March and April 2020, the age-standardised mortality rate of deaths involving COVID-19 in the most 
deprived areas of England was 55.1 deaths per 100,000 population compared with 25.3 deaths per 100,000 
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Finally, the overall cost of the crisis for the public deficit is massive – with a 35% projected decrease 
in total net revenues for the Government (£61 billion pounds). This raises the issue of how the increased 
debt will be managed in the years ahead, and in particular if the advances that have been achieved, most 
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Appendix 1: Additional tables and figures 
 
Table A1: Industries included in the questionnaire 
 
Note: Industries in the left column were considered for final household demand, with values of the responses 
being referred to as F1-F23; industries in the right column were considered for exports and supply of intermediate 
goods and services, with values of the responses being referred to as X1-X11 and Z1-Z11 respectively. 
  
Industry Ref Industry Ref
Food and beverages F1 Coke and refined petroleum products X1 / Z1
Electricity, water, sewage F2 Chemicals and chemical products X2 / Z2
Textiles, wearing apparel and leather products F3 Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations X3 / Z3
Furniture F4 Other manufacturing X4 / Z4
Motor vehicles F5 Constructions and construction works X5 /Z5
Computer, electronic and optical products F6 Mining and quarrying X6 / Z6
Wholesale and retailing F7 Land and water transport X7 / Z7
Hotels, restaurants, pubs, etc. F8 Advertising X8 / Z8
Air transport F9 Other professional, scientific and technical services X9 / Z9
Public transport F10 Scientific research and development X10 / Z10
Telecommunication services F11 Public administration X11 / Z11
Postal and courier services F12
Financial, insurance and legal services F13
Rents F14
Other real estate services F15
Compulsory education F16
Non-compulsory education F17
Public health services F18
Private health services F19
Services of households as employers F20
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Table A2: Mapping from results of the consensus analysis to parameters used for the macro model. 
 





Direct Multiplier of 
Lockdown on Final 
Consumption 
(Exports ecluded)
Direct Multiplier of 
Lockdown on 
Exports




1 A Products of agriculture, hunting and related services F1 F1 F1
2 A Products of forestry, logging and related services Z4 X4 Z4
3 A Fish and other fishing products; aquaculture products; support services to fishing F1 F1 F1
4 BDE Mining and quarrying Z6 X6 Z6
5 C Food products, beverages and tobacco products F1 F1 F1
6 C Textiles, wearing apparel and leather products F3 X4 Z4
7 C
Wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; articles of straw and 
plaiting materials Z4 X4 Z4
8 C Paper and paper products Z4 X4 Z4
9 C Printing and recording services Z4 X4 Z4
10 C Coke and refined petroleum products Z1 X1 Z1
11 C Chemicals and chemical products Z2 X2 Z2
12 C Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations Z3 X3 Z3
13 C Rubber and plastics products Z4 X4 Z4
14 C Other non-metallic mineral products Z4 X4 Z4
15 C Basic metals Z4 X4 Z4
16 C Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment Z4 X4 Z4
17 C Computer, electronic and optical products F6 F6 Z4
18 C Electrical equipment Z4 X4 Z4
19 C Machinery and equipment n.e.c. Z4 X4 Z4
20 C Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers F5 F5 Z4
21 C Other transport equipment Z4 Z4 Z4
22 C Furniture; other manufactured goods F4 F4 Z4
23 C Repair and installation services of machinery and equipment Z4 X4 Z4
24 BDE Electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning F2 X6 Z6
25 BDE Natural water; water treatment and supply services F2 X6 Z6
26 BDE
Sewerage; waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery; 
remediation activities and other waste management services F2 Z4 Z4
27 F Constructions and construction works Z5 X5 Z5
28 G Wholesale and retail trade and repair services of motor vehicles and motorcycles F5 F7 F7
29 G Wholesale trade services, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles F7 F7 F7
30 G Retail trade services, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles F7 F7 F7
31 H Land transport services and transport services via pipelines F10 X7 Z7
32 H Water transport services F9 X7 Z7
33 H Air transport services F9 F9 F9
34 H Warehousing and support services for transportation Z7 X7 Z7
35 H Postal and courier services F12 F12 F12
36 I Accommodation and food services F8 F8 F8
37 J Publishing services F21 X9 Z9
38 J
Motion picture, video and television programme production services, sound 
recording and music publishing; programming and broadcasting services Z9 X9 Z9
39 J Telecommunications services F11 F11 F11
40 J Computer programming, consultancy and related services; information services Z9 X9 Z9
41 K Financial services, except insurance and pension funding F13 F13 F13
42 K Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding services, except compulsory social F13 F13 F13
43 K Services auxiliary to financial services and insurance services F13 F13 F13
44 L Real estate services excluding imputed rents (F14+F15/2) (F14+F15/2) (F14+F15/2)
45 L Imputed rents of owner-occupied dwellings
46 M Legal and accounting services; services of head offices; management consulting F13 F13 F13
47 M Architectural and engineering services; technical testing and analysis services F23 X9 Z9
48 M Scientific research and development services Z10 X10 Z10
49 M Advertising and market research services Z8 X8 Z8
50 M Other professional, scientific and technical services; veterinary services Z9 X9 Z9
51 N Rental and leasing services Z9 X9 Z9
52 N Employment services Z9 X9 Z9
53 N Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation services and related services
54 N
Security and investigation services; services to buildings and landscape; office 
administrative, office support and other business support services Z9 X9 Z9
55 O Public administration and defence services; compulsory social security services Z11 X11 Z11
56 P Education services (F16+F17)/2 (F16+F17)/2 (F16+F17)/2
57 Q Human health services (F18+F19)/2 (F18+F19)/2 (F18+F19)/2
58 Q Social work services F23 F23 F23
59 RST
Creative, arts and entertainment services; library, archive, museum and other 
cultural services; gambling and betting services F21 F21 F21
60 RST Sporting services and amusement and recreation services F22 F22 F22
61 RST Services furnished by membership organisations F23 F23 F23
62 RST Repair services of computers and personal and household goods F23 F23 F23
63 RST Other personal services F23 F23 F23
64 RST
Services of households as employers; undifferentiated goods and services 
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Table A3: Employment transition model: Descriptive statistics 
 
Figure A1: Box-plot for the expected change in household demand, by sector 
 
Responses to the question: Please provide your estimates of the effects on final household demand for goods and 
services of the Covid-19 related lock-down measures implemented by the UK Government on March 23: these 
are due to constraints preventing consumers from physically visiting sellers.  









Variable mean sd min max 
Employment to Non-employment transition = 1 0.0237  0 1 
Age 43.19 12.77 16 69 
Sex (1 = Male) 0.482  0 1 
Single 0.324  0 1 
Married 0.555  0 1 
Separated 0.025  0 1 
Divorced 0.082  0 1 
Widowed 0.014  0 1 
Total usual hours worked in main job (incl. 
overtime) 36.00 12.73 0 97 
Months continuously employed 109.4 110.2 0 696 
Public sector = 1 0.290  0 1 
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Figure A2: Box-plot for the expected change in supply of intermediate goods and services, by sector 
 
Responses to the question: Please provide your estimates of the effects on the supply of intermediate goods and 
services to businesses of the Covid-19 related lock-down measures implemented by the UK Government on March 
23: these are due to social distancing and smart working measures reducing the output of intermediate goods and 
services, which producers sell to other producers.  
Note: Statistics based on 223 valid responses to this question. 
Figure A3: Box-plot for the expected change in export of intermediate and final goods and services, by 
sector 
 
Responses to the question: Please provide your estimates of the effects on the supply of intermediate and final 
goods and services of the Covid-19 related lock-down measures implemented by the UK Government on March 
23: these are due to due to reduction in the demand from importers, or to difficulties to get the goods and services 
through the border.  
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Appendix 2: Modifications to UKMOD input data and modelling assumptions 
UKMOD runs on the Family Resources Survey (FRS). This survey contains weekly information on incomes. For 
most analyses, incomes are simply extrapolated to months in UKMOD (and to years in our fiscal overview). Since 
we are simulating that the COVID-19 crisis lasts for part of the year, we modify incomes from employment (yem), 
self-employment (yse) and contributory-based Job Seekers Allowance (bunct_s) to obtain weighted average 
amounts that reflects the months during and after the crisis (while we do not modify hours of work), as detailed 
in Table A4. 
We consider as employed (self-employed) individuals, people with positive employment (self-employment) 
income and whose incomes from this source are higher than those from self-employment (employment). 
 
Table A4: Changes to UKMOD variables. 
Var Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
yem yem yem*(8/12) 
MISS=1 → as in Scenario 2  
+ min(0.8*yem,2500)*(4/12)  




as in Scenario 2  
+ min(0.8*(yse-new_emp*yse), 2500) *(4/12) 
bunct_s 0 
bunct_s *(4/12)  
[this & yem removed 
from disregard] 
MISS=1 → 0 
MISS=0 → bunct_s *(4/12) [as in Scenario 2] 
lhw lhw (not modified) (not modified) 
 
Job Retention Scheme (JRS) 
JRS is a grant that covers 80% of usual monthly wage costs, up to £2,500 a month, plus the associated Employer 
National Insurance contributions and pension contributions (up to the level of the minimum automatic enrolment 
employer pension contribution). UKMOD does not simulate employer pension contributions; therefore, we do not 
assess their impact of revenue changes. Employees pay the taxes they normally pay, which includes automatic 
pension contributions, unless the employee has opted out or stopped saving into their pension. We do not have 
information on the latter, and therefore assume they continue to pay pension contributions. Employer National 
Insurance contributions are paid by the government instead of the employers under the JRS. Accordingly, for the 
fiscal overview we made those contributions negative.  
yem = yem*(8/12) + min(0.8*yem,2500)*(4/12) (A1) 
  
Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) 
SEISS is taxable grant of 80% of average monthly trading profits, paid out in a single instalment covering 3 
months, and capped at £7,500 altogether. UKMOD uses the FRS variable on gross earnings from self-employed 
Opt 2 (yse). SEISS is subject to Income Tax and self-employed National Insurance. The pseudo-code for the 
implementation of this policy is: 
yse = yse*(8/12) + income_reduction_coeff*yse*(4/12) +  




Contribution-based Job Seekers Allowance (Cb-JSA) 
UKMOD includes a Labour Market Adjustment (LMA) add-on to transition people across employment statuses. 
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add-on) and contribution-based Job Seekers Allowance (in UKMOD) as in Table A4. In addition, for those 
transitioning we remove income from employment from the base for disregards in UKMOD (otherwise the income 
earned after the crisis would be part of this base). Furthermore, for the (very few) people considered as employed 
that also have some self-employment incomes, the latter incomes are maintained (and not put to 0 as by the default 


























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
Covid Economics Issue 26, 5 June 2020
Copyright: Tushar Bharati and Adnan M. S. Fakir
Pandemic Catch-22: How 
effective are mobility restrictions 
in halting the spread of COVID-19 
in developing countries?
Tushar Bharati1 and Adnan M. S. Fakir2
Date submitted: 31 May 2020; Date accepted: 2 June 2020
Countries across the world responded to the COVID-19 pandemic with 
what might well be the set of biggest state-led mobility and activity 
restrictions in the history of mankind. But how effective were these 
measures across countries? Compared to multiple recent studies that 
document an association between such restrictions and the control of 
the contagion, we use an instrumental variable approach to estimate 
the causal effect of these restrictions on mobility, and the growth rate 
of confirmed cases and deaths attributed to COVID-19. Using the level 
of stringency in the rest of the world to predict the level of stringency 
of the restriction measures in a country, we show while stricter 
contemporaneous measures affected mobility, stringency in seven to 
fourteen days mattered for containing the contagion. Heterogeneity 
analysis reveal that even though the restrictions reduced mobility 
more in relatively less-developed countries, the causal effect of a 
reduction in mobility was higher in more developed countries. We 
propose several explanations. Our results highlight the need to 
complement mobility and activity restrictions with other health 
and information measures, especially in less-developed countries, to 
combat the COVID-19 pandemic effectively.
1 Lecturer, Department of Economics, Business School, University of Western Australia.
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1 Introduction
By May 30, 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had infected close to six million people and claimed
over 365,000 lives. Countries across the world have responded with what might well be the set
of biggest state-led mobility and activity restrictions in the history of mankind. The hope is to
reduce contagion and congestion in health-care utilization. Besides being controversial and costly,
such measures may not always be successful in containing the spread and can, sometimes, worsen
the situation.1 The situation is especially dire for many developing countries. In the absence of
of proper social security support, they face a catch-22 situation where strict mobility and activity
restrictions, especially if ineffective, will unnecessarily increase the economic cost through lost
livelihoods. The natural question that then follows is whether such measures have been effective in
controlling the COVID-19 contagion. If yes, then what factors contribute to their effectiveness?
Multiple recent studies have submitted that there exists a negative association between such
restrictions and the contagion (Anderson et al. (2020); Fang et al. (2020); Greenstone and Nigam
(2020); Jinjarak et al. (2020); Qiu et al. (2020); Villas-Boas et al. (2020); Yilmazkuday (2020)).
However, much of the work either simulates counterfactual scenarios or documents association
between the restrictions and the contagion. With studies suggesting a steep economic cost of such
restrictions, to be able to design optimal mitigation policy for COVID-19 and future pandemics, it is
crucial to understand whether, when, where, and how much do these restrictions have a causal effect
on containing the contagion (Glover et al. (2020)). Few studies attempt to identify causal effects of
the restrictions using a difference-in-differences (DiD) design - comparing regions with high and
low levels of restrictions (Fang et al. (2020); Villas-Boas et al. (2020); Yilmazkuday (2020)). But
the restrictions were often in response to disease situation. Areas with worse contagion or more
watchful population might have enacted stringent restrictions relatively early. Since these factors
must have also affected the evolution of the disease scenario, the assumption of parallel trends
underlying the DiD methodology comes into question.
First, we propose an instrumental variable approach to estimate the causal effect that the level
of stringency of the restrictions had on human mobility and the rate of growth of the contagion. In
deciding whether to impose restrictions, national and local governments took into account not only
the prevailing disease situation in the country (the factor that confounds DiD estimates) but also
what they expected would happen in the future in the presence and absence of such restrictions.
Lacking perfect foresight, they made predictions based on their observations of the condition in
1See, among others, Markel (1999), Cetron and Landwirth (2005), World Health Organization Writing Group (2006),
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the rest of the world. Governments that witnessed a rapid increase in the number of COVID-
19 cases and subsequent mobility and activity restrictions in the rest of the world, in the days
following the first confirmed case in their own country, sprung into action swiftly and imposed
stricter restrictions. Building on this insight, we use the day-to-day changes in the stringency of the
restrictions in the rest of the world to instrument how stringent a country’s internal mobility and
activity restrictions were.
We conduct our analysis combining high-frequency measures of mobility data from Google’s
daily mobility reports, country-date-level information on the stringency of restrictions in response
to the pandemic from Oxford’s Coronavirus Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT), and daily
data on people tested, confirmed cases, recovery and deaths attributed to COVID-19 from Our
World In Data and the Johns Hopkins Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE). Us-
ing the instrumental variable technique, we estimate large causal effects of stricter restrictions on
mobility and on the weekly growth rate of recorded cases and deaths attributed to COVID-19. In
comparison, we find that more stringent restrictions have weak marginal effects on the growth rate
of tests conducted and recoveries. Consistent with the current scientific understanding that an in-
fected human can infect another human up till 14 days since being infected, we find that the level
of stringency of the restrictions in the previous two weeks matter more than contemporaneous level
or level of restrictions 3 weeks in the past.2 We also document considerable differences between
the correlation and causal estimates that raise concerns over the use of the association estimates
from previous studies to evaluate the costs and benefits of the restrictions.
Next, we show that the effectiveness of the restrictions vary significantly across countries.
In particular, more stringent measures help more in richer, more educated, more democratic, and
less corrupt countries with older, healthier populations and more effective governments. Finally,
we draw attention to the observation that announcing restrictions does not necessarily imply a re-
duction in mobility; it depends on the level of compliance. The estimated reduced-form effects of
stringency on the growth rate of cases, deaths, and recoveries incorporates the differential compli-
ance across countries. Taking a ratio of the causal effect of restriction stringency on the growth rate
of cases or deaths, to the effect on mobility, we show that even though the stricter restrictions had
a larger negative effect on mobility in relatively less-developed countries, they were more effective
in containing the contagion in more developed countries. Consistent with the heterogeneity results,
these results indicate that imposing mobility restrictions is not enough to contain the contagion
in developing countries, and the benefits reaped from high stringency is lower relative to devel-
oped nations. The restrictions should be effectively complemented with other policy measures,
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such as raising awareness about best-practices when these restrictions are imposed, and health and
economic assistance for those affected (Chang and Velasco (2020); Lin and Meissner (2020)).
The findings have important policy implications. COVID-19 is not the first and will not be
the last epidemic to afflict humanity. Better future preparedness requires a better understanding
of when and how to act in times of such crises. If the 2002–2004 SARS outbreak is any guide, it
might be years before we develop a vaccine against COVID-19. Understanding the effectiveness
of mobility and activity restrictions in containing contagions will not only help us optimize our
current response to COVID-19 but also prepare us better to face future disease outbreaks. The
heterogeneity analysis suggests that increasing stringency alone might not be enough, especially
in developing countries where labour market conditions, lacking in health infrastructure, and con-
straints on implementation infrastructure might limit the effectiveness of these restrictions. Since
the economic downturn can negatively affect the health and welfare outcomes in poorer countries
more than in rich countries, where transition into work from home is relatively easier, this raises
serious concerns about health cost-effectiveness of stringent mobility and activity restrictions in the
absence of complementary policies. The results call for a country-specific policy response suited
to the institutional capacity and socio-economic circumstances of the country.
2 Data and Empirical Specification
2.1 Data and Summary Statistics
For our analyses, we collate and link country-level daily data from the following sources:
2.1.1 Google Community Mobility Reports
In lieu of various nationwide and local lockdown decisions to promote social distancing to reduce
the transmission of the COVID-19 contagion, Google has released publicly daily aggregated data
on changes in mobility across six key high-level location categories in 131 countries. The mobility
measures reflect how busy these places are. The six location categories are groceries and phar-
macies, retail and recreation sites, parks, transit stations, workplaces, and residences. We source
the mobility data from these reports from the 15th of February to the 09th of May reflecting daily
percentage changes in reference to a baseline. The baseline is the median value of mobility for the
corresponding day of the week during the 5-week period of January 3, 2020 to February 6, 2020.
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While a reasonable measure of the extent of compliance to the restrictions, the data comes with
certain caveats. The reports are generated using a technology similar to the real-time anonymized
Google Maps traffic data, and as such are reflective of only those users who have their location
history setting turned on in their Google account (Aktay et al. (2020)). Therefore, while the data
is impressive, it is not representative of the population at large. Another important aspect to note
is that while the residential category shows relative change in daily time spent at home, the other
measures reflect respective daily relative changes in the number of individual visits. So, the resi-
dential category carries a different unit of measurement than the other categories and thus should
be interpreted as such.
2.1.2 Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT)
OxCGRT provides a comprehensive and systematic country-level daily stringency index, con-
structed on the basis of common policy responses implemented by governments to combat COVID-
19 (Hale et al. (2020)). Stringency is measured as a composite score, equally weighted and normal-
ized between 0 and 100 for each country (with 100 being the strictest response), using eight ordinal
indicators of containment, movement restriction and closure policies, and a ninth indicator mea-
suring the coordinated presence of public awareness campaigns on the pandemic. The containment
indicators include school closures, workplace closure, cancellation of public events, restrictions
on gatherings, public transport closure, stay at home requirements, internal movement restrictions,
and international travel controls.
Since the stringency index further tracks how quickly governments implemented or rolled
out such their policy measures, we use the index as our primary independent variable of interest.
As contemporary stringency measures would affect mobility but its affect on the growth of the
pandemic would be observable only days after, we also use 7-day and 14-day lagged values of the
index in our analyses. While the index provides a numerical score to the strictness of the policies
enacted, it does not reflect the compliance or effectiveness of the stringency put in place. Hence,
while a higher score in the index reflects a willingness for greater stringency, it does not translate
to a country’s response being better than countries with a lower score.
2.1.3 COVID-19 Outbreak Data
We source COVID-19 country-specific daily data on confirmed cases per million, deaths attributed
to COVID-19 per million, and recoveries per million from the Johns Hopkins Center for Systems
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combine this with tests per million population data collated by Our World In Data (OWID). Since
it takes some time for delayed reporting to be reflected in the dataset, we restrict our focus to
events between February 15, 2020 to May 9, 2020. OWID collects testing data from country-
specific official government reports and is available only from 85 countries. We then construct
daily growth rates for the four outbreak variables – cases, deaths, recoveries and tests – and use
them as our second set of outcomes. We limit our analysis to the 117 (78 for testing) countries that
we have mobility, stringency, cases, deaths, and recovery data for. The countries are listed in Table
A1.
Several studies and media outlets have reported that due to country-specific differences in
testing rates, data aggregation, and reporting quality, the number of cases, deaths and recovery are
potentially under-reported (Vogel (2020); Bendavid et al. (2020); Burn-Murdoch et al. (2020)).
Testing data, when available, has strong selection bias with many countries screening and testing
only those people who presented symptoms. The extent of this selection bias might be system-
atically related to country-specific characteristics. While we control for country fixed effects in
our empirical specifications, it will not account for systematic changes in selection bias over time
across countries. Therefore, this study, like all studies utilizing the CSSE and the OWID data,
should be interpreted with a healthy dose of skepticism.
2.1.4 Heterogeneity Variables
In order to investigate the heterogeneity in the impact of the restrictions across developing and
developed countries, we link our data with various pre-COVID-19 country-specific demographic,
health, and governance factors, that may aid or hinder the stringency effect on people’s mobil-
ity and the spread of the disease. Along the demography dimension, we examine heterogeneity
by population density, education, poverty head count, inequality (Gini index), share of population
aged 65 years of above, and air pollution per capita (measured by the concentration of suspended
particulate matter in the air with a diameter of 2.5 micrometers or less, PM2.5). We also examine
heterogeneity by available hospital beds per 100 thousand population (a proxy of available health-
care infrastructure), share of the population with hand-washing facilities on premises (a proxy for
availability of tools to combating the growth in transmissions), and death rate form cardiovascular
diseases (CVD) as proxy for share of immune-compromised population who face higher risks from
COVID-19.
Finally, we examine heterogeneity along country’s governance indicators using the Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU) democracy index, government effectiveness from the Worldwide Gover-
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index (CPI) developed by Transparency International (TI), where larger values represent cleaner
countries. The vast majority of data from the demography and health dimensions are sourced from
the World Development Indicators (WDI), United Nations Population Division or the Global Bur-
den of Disease Collaboration Network. Table A2 in the appendix provides details of the sources
for each of the variables used, and Table 1 presents the summary statistics.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
N Mean SD Median Min Max
Oxford Government Response Tracker
Stringency Index 9901 55.04 34.44 67.06 0.00 100.00
Google Mobility Measures
Retail and Recreation (% change) 10115 -34.17 31.00 -33.00 -97.00 37.00
Grocery and Pharmacy (% change) 10111 -17.03 23.90 -11.00 -97.00 76.00
Parks (% change) 10115 -17.49 33.37 -13.00 -95.00 226.00
Transit Stations (% change) 10115 -35.51 30.67 -37.00 -95.00 31.00
Workplaces (% change) 10115 -25.99 27.84 -24.00 -92.00 56.00
Residential (% change) 10063 12.97 11.83 12.00 -5.00 55.00
Outbreak Variables
Tests (Growth Rate) 4339 0.11 0.68 0.05 -0.08 39.78
Confirmed Cases (Growth Rate) 7783 0.15 0.45 0.05 -0.08 14.00
Deaths (Growth Rate) 5416 0.11 0.27 0.03 0.00 4.60
Recoveries (Growth Rate) 6292 0.30 4.48 0.03 -1.00 17.09
Days since first case (by Country) 10030 23.76 27.70 24.00 -55.00 84.00
Heterogeneity Variables
Population Density 10030 286.60 976.95 86.23 1.98 7915.73
Primary Education 6545 79.51 22.26 87.54 13.87 100.00
Poverty Headcount (2011 PPP) 8925 10.05 16.41 1.60 0.00 62.90
Gini Index 8840 38.23 8.19 36.55 24.20 63.00
Population Aged 65 or older 10030 9.88 6.62 7.40 1.14 27.05
PM2.5 (2010-2017 Average) 9860 28.56 19.76 23.67 6.46 98.25
Hospital Beds per 100k Population 9180 3.07 2.51 2.36 0.10 13.05
Handwashing Facilities 4590 57.61 29.79 59.58 2.74 98.99
CVD Death Rate 9945 230.20 113.56 208.26 79.37 597.03
Democracy Score 9520 6.04 2.07 6.42 1.93 9.87
Governance Effectiveness 10030 0.22 0.96 0.11 -2.24 2.23
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The stringency index appears to be skewed to the left with a mean value of 55 below the me-
dian of 67, meaning there is a relatively long tail of days with lower stringency scores. All the
mobility measures, excluding residential mobility, show a percentage decrease in the visits with
the decrease being greatest at about 35.5 percent at transit stations, followed closely by mobility
around retail and recreation sites. On the other hand, the percentage change of time spent at home
increases by about 13 percent. Segregating the measures by developing vis-à-vis developed coun-
tries, reported in Table A3 in the appendix, reveal that compliance to mobility restrictions has been,
expectedly, overall lower in developing countries (for example, while transit stations see a decrease
of 29 percent in developing countries, developed countries see a 38.6 percent decrease).
Mean cumulative daily growth rates of tests, cases, and deaths are 11.2, 14.8, and 11.4 percent,
respectively, and that of recoveries is greater at 30 percent. Finally, while the mean statistic of the
variables provide a snapshot of the overall sample, developing countries are significantly less edu-
cated, poorer, younger, more polluted, lack adequate health infrastructure, face greater corruption,
and have poorer levels of democracy and government effectiveness (see Table A3).
2.2 Empirical Specification
Investigating the causal impact of the level of stringency on the mobility indicators, and COVID-19
outbreak growth rate variables, presents a few empirical challenges. First, governments around the
world enacted these measures in response to the disease situation in their countries. Therefore,
ordinary least squares estimation (OLS) of the associations between stringency of the measures
and the outbreak growth rate could be driven by the reverse causality - countries with worse disease
situations had to enact more stringent measures to control the contagion. Similarly, even without
the announced restrictions, countries with a higher proportion of circumspect population might see
a decrease in both mobility and disease spread. The governments in these countries might have
responded to the expectation this placed on the government to support their citizens. It is also
possible that the outcome measures suffer from non-classical measurement errors. For example,
less educated countries might be less stringent and might also have larger measurement errors in
recording cases, deaths, and recoveries. All these factors will bias the OLS estimates.
In order to address these concerns, we opt an instrumental variable (IV) approach. We use
the level of stringency in countries other than country c on date t, to predict the level of stringency
of the restrictions in country c on date t. The rationale is that governments, in deciding the level
of stringency of the restriction, looked not only at the disease condition in their own country but
also what they expected would happen if they did not impose stricter measures. Since there was no
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particular, they observed the actions other countries in the world were taking. If a country observed
that all other countries in the world were imposing strict restrictions, it was under greater pressure
to enact stricter restrictions regardless of the disease situation at home.3 So, the level of stringency
of the measures in a country c at time tmust be correlated with the stringency of the measures in the
rest of the world, satisfying the relevance requirement for the IV. While the day-to-day variations in
the extent of governments-imposed restrictions in the rest of the world might influence a country’s
propensity to impose mobility and activity restrictions, it should not, at least in the short-run, affect
the level of activity and the growth rate of confirmed cases in the country through other channels.
Therefore, the exclusion restriction is likely to hold.
The first stage of our 2SLS specification is as follows:
First Stage: Stringencyc,t = a+ b× Stringencyw−c,t + θc + δt−i + εc,t (1)
where, Stringencyc,t is the level of stringency of the measures at time t in country c. Stringencyw−c,t
measures the average level of stringency at time t in countries in our sample excluding country c.
In some specifications, we exclude all countries in the same region or sub-region as country c to
minimize any spillovers of infections across borders.4 In our preferred specification, we exclude
all countries in the sub-region while calculating Stringencyw−c,t.5 γc controls for time-invariant
differences across countries that capture factors like differential measurement errors in outcomes
variables, levels of health and health infrastructure, times at which the first case was detected in
different countries, and so on. θi−t controls for affects that are associated with days since the first
confirmed case in the country. We believe θi−t does a better job at capturing the time varying
unobservable factors that might affect stringency across countries, since how the disease spreads
within a country depends on when the first confirmed case was detected. For example, since the
first confirmed case in China was much earlier than in the United States of America, there is no
reason why both countries will have a similar level of unobservable factors affecting Stringencyc,t
on February 15, 2020.
We then use the predicted values of Stringencyc,t in:
Second Stage: Yc,t = α+ β × ̂Stringencyc,t + γc + τi−t + εc,t (2)
3Since a country did not observe the private signal of other countries about how bad they expected the situation to
become, the country used the observable decision of other countries to inform its own decision.
4We use the World Bank’s classification of world regions and sub-regions
5Other definitions we use are: (1) World stringency minus country stringency, (2) Region stringency minus country
stringency, (3) Sub-region stringency minus country stringency, and (4) World stringency minus region stringency. The
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where Yc,t is any of the mobility or outbreak growth rate outcomes for country c at time
t. In some of our second stage specifications, we replace ̂Stringencyc,t with ̂Stringencyc,t−7,
̂Stringencyc,t−14, or ̂Stringencyc,t−21 to account for possibility that the impact of a change in
stringency on the number of confirmed cases, deaths, and recovery might show up after a lag. We
cluster the standards errors at the level of the country.
3 Results
The mobility and activity restrictions enacted by countries around the world aimed at containing
the contagion by limiting human-to-human contact. However, it is not obvious whether these re-
strictions actually limited mobility and activity; it depended on people’s will and ability to observe
these restrictions and their government’s ability to enforce it. For example, multiple factors in-
cluding, but not limited to, the level of education, trust in the government, and ability to maintain
basic consumption expenditure without working, affect the extent to which citizens of a country
might observe the restrictions. In Table 2, we begin by examining the impact of these restrictions
on mobility.
The dependent variables in columns (1) to (6) are the percentage changes in mobility in areas
of the country as compared to the median value for the corresponding day of the week, during the
5-week period of January 3, 2020 to February 6, 2020. The first four panels of the table present the
association between these dependent variables and the stringency of the restrictions in the country
at distinct points in time. The estimated coefficient for Stringency Index (Lag 0) reports the asso-
ciation between mobility and contemporaneous restrictions. Similarly, coefficients for Stringency
Index (Lag 7), Stringency Index (Lag 14), Stringency Index (Lag 21) report the association of the
mobility measures with the stringency of the restrictions seven, fourteen, and twenty one days ago,
respectively. All specifications include country fixed effects and the number of days since the first
case fixed effect, and we cluster the standard errors at the country level. Two observations stand out.
First, the restrictions had the intended impact - countries with stricter restrictions observed higher
reduction in mobility in public areas and an increase in time spent in residential areas.6 Second,
as expected, contemporaneous restrictions matter more than past restrictions. In fact, the mobility
measures had no significant association with the level of stringency of the restrictions twenty-one
days prior. This suggests that the stringency varies a lot over time even within countries.
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Table 2: Impact of stricter restrictions on mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Retail Grocery Parks Transit Stations Workplaces Residential
Recreation Pharmacy
Ordinary Least Squares
Stringency Index (Lag 0) -0.8976*** -0.5629*** -0.6857*** -0.8635*** -0.7509*** 0.3177***
(0.0344) (0.0362) (0.0477) (0.0309) (0.0317) (0.0146)
Mean of DV -43.568 -22.383 -23.327 -44.998 -33.865 16.376
Stringency Index (Lag 7) -0.6906*** -0.5378*** -0.5411*** -0.6667*** -0.6077*** 0.2540***
(0.0373) (0.0367) (0.0463) (0.0354) (0.0327) (0.0144)
Mean of DV -44.515 -22.870 -23.997 -46.047 -34.605 16.734
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.2996*** -0.2760*** -0.2354*** -0.2725*** -0.2773*** 0.1131***
(0.0408) (0.0346) (0.0430) (0.0397) (0.0333) (0.0152)
Mean of DV -45.798 -23.569 -24.846 -47.394 -35.593 17.186
Stringency Index (Lag 21) 0.0291 -0.0241 0.0284 0.0488 0.0159 -0.0135
(0.0470) (0.0372) (0.0461) (0.0469) (0.0400) (0.0182)
Mean of DV -48.342 -25.046 -26.343 -49.983 -37.705 18.090
2SLS: Excluding Subregion IV
Stringency Index (Lag 0) -1.1042*** -0.6644*** -0.7332*** -1.0775*** -0.9591*** 0.3805***
(0.0448) (0.0400) (0.0792) (0.0401) (0.0361) (0.0179)
Mean of DV -43.567 -22.378 -23.332 -44.998 -33.861 16.376
F-Stat 303.458 303.405 303.458 303.458 303.458 302.388
Stringency Index (Lag 7) -0.9821*** -0.7383*** -0.6374*** -0.9706*** -0.9403*** 0.3651***
(0.0491) (0.0411) (0.0695) (0.0485) (0.0449) (0.0199)
Mean of DV -44.514 -22.865 -24.001 -46.047 -34.600 16.734
F-Stat 306.084 306.032 306.084 306.084 306.084 303.958
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.4120*** -0.4438*** -0.1999*** -0.4119*** -0.5168*** 0.1831***
(0.0529) (0.0472) (0.0546) (0.0517) (0.0487) (0.0205)
Mean of DV -45.797 -23.563 -24.851 -47.393 -35.588 17.185
F-Stat 299.846 299.693 299.846 299.846 299.846 297.280
Stringency Index (Lag 21) 0.0374 -0.1182 -0.2874 0.0756 -0.0125 0.0279
(0.1457) (0.1088) (0.1450) (0.2428) (0.1272) (0.0520)
Mean of DV -48.340 -25.039 -26.348 -49.982 -37.699 18.089
F-Stat 59.144 59.105 59.144 59.144 59.144 59.266
Fixed Effects Country; Days since first case
Number of country 117 117 117 117 117 117
Observations (Lag 0) 7,701 7,697 7,701 7,701 7,701 7,655
Observations (Lag 7) 7,617 7,613 7,617 7,617 7,617 7,570
Observations (Lag 14) 7,389 7,385 7,389 7,389 7,389 7,342
Observations (Lag 21) 6,983 6,979 6,983 6,983 6,983 6,936
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
The next four panels of the table present the results from the instrumental variable (IV) ap-
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the rest of the world to predict the level of stringency in a country.7 We use several definitions of the
instrumental variable, all of which yield similar results. We present these results using alternative
instruments in Appendix Tables A4 and A5. In what follows, we present results from our most-
preferred IV specification where we use the stringency in the countries outside the sub-region to
which the country belongs. Excluding countries from the sub-regions minimizes the chances of the
stringency in other countries affecting the mobility or spread of the disease in the country through
pathways other than affecting the country’s restriction stringency. Compared to the association
results in the first four panels, the IV causal estimates are larger in magnitude. But the two broad
observations remain unchanged - countries with stricter restrictions observed higher reduction in
mobility, and contemporaneous restrictions matter more than past restrictions.
Next, in Table 3, we examine the impact of the level of stringency of the restrictions on the
growth rates of the numbers of tests conducted, confirmed cases, deaths attributed to COVID-19,
and recoveries across time in different countries.8 The first four panels present the associations for
comparison, but the discussion hereon will focus on the IV results. Compared to Table 2 where the
contemporaneous restrictions had the largest impact on mobility, the stringency of the measures
seven days and fourteen days ago have a much larger impact on the growth rate of confirmed
cases and deaths attributed to COVID-19. Given the current scientific understanding that the virus
has an incubation and infection period of up to fourteen days, this is expected. Second, even if
we focus only on the effect of stringency in seven or fourteen days prior, there appears to be no
strong effect on the number of tests. We expected this too. There is no reason why the number of
tests conducted, given the testing infrastructure of a country is controlled for by the country fixed
effect, would have been affected by a decrease in mobility.9 But the more stringent the measures,
the lower the growth in the number of confirmed cases and deaths attributed to COVID-19. The
impact on cases and deaths suggest that stricter restrictions achieved their goal of containing the
contagion. The impact on recoveries, even though sometimes large and in the right direction, is
7The rationale, once again, is that countries, while deciding to the on the level of stringency responded not only to
the disease situation in the country but also to how it was expected to evolve. To predict how the situation would have
evolved and what the optimal level of stringency might have been, every country looked at the rest of the countries in
the world. Therefore, while the level of stringency in the rest of the world affected the stringency of the restrictions in a
country, it did not affect the mobility and the disease situation in the country directly. That is, the exclusion restriction
is likely to be satisfied.
8While we cannot rule out systematic (non-classical) measurement error in these outcome variables, we follow
other researchers and assume that these measurement errors are classical in nature and do not add bias to the estimated
coefficients.
9It is possible that with reduced mobility, events like accidents that require medical attention decreases reducing the
pressure on the health infrastructure that could then be devoted to COVID-19 testing. However, that would have lead to
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mostly statistically insignificant.
Table 3: Impact of stricter restrictions on growth rates of tests, cases, deaths, and recoveries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Tests Cases Deaths Recoveries
Ordinary Least Squares
Stringency Index (Lag 0) -0.0023 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0178**
(0.0018) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0090)
Mean of DV 0.112 0.149 0.116 0.304
Stringency Index (Lag 7) -0.0021* -0.0028*** -0.0011** 0.0056**
(0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0027)
Mean of DV 0.110 0.150 0.115 0.303
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0010*** -0.0020*** -0.0018*** -0.0070
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0063)
Mean of DV 0.098 0.145 0.114 0.306
Stringency Index (Lag 21) -0.0002 -0.0008*** -0.0019*** -0.0100*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0054)
Mean of DV 0.092 0.134 0.112 0.314
2SLS: Excluding Subregion IV
Stringency Index (Lag 0) -0.0047 -0.0009* -0.0009 0.0168**
(0.0030) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0072)
Mean of DV 0.112 0.149 0.116 0.304
F-Stat 77.081 299.485 46.873 158.483
Stringency Index (Lag 7) -0.0033* -0.0029*** -0.0024*** 0.0024
(0.0018) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0036)
Mean of DV 0.110 0.150 0.115 0.303
F-Stat 114.377 305.991 127.046 220.038
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0005 -0.0029*** -0.0032*** -0.0127
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0090)
Mean of DV 0.098 0.145 0.114 0.306
F-Stat 128.357 298.155 244.166 277.915
Stringency Index (Lag 21) 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0027*** -0.0140*
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0083)
Mean of DV 0.092 0.134 0.112 0.314
F-Stat 100.106 237.133 244.085 238.362
Fixed Effects Country; Days since first case
Number of country 72 117 108 113
Observations (Lag 0) 4,113 7,607 5,277 6,141
Observations (Lag 7) 4,063 7,525 5,333 6,081
Observations (Lag 14) 4,008 7,319 5,300 5,939
Observations (Lag 21) 3,867 6,932 5,240 5,755
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
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But were restrictions equally effective across developing and developed countries, and ade-
quate to contain the contagion? Heterogeneity analysis by demography, the status of the health
infrastructure, and governance indicators will help us understand the mechanisms and the role of
other institutional and cultural factors. To find out, we split the sample of countries at the median
along a range of characteristics and repeat the analysis. We present the heterogeneity in the impact
of stringency on mobility in Tables 4 and 5. The first and last three columns in each panel report the
impact of imposing stricter restrictions on cases, deaths, and recovery in countries below and above
the median along the different dimensions. Comparing column (1) with column (4), column (2)
with column (5), and column (3) with column (6), stricter restrictions worked in limiting mobility
better in densely populated, poorer, more unequal, more polluted countries with younger but un-
healthier populations and worse health infrastructure. From their description, and affirmed by the
segregated summary statistics presented in Table A3, these characteristics belong to the relatively
less-developed countries in the sample. The restrictions also worked better in more democratic
countries, with better government effectiveness and lower perceived levels of corruption.
However, this stronger effect of stringency on mobility does not imply that the relatively
less-developed countries contained the contagion better. First, it is important to note that upon
announcement of lockdowns, less-developed countries generally faced a mass migration of urban
migrant workers moving back to their homes in rural areas, before the lockdown is in effect (see
for example, Roy and Agarwal (2020) for the case in India). With limited mobility (or mobility
not captured in the Google data) in their rural homes, this can contribute to the stronger stringency
effect on mobility for less-developed countries, but does not translate to better contagion contain-
ment. Second, it is entirely possible that people in more developed countries were already socially
distancing even in the absence of these restrictions (Maloney and Taskin (2020)). Similarly, it is
also possible that countries with population in better health and adequate health infrastructure, han-
dled the infections better, even if the restrictions were not stringent or if the populations were lax
about observing them.10
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Table 4: Heterogenous impact of stricter restrictions on mobility 01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Transit Workplaces Residential Transit Workplaces Residential
Stations Stations
< Median > Median
Population Density
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.3893*** -0.5110*** 0.1621*** -0.5251*** -0.5097*** 0.1965***
(0.0777) (0.0756) (0.0306) (0.0723) (0.0645) (0.0276)
Observations 3,513 3,513 3,499 3,878 3,878 3,845
Number of country 58 58 58 59 59 59
Mean of DV -45.481 -33.615 16.332 -49.126 -37.375 17.961
F-Stat 155.829 155.829 153.769 125.467 125.467 125.219
Primary Education
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.3679*** -0.4488*** 0.1750*** -0.5428*** -0.5568*** 0.2927***
(0.0819) (0.0748) (0.0323) (0.0663) (0.0634) (0.0257)
Observations 2,345 2,345 2,332 5,046 5,046 5,012
Number of country 38 38 38 79 79 79
Mean of DV -51.445 -37.950 19.637 -45.511 -34.490 16.044
F-Stat 173.657 173.657 173.474 168.153 168.153 166.004
Poverty Head Count
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.3438*** -0.4193*** 0.1557*** -0.5512*** -0.6424*** 0.2392***
(0.0817) (0.0696) (0.0303) (0.0749) (0.0730) (0.0309)
Observations 3,441 3,441 3,439 3,950 3,950 3,905
Number of country 51 51 51 66 66 66
Mean of DV -47.607 -37.839 16.281 -47.207 -33.627 17.981
F-Stat 126.350 126.350 126.203 154.908 154.908 152.585
Gini Index
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.3976*** -0.4974*** 0.1666*** -0.4734*** -0.5590*** 0.2161***
(0.0834) (0.0803) (0.0289) (0.0703) (0.0650) (0.0297)
Observations 3,480 3,480 3,478 3,911 3,911 3,866
Number of country 52 52 52 65 65 65
Mean of DV -44.932 -34.470 14.497 -49.584 -36.582 19.603
F-Stat 98.720 98.720 98.593 199.702 199.702 197.319
Age 65 & Older
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.5122*** -0.5472*** 0.2133*** -0.3741*** -0.5166*** 0.1818***
(0.0767) (0.0704) (0.0310) (0.0744) (0.0701) (0.0290)
Observations 3,512 3,512 3,485 3,879 3,879 3,859
Number of country 59 59 59 58 58 58
Mean of DV -46.549 -32.707 17.672 -48.158 -38.196 16.745
F-Stat 133.420 133.420 132.017 135.047 135.047 137.220
PM2.5
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.4022*** -0.5205*** 0.1860*** -0.4789*** -0.5449*** 0.2032***
(0.0690) (0.0666) (0.0297) (0.0795) (0.0744) (0.0311)
Observations 3,761 3,761 3,752 3,630 3,630 3,592
Number of country 57 57 57 60 60 60
Mean of DV -48.224 -37.724 17.266 -46.533 -33.375 17.101
F-Stat 176.502 176.502 175.536 119.232 119.232 117.192
FE Country; Days since first case
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
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Table 5: Heterogenous impact of stricter restrictions on mobility 02
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Transit Workplaces Residential Transit Workplaces Residential
Stations Stations
< Median > Median
Hospital Beds per 100k
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.4501*** -0.5076*** 0.1894*** -0.4025*** -0.5276*** 0.1859***
(0.0717) (0.0665) (0.0285) (0.0705) (0.0668) (0.0275)
Observations 3,271 3,271 3,251 4,120 4,120 4,093
Number of country 54 54 54 63 63 63
Mean of DV -47.988 -34.815 18.474 -46.922 -36.201 16.161
F-Stat 189.553 189.553 187.191 130.292 130.292 130.560
Handwashing Facilities
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.8003*** -0.7785*** 0.3288*** -0.3398*** -0.4575*** 0.1550***
(0.1494) (0.1435) (0.0646) (0.0520) (0.0500) (0.0204)
Observations 1,530 1,530 1,530 5,861 5,861 5,814
Number of country 27 27 27 90 90 90
Mean of DV -41.393 -29.052 16.808 -48.960 -37.294 17.284
F-Stat 73.924 73.924 73.924 226.589 226.589 224.396
Cardiovascular Diseases Death Rate
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.3991*** -0.5182*** 0.1814*** -0.4492*** -0.5290*** 0.1915***
(0.0679) (0.0646) (0.0271) (0.0794) (0.0763) (0.0308)
Observations 3,790 3,790 3,764 3,601 3,601 3,580
Number of country 58 58 58 59 59 59
Mean of DV -49.565 -38.488 18.567 -45.108 -32.536 15.732
F-Stat 174.289 174.289 169.300 109.755 109.755 109.745
Democracy Score
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.4281*** -0.3849*** 0.1814*** -0.4700*** -0.5942*** 0.2168***
(0.0789) (0.0757) (0.0309) (0.0702) (0.0641) (0.0280)
Observations 3,344 3,344 3,337 4,047 4,047 4,007
Number of country 55 55 55 62 62 62
Mean of DV -45.116 -32.235 16.751 -49.276 -38.358 17.546
F-Stat 129.313 129.313 128.962 137.939 137.939 135.267
Government Effectiveness
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.4161*** -0.3741*** 0.1750*** -0.4926*** -0.6096*** 0.2211***
(0.0762) (0.0731) (0.0300) (0.0784) (0.0744) (0.0322)
Observations 3,518 3,518 3,504 3,873 3,873 3,840
Number of country 59 59 59 58 58 58
Mean of DV -45.882 -34.003 17.370 -48.766 -37.028 17.016
F-Stat 119.758 119.758 118.808 138.460 138.460 136.651
Corruption Perception Index
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.3993*** -0.3361*** 0.1597*** -0.4951*** -0.6195*** 0.2283***
(0.0814) (0.0756) (0.0311) (0.0692) (0.0644) (0.0282)
Observations 3,060 3,060 3,053 4,331 4,331 4,291
Number of country 51 51 51 66 66 66
Mean of DV -45.422 -33.445 17.427 -48.787 -37.102 17.013
F-Stat 104.360 104.360 104.185 175.311 175.311 172.424
FE Country; Days since first case
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
We see this in Tables 6 and 7. As opposed to the results in Tables 4 and 5, stricter measures
for containing the contagion did better in richer, more equal, less-polluted countries with older but
healthier populations and better health infrastructure. From the description, the country character-
istics reflect relatively more developed countries in the sample.11 Not surprisingly, the restrictions
also worked better in more democratic countries, with better government effectiveness and lower
perceived levels of corruption. The results from tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 taken together suggest that even
though stricter restrictions worked better at limiting mobility in relatively less developed countries,
it did not translate into better control of the contagion. To see this, note that:
d (growth rate of cases or deaths)
d (Mobility)
=




That is, the ratio of the causal IV estimate of the impact of the stringency index on the growth
rates to the impact of the stringency index on mobility, is an estimate of how mobility affected the
growth rates of cases or deaths in different countries. We present these ratios in 8.12 We use the
estimated effect on the mobility at public transport transit stations as the denominator to calculate
these ratios. Using alternative measures of mobility produce similar results.
For the sake of completeness, we also present in table 8 the ratio of the impact on recovery
to impact on mobility at transit stations. However, since the impact of stricter restrictions on
recovery are almost always insignificant, we focus on the ratios for cases and deaths. Comparing
the ratios in column (1) with column (4) and column (2) with column (5), it is clear that the decrease
in mobility had a larger effect in more developed countries with better health infrastructure and
governance. For example, a unit decrease in mobility in countries with more than the median
number of hospital beds per 100,000 people causes a 0.006 unit decrease in the growth of deaths
attributed to COVID-19. The corresponding figure for countries with less than median number of
hospital beds per 100,000 people is 0.002. With relatively few exceptions, the results suggest that
developed countries benefited more from reduction in mobility than developing countries.13
11These results are in partly in contrast with association results from Jinjarak et al. (2020) that finds that the correlation
between stricter pandemic policies and lower future mortality growth was more pronounced in countries with a greater
proportion of the elderly population, higher density, greater proportion of employees in vulnerable occupations, greater
democratic freedom, more international travels, and further distance from the equator. The differences in our findings
highly the need to distinguish causal effects of these restrictions from associations.
12A more methodological sound approach is to use the 3-Stages Least Square Methodology. But it comes with
additional assumptions. Similarly, we can add level of significance and standard errors to these ratios. But the point we
wish to make can be made simply by comparing these ratios.
13This result is consistent with Barnett-Howell and Mobarak (2020) who also report much lower estimated benefits
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Table 6: Heterogenous impact of stricter restrictions on growth rates of cases, deaths, and recoveries 01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Cases Deaths Recovery Cases Deaths Recovery
< Median > Median
Population Density
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0027*** -0.0026** 0.0117** -0.0041*** -0.0028** -0.0034
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0047) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0042)
Observations 3,518 2,422 2,671 4,009 2,914 3,413
Number of country 58 53 56 59 55 57
Mean of DV 0.150 0.114 0.263 0.151 0.116 0.334
F-Stat 184.961 134.058 164.411 122.684 55.175 94.257
Primary Education
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0010 -0.0009 0.0041** -0.0036*** -0.0025*** 0.0038
(0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0053)
Observations 2,366 1,640 1,929 5,161 3,696 4,155
Number of country 38 34 38 79 74 75
Mean of DV 0.161 0.108 0.200 0.145 0.118 0.350
F-Stat 197.516 88.825 225.520 184.958 82.043 128.590
Poverty Head Count
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0040*** -0.0019** 0.0018 -0.0020** -0.0020 0.0020
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0060) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0027)
Observations 3,556 2,723 3,088 3,971 2,613 2,996
Number of country 51 50 51 66 58 62
Mean of DV 0.154 0.131 0.411 0.147 0.098 0.191
F-Stat 170.724 94.956 152.729 123.444 22.485 62.173
Gini Index
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0025*** -0.0017** 0.0040*** -0.0026*** -0.0014 -0.0018
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0071)
Observations 3,595 2,590 3,075 3,932 2,746 3,009
Number of country 52 48 51 65 60 62
Mean of DV 0.149 0.131 0.418 0.151 0.100 0.185
F-Stat 132.052 85.478 126.623 149.001 25.938 76.008
Age 65 & Older
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0022** -0.0018* 0.0018 -0.0032*** -0.0019** 0.0022
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0069)
Observations 3,532 2,238 2,738 3,995 3,098 3,346
Number of country 59 50 57 58 58 56
Mean of DV 0.150 0.099 0.182 0.151 0.127 0.401
F-Stat 156.680 87.763 146.525 126.848 71.324 94.809
PM2.5
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0032*** -0.0029*** 0.0009 -0.0026** -0.0007 0.0016
(0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0066) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0022)
Observations 3,848 2,960 3,204 3,679 2,376 2,880
Number of country 57 55 55 60 53 58
Mean of DV 0.152 0.131 0.414 0.149 0.096 0.179
F-Stat 201.158 110.374 142.214 120.273 23.316 89.538
FE Country; Days since first case
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
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Table 7: Heterogenous impact of stricter restrictions on growth rates of cases, deaths, and recoveries 02
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Cases Deaths Recovery Cases Deaths Recovery
< Median > Median
Hospital Beds per 100k
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0028*** -0.0009 0.0022 -0.0028*** -0.0025*** 0.0027
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0026) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0063)
Observations 3,311 2,335 2,600 4,216 3,001 3,484
Number of country 54 50 53 63 58 60
Mean of DV 0.157 0.106 0.208 0.145 0.122 0.373
F-Stat 215.723 102.682 225.611 132.499 73.230 103.493
Handwashing Facilities
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0007 -0.0012 0.0041** -0.0030*** -0.0022*** 0.0013
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0047)
Observations 1,529 876 1,174 5,998 4,460 4,910
Number of country 27 21 27 90 87 86
Mean of DV 0.147 0.100 0.164 0.151 0.118 0.336
F-Stat 86.892 133.378 275.484 236.312 109.709 166.313
Cardiovascular Diseases Death Rate
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0035*** -0.0034** 0.0041 -0.0022** -0.0019* 0.0014
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0063) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0021)
Observations 3,909 3,039 3,244 3,618 2,297 2,840
Number of country 58 57 56 59 51 57
Mean of DV 0.155 0.123 0.415 0.145 0.104 0.174
F-Stat 166.194 79.668 101.821 122.073 85.867 112.774
Democracy Score
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0010 -0.0007 0.0018 -0.0035*** -0.0026*** 0.0033
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0062)
Observations 3,376 2,131 2,684 4,151 3,205 3,400
Number of country 55 48 54 62 60 59
Mean of DV 0.152 0.099 0.174 0.149 0.126 0.404
F-Stat 118.138 79.102 87.654 166.684 81.403 116.450
Government Effectiveness
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0022*** -0.0006 0.0027 -0.0032*** -0.0024*** 0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0029) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0060)
Observations 3,524 2,323 2,710 4,003 3,013 3,374
Number of country 59 51 57 58 57 56
Mean of DV 0.153 0.108 0.207 0.148 0.120 0.380
F-Stat 129.661 135.962 92.951 142.381 58.642 106.264
Corruption Perception Index
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0019** -0.0011 0.0024 -0.0035*** -0.0032*** 0.0011
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0029) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0061)
Observations 3,079 2,076 2,404 4,448 3,260 3,680
Number of country 51 44 50 66 64 63
Mean of DV 0.152 0.105 0.205 0.149 0.121 0.366
F-Stat 123.339 118.122 120.891 169.900 64.596 110.002
FE Country; Days since first case
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
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Table 8: Ratio of the estimated effect on growth rates to the estimated effect on mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Cases Deaths Recovery Cases Deaths Recovery
< Median > Median
Population Density 0.007 0.007 -0.030 0.008 0.005 0.006
Primary Education 0.003 0.002 -0.011 0.007 0.004 -0.007
Poverty Head Count 0.012 0.006 -0.005 0.004 0.004 -0.004
Gini Index 0.006 0.004 -0.010 0.005 0.003 0.004
Age 65 & Older 0.004 0.004 -0.004 0.009 0.005 -0.006
PM2.5 0.008 0.007 -0.002 0.005 0.001 -0.003
Hospital Beds per 100k 0.006 0.002 -0.005 0.007 0.006 -0.007
Handwashing Facilities 0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.009 0.006 -0.004
Cardiovascular Diseases Death Rate 0.009 0.009 -0.010 0.005 0.004 -0.003
Democracy Score 0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.007 0.006 -0.007
Government Effectiveness 0.005 0.001 -0.006 0.007 0.005 -0.001
Corruption Perception Index 0.005 0.003 -0.006 0.007 0.006 0.002
The heterogeneity results provide some elucidation to the possible reasons. Given that the
population, on average, in relatively less-developed countries is more immunocompromised, fewer
people are able to fight off the infections.14 Stringency measures are unable to counter the rise in
cases and deaths, catalyzed by immunodeficiency. This is further aggravated by the fact that strin-
gent mobility measures lower disease rise at the cost of people’s economic opportunities. With high
poverty rates, poor people will thus place greater value on their livelihoods relative to contracting
the infection. The reduction in economic activity due to the restrictions could directly affect the
daily consumption of poorer people, further compromising their immune system. Lack of access
to adequate handwashing facilities also further hinders their ability to combat the virus, even in the
14There is a growing amount of scientific evidence that point towards people with better immune systems being able
to fight SARS-CoV-2 infection better. See, for example Shi et al. (2020). People who are able to fight off the viral
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presence of greater stringency.
The idea of instilling mobility restrictions is to flatten the curve and thereby lower the disease
burden on the health infrastructure. However, most less-developed countries have limited number
of hospital beds and ventilators. If these are already over-whelmed and inaccessible, flattening
the curve is only marginally useful compared to countries with better and accessible health infras-
tructure, and the effect of stringcy measures would be, accordingly, much lower. Furthermore, the
higher population density in less-developed countries could mean a higher rate of human-to-human
contact and transfer even with lower mobility than richer countries. Finally, another reason could
be that less-developed countries lacked the knowledge of best-practices to follow when a person
who tested positive was isolated either at home or at the hospital. Poorer government effectiveness
and more corruption also means sluggish enforcement of recommended best-practices.
Whatever be the reason(s), one clear inference from this final result is that mobility measures
alone were not and will not be sufficient to contain the contagion in developing countries. What
is worse is that on top of the relatively worse performance of decrease in mobility in controlling
the spread, the economic cost of these restrictions are also higher in these countries. With weaker
social security support and reliance on daily wages for consumption, restrictions on economic
activity mean that poorer countries face a catch-22 much worse than the richer countries. Finding
a solution could be difficult without external support.
4 Conclusion
Some have claimed that governments across the world have responded slowly and insufficiently to
the COVID-19 pandemic (The Lancet (2020)). Others have highlighted the real threats of stricter
restrictions (Ravallion (2020)). It is, therefore, imperative to understand how effective the restric-
tions implemented by the countries across the world are. Compared to earlier evaluations of these
restrictions that document a strong negative association between the stringency of the restrictions
and the spread of the disease, we use an instrumental variable approach to estimate the causal effect
of the restrictions.
We find that while the restrictions implemented affected mobility and the spread of the disease,
there was considerably heterogeneity across countries. While stricter measures reduce mobility
more in less-developed countries, it does not contain the contagion as effectively as it does in
developed countries. Thus, it would seem less-developed countries have less to gain from stricter
mobility restrictions. This could result from the lower levels of awareness, poorer health conditions
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complement restriction policies with awareness, economic and health assistance schemes.
It is, however, unclear what these complementary policies could be. From direct monetary
help to only partial shutdowns, there is a range of policies to choose from. Future research should
investigate the effectiveness of these alternative complementary policies in increasing the effective-
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Appendix
Table A1: List of Countries
# Country Stringency Cases # Country Stringency Cases
Index Growth Rate Index Growth Rate
1 Afghanistan 50.056 .153 60 Libya 88.541 .208
2 Angola 84.413 .075 61 Luxembourg 67.045 .172
3 Argentina 79.216 .172 62 Malaysia 53.761 .077
4 Aruba 69.340 .100 63 Mali 76.190 .192
5 Australia 49.116 .081 64 Mauritius 85.027 .139
6 Austria 63.530 .148 65 Mexico 56.029 .158
7 Bahrain 64.758 .229 66 Moldova 78.445 .171
8 Bangladesh 78.700 .158 67 Mongolia 65.153 .097
9 Barbados 80.394 .121 68 Mozambique 53.203 .153
10 Belarus 11.047 .181 69 Myanmar 76.925 .115
11 Belgium 57.854 .181 70 Namibia 64.296 .047
12 Belize 64.521 .086 71 Nepal 61.150 .068
13 Benin 53.961 .133 72 Netherlands 66.337 .193
14 Bolivia 89.296 .151 73 New Zealand 71.856 .123
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina 78.140 .172 74 Nicaragua 13.260 .069
16 Botswana 86.168 .066 75 Niger 60.327 .218
17 Brazil 55.017 .197 76 Nigeria 57.909 .141
18 Bulgaria 68.718 .143 77 Norway 62.489 .170
19 Burkina Faso 75.651 .172 78 Oman 68.540 .117
20 Cameroon 57.931 .158 79 Pakistan 75.192 .201
21 Canada 50.817 .119 80 Panama 73.834 .245
22 Cape Verde 75.741 .152 81 Papua New Guinea 74.159 .096
23 Chile 59.446 .190 82 Paraguay 85.995 .154
24 Colombia 76.634 .192 83 Peru 87.598 .261
25 Costa Rica 68.742 .155 84 Philippines 72.511 .124
26 Cote d’Ivoire 75.580 .179 85 Poland 70.174 .201
27 Croatia 72.261 .123 86 Portugal 71.590 .170
28 Czech Republic 64.538 .135 87 Puerto Rico 96.835 .093
29 Denmark 71.204 .167 88 Qatar 74.145 .282
30 Dominican Republic 73.720 .183 89 Romania 72.632 .165
31 Ecuador 76.866 .238 90 Rwanda 92.702 .158
32 Egypt 53.374 .158 91 Saudi Arabia 77.283 .212
33 El Salvador 92.936 .166 92 Senegal 52.949 .144
34 Estonia 58.387 .141 93 Serbia 85.981 .216
35 Finland 56.220 .129 94 Singapore 54.101 .073
36 France 67.215 .131 95 Slovakia 76.697 .147
37 Gabon 68.453 .149 96 Slovenia 75.849 .178
38 Georgia 79.713 .112 97 South Africa 73.410 .175
39 Germany 57.094 .132 98 South Korea 62.016 .089
40 Ghana 66.817 .171 99 Spain 63.260 .174
41 Greece 70.640 .147 100 Sri Lanka 63.661 .097
42 Guatemala 93.115 .190 101 Sweden 28.324 .156
43 Honduras 94.689 .138 102 Switzerland 64.134 .230
44 Hungary 68.523 .131 103 Taiwan 28.324 .042
45 India 65.155 .159 104 Tanzania 45.349 .158
46 Indonesia 56.511 .166 105 Thailand 50.180 .063
47 Iraq 82.571 .148 106 Trinidad and Tobago 76.006 .145
48 Ireland 69.106 .182 107 Turkey 72.869 .373
49 Israel 71.557 .154 108 Uganda 87.276 .243
50 Italy 80.108 .206 109 United Arab Emirates 58.885 .102
51 Jamaica 76.759 .123 110 United Kingdom 51.247 .135
52 Japan 47.249 .076 111 United States 49.452 .157
53 Jordan 78.330 .271 112 Uruguay 70.600 .119
54 Kazakhstan 79.759 .149 113 Venezuela 83.516 .086
55 Kenya 83.182 .147 114 Vietnam 66.303 .037
56 Kuwait 72.466 .124 115 Yemen 44.793 .241
57 Kyrgyzstan 84.603 .147 116 Zambia 52.778 .126
58 Laos 85.710 .073 117 Zimbabwe 82.384 .096
59 Lebanon 67.771 .118
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Table A2: Data Sources
Variable Data Source
Stringency Index Oxford Government Response Tracker
Retail and Recreation (% change) Google Community Mobility Report
Grocery and Pharmacy (% change) Google Community Mobility Report
Parks (% change) Google Community Mobility Report
Transit Stations (% change) Google Community Mobility Report
Workplaces (% change) Google Community Mobility Report
Residential (% change) Google Community Mobility Report
Tests (Growth Rate) Our World In Data (OWID)
Confirmed Cases (Growth Rate) Johns Hopkins Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE)
Deaths (Growth Rate) Johns Hopkins Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE)
Recoveries (Growth Rate) Johns Hopkins Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE)
Population Density World Development Indicators (most recent year available)
Primary Education World Development Indicators (most recent year available)
Poverty Headcount (2011 PPP) World Development Indicators (most recent year available)
Gini Index World Development Indicators (most recent year available)
Population Aged 65 or older World Development Indicators (most recent year available)
PM2.5 (2010-2017 Average) World Development Indicators
Hospital Beds per 100k Population OECD, Eurostat, World Bank, National Government Records,
and other sources (most recent year available since 2010)
Handwashing Facilities United Nations Statistics Division (most recent year available)
CVD Death Rate Global Burden of Disease Study 2017 Results
Democracy Score Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
Governance Effectiveness Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
























































Table A3: Summary statistics by level of development
N Mean SD Median Min Max N Mean SD Median Min Max
Developing Countries Developed Countries
Oxford Government Response Tracker
Stringency Index 3244 51.280 34.632 53.830 0.000 100.000 6657 56.869 34.197 71.420 0.000 100 .000
Google Mobility Measures
Retail and Recreation (% change) 3315 -27.056 28.057 -19.000 -94.000 28.000 6800 -37.630 31.774 -42.000 -97.000 37.000
Grocery and Pharmacy (% change) 3315 -16.636 23.152 -8.000 -95.000 34.000 6796 -17.222 24.251 -12.000 -97.000 76.000
Parks (% change) 3315 -17.276 20.814 -12.000 -90.000 65.000 6800 -17.599 38.020 -14.000 -95.000 226.000
Transit Stations (% change) 3315 -28.985 28.270 -23.000 -92.000 23.000 6800 -38.684 31.279 -46.000 -95.000 31.000
Workplaces (% change) 3315 -18.124 26.364 -10.000 -87.000 56.000 6800 -29.826 27.730 -33.000 -92.000 43.000
Residential (% change) 3290 10.948 11.167 9.000 -5.000 49.000 6773 13.959 12.011 14.000 -5.000 55.000
Outbreak Variables
Tests (Growth Rate) 878 0.117 0.447 0.055 0.000 9.856 3461 0.111 0.731 0.047 -0.084 39.778
Confirmed Cases (Growth Rate) 2321 0.137 0.413 0.038 0.000 7.955 5462 0.152 0.470 0.050 -0.077 14.000
Deaths (Growth Rate) 1417 0.096 0.263 0.000 0.000 3.007 3999 0.121 0.277 0.037 0.000 4.598
Recoveries (Growth Rate) 1774 0.163 0.827 0.023 -0.912 14.500 4518 0.354 5.265 0.033 -1.000 17.086
Days since first case (by Country) 3315 17.385 28.002 17.000 -55.000 84.000 6715 26.911 26.997 27.000 -46.000 84.000
Heterogeneity Variables
Population Density 3230 152.582 219.197 82.025 1.980 1265.036 6800 350.257 1171.510 94.592 3.078 7915.731
Primary Education 1785 52.196 22.313 51.424 13.870 99.442 4760 89.755 10.491 92.306 61.796 100.000
Poverty Headcount (2011 PPP) 3145 24.641 20.182 21.200 0.000 62.900 5780 2.110 3.909 0.500 0.000 18.900
Gini Index 3145 40.122 7.188 40.500 25.700 57.100 5695 37.178 8.508 34.900 24.200 63.000
Population Aged 65 or older 3230 4.199 1.841 3.597 2.168 10.864 6800 12.575 6.363 13.921 1.144 27.049
PM2.5 (2010-2017 Average) 3230 40.514 20.968 33.802 13.805 98.248 6630 22.738 16.224 17.919 6.455 87.022
Hospital Beds per 100k Population 2720 1.437 1.532 0.900 0.100 7.000 6460 3.762 2.524 2.965 0.600 13.050
Handwashing Facilities 2975 45.206 27.828 41.949 2.735 90.650 1615 80.458 17.033 87.847 43.993 99.000
CVD Death Rate 3315 296.950 115.538 268.024 103.957 597.029 6630 196.817 96.585 170.668 79.370 496.218
Democracy Score 3060 4.729 1.440 4.970 1.950 7.730 6460 6.662 2.036 7.090 1.930 9.870
Governance Effectiveness 3230 -0.533 0.575 -0.595 -2.244 1.362 6800 0.575 0.896 0.472 -1.847 2.231
Corruption Perception Index 3145 32.378 9.022 33.000 14.000 57.000 6375 54.547 19.224 52.000 17.000 88.000
Note: Here Low- and Lower Middle-Income Countries are categorized as developing countries while High- and Upper Middle-Income Countries are
categorized as Developed countries. Low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method,
of $1,025 or less in 2018; lower middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $1,026 and $3,995; upper middle-income economies are
those with a GNI per capita between $3,996 and $12,375; high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of $12,376 or more.
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Table A4: Impact on mobility using alternative instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Retail Grocery Parks Transit Stations Workplaces Residential
Recreation Pharmacy
2SLS: World excluding Country IV
Stringency Index (Lag 0) -1.1056*** -0.6678*** -0.7514*** -1.0768*** -0.9559*** 0.3814***
(0.0451) (0.0401) (0.0790) (0.0400) (0.0363) (0.0179)
Mean of DV -43.567 -22.378 -23.332 -44.998 -33.861 16.376
F-Stat 346.324 346.294 346.324 346.324 346.324 345.179
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.4175*** -0.4491*** -0.2396*** -0.4132*** -0.5116*** 0.1856***
(0.0498) (0.0460) (0.0521) (0.0484) (0.0460) (0.0196)
Mean of DV -45.797 -23.563 -24.851 -47.393 -35.588 17.185
F-Stat 365.482 365.317 365.482 365.482 365.482 362.968
2SLS: Region excluding Country IV
Stringency Index (Lag 0) -1.1119*** -0.5778*** -0.5414*** -1.0520*** -0.9081*** 0.3655***
(0.0691) (0.0610) (0.1585) (0.0546) (0.0476) (0.0237)
Mean of DV -43.567 -22.378 -23.332 -44.998 -33.861 16.376
F-Stat 212.740 212.541 212.740 212.740 212.740 211.859
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.2199* -0.2350*** 0.2507 -0.1751 -0.3093*** 0.0932**
(0.1311) (0.0912) (0.1779) (0.1250) (0.1066) (0.0442)
Mean of DV -45.797 -23.563 -24.851 -47.393 -35.588 17.185
F-Stat 74.426 74.408 74.426 74.426 74.426 74.218
2SLS: World excluding Region IV
Stringency Index (Lag 0) -1.1043*** -0.6873*** -0.7970*** -1.0822*** -0.9663*** 0.3849***
(0.0459) (0.0412) (0.0699) (0.0438) (0.0399) (0.0199)
Mean of DV -43.567 -22.378 -23.332 -44.998 -33.861 16.376
F-Stat 226.656 226.615 226.656 226.656 226.656 225.722
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.4723*** -0.5085*** -0.3756*** -0.4792*** -0.5677*** 0.2112***
(0.0666) (0.0568) (0.0621) (0.0667) (0.0617) (0.0261)
Mean of DV -45.797 -23.563 -24.851 -47.393 -35.588 17.185
F-Stat 168.185 168.109 168.185 168.185 168.185 166.147
2SLS: Sub-region excluding Country IV
Stringency Index (Lag 0) -1.1274*** -0.7204*** -1.0329*** -1.0663*** -0.9064*** 0.3956***
(0.0722) (0.0596) (0.1039) (0.0595) (0.0537) (0.0243)
Mean of DV -43.567 -22.378 -23.332 -44.998 -33.861 16.376
F-Stat 168.375 168.403 168.375 168.375 168.375 167.566
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.4851*** -0.5148*** -0.7307*** -0.4293*** -0.4462*** 0.2155***
(0.1101) (0.0815) (0.1349) (0.1068) (0.0942) (0.0389)
Mean of DV -45.797 -23.563 -24.851 -47.393 -35.588 17.185
F-Stat 92.105 92.037 92.105 92.105 92.105 92.110
Fixed Effects Country; Days since first case
Number of country 117 117 117 117 117 117
Observations (Lag 0) 7,701 7,697 7,701 7,701 7,701 7,655
Observations (Lag 14) 7,389 7,385 7,389 7,389 7,389 7,342
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
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Table A5: Impact on growth rates using alternative instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Tests Cases Deaths Recoveries
2SLS: World excluding Country IV
Stringency Index (Lag 0) -0.0047 -0.0010* -0.0010 0.0166**
(0.0030) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0072)
Mean of DV 0.112 0.149 0.116 0.304
F-Stat 84.652 341.595 51.000 179.140
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0005 -0.0030*** -0.0033*** -0.0124
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0087)
Mean of DV 0.098 0.145 0.114 0.306
F-Stat 150.551 362.780 287.694 332.094
2SLS: Region excluding Country IV
Stringency Index (Lag 0) -0.0087 -0.0023*** -0.0028* 0.0213*
(0.0055) (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0110)
Mean of DV 0.112 0.149 0.116 0.304
F-Stat 85.755 212.513 66.274 167.360
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0024*** -0.0046*** -0.0039*** -0.0298
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0185)
Mean of DV 0.098 0.145 0.114 0.306
F-Stat 30.371 75.313 123.282 91.143
2SLS: World excluding Region IV
Stringency Index (Lag 0) -0.0038 -0.0007 -0.0006 0.0157**
(0.0025) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0065)
Mean of DV 0.112 0.149 0.116 0.304
F-Stat 61.194 224.070 40.052 122.171
Stringency Index (Lag 14) 0.0001 -0.0025*** -0.0031*** -0.0079
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0065)
Mean of DV 0.098 0.145 0.114 0.306
F-Stat 73.003 168.636 140.128 167.248
2SLS: Sub-region excluding Country IV
Stringency Index (Lag 0) -0.0042 -0.0019** -0.0025 0.0138*
(0.0030) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0079)
Mean of DV 0.112 0.149 0.116 0.304
F-Stat 35.140 167.031 31.764 99.499
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0006 -0.0033*** -0.0036*** -0.0086
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0057)
Mean of DV 0.098 0.145 0.114 0.306
F-Stat 30.994 93.769 74.389 104.432
Fixed Effects Country; Days since first case
Number of country 72 117 108 113
Observations (Lag 0) 4,113 7,607 5,277 6,141
Observations (Lag 14) 4,008 7,319 5,300 5,939
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
Covid Economics Issue 26, 5 June 2020
Copyright: Alina Kristin Bartscher, Sebastian Seitz, Sebastian Siegloch, 
Michaela Slotwinski and Nils Wehrhöfer
Social capital and the spread of 
Covid-19: Insights from European 
countries
Alina Kristin Bartscher,1 Sebastian Seitz,2 Sebastian Siegloch,3 
Michaela Slotwinski4 and Nils Wehrhöfer5
Date submitted: 30 May 2020; Date accepted: 1 June 2020
We explore the role of social capital in the spread of the recent Covid-19 
pandemic in independent analyses for Austria, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. We exploit within-
country variation in social capital and Covid-19 cases to show that 
high-social-capital areas accumulated between 12% and 32% fewer 
Covid-19 cases per capita from mid-March until mid-May. Using 
Italy as a case study, we find that high-social-capital areas exhibit 
lower excess mortality and a decline in mobility. Our results have 
important implications for the design of local containment policies in 
future waves of the pandemic.
1 PhD student, University of Bonn.
2 PhD student, ZEW and University of Mannheim.
3 Head of Research Area “Social Policy and Redistribution" at ZEW, Professor at University of Mannheim.
4 Senior Researcher at ZEW and PostDoc at University of Basel.






















VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
1 Introduction
The current Covid-19 pandemic has triggered a tremendous amount of research contribut-
ing to a better understanding of the virus and its containment. In absence of medical
answers like pharmaceuticals or vaccines, human behavior is the key margin to contain
the spread of the pandemic (Van Bavel et al., 2020). Policymakers and health experts
around the world summon the population to limit social contacts and follow strict hygiene
and distance recommendations, appealing to the social responsibility of their citizens.1 In
other words, politicians ask their citizens to consider the social costs of their individual ac-
tions. We define this willingness to act collectively and pursue socially valuable activities
as social capital (Putnam, 1993, 2000).2
While social capital plays a key role in official Covid-19 strategies around the globe,
there is no systematic evidence on whether it is indeed an important factor in containing
Covid-19. This paper adds empirical evidence to this timely question by studying the
relationship between social capital and the early spread of the virus. We independently
investigate the relationship in seven European countries – Austria, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. As countries differ in many macroeco-
nomic and Covid-19-specific aspects, it is challenging to identify the systematic effect of
any economic or cultural factor from the comparisons between countries. Our empirical
strategy rather draws on several independent country analyses, exploiting within-country
regional variation in the spread of Covid-19 and social capital. Following the literature,
we operationalize social capital by area-specific electoral turnout in the 2019 European
election, yielding a consistent and comparable measure across countries that has little
measurement error and is likely to be largely unaffected by economic factors (Putnam,
1993, 2000).
From a theoretical perspective, social capital, the spread of Covid-19 and containment
policies interact in various ways. First, high-social-capital areas are known to be more
vibrant and better connected, economically and socially (see, e.g., Knack and Keefer,
1997; Tabellini, 2010). Hence, we expect the virus to spread more quickly in those areas
in the beginning of the pandemic, when information about the virus and its severity were
incomplete. Second, as soon as the importance of behavioral containment norms becomes
more salient, we expect the relationship to change. Complying with containment norms
yields a classical collective action problem (Ostrom, 1991): it is costly for the individual,
1 Some prominent examples are: Angela Merkel (18.03.2020): “This is the greatest challenge for our coun-
try since WWII, in which taking action collectively as a society is key.” Emmanuel Macron (16.03.2020):
“But the best rule is the rule that you, as citizens, impose on yourselves. Once again, I am appealing
to your sense of responsibility and solidarity.” Giuseppe Conte (26.04.2020): “The responsible conduct
of everyone of us will be fundamentally important. (...) If you love Italy, keep your distance.”
2 In this definition, sometimes also referred to as civic capital (Guiso et al., 2011; Lichter et al., 2020), we
narrow down the broader concept of social capital to its positive facet of helping a group to overcome
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while the single individuals’ contribution to the collective goal is negligible. Social capital
is assumed to overcome exactly such problems by increasing the willingness to contribute
to the common good (Coleman, 1990; Ostrom, 1999; Putnam, 1993, 2000). Hence, we
expect that informal rules of containment are more likely to be (voluntarily) adopted in
areas with high social capital, leading to a relative decrease in infections. Third, there
are interactions with the strictness of containment policies. During lockdowns, rules are
formalized, violations are easier to detect and to be sanctioned, making non-compliance
more costly for the individual. Hence, we would expect containment to depend less on
social capital during stricter policy regimes.
We implement the same microeconometric within-country design in all seven countries.
Our main empirical specification boils down to a two-way fixed effects model with area
and day fixed effects. In each country, we regress the daily log cumulative Covid-19
cases on a measure of pre-determined social capital interacted with day fixed effects. The
logarithmic model accounts for the exponential growth of the virus. We flexibly control for
differences in regional outbreak patterns, e.g. due to regional policies, with region-by-day
fixed effects. Furthermore, we account for the possibility that high-social-capital areas
might be hit earlier and that the pattern of the spread might change over time, e.g., due
to more accurate information about the virus, by including weeks-since-outbreak-by-day
fixed effects.
We choose cases as our main outcome because it is available at a fine geographic level
across many countries. To address well-known issues of measurement error and endogene-
ity related to the number of reported cases, such as (non-random) differences in testing,
we use log cumulative excess mortality as an alternative outcome for Italy. Excess mortal-
ity is defined as the count of all deaths on a given day relative to the same day in 2019. In
addition, we use mobility data from cell phone locations to test for the hypothesized un-
derlying individual behavior. For both mortality and mobility, we observe outcomes prior
to the outbreak, giving rise to a standard differences-in-differences design and enabling
us to test for differential pre-treatment trends. Moreover, we validate that our results are
not driven by obvious confounders like education level, income or population size, and
that they are sustained when using well-established alternative measures of social capital
such as blood donations and historical literacy rates (Guiso et al., 2004; Tabellini, 2010).
We derive the following main findings. First, the number of Covid-19 cases is initially
higher in high-social-capital areas. Second, as information on the virus spreads, high-
social-capital areas start to show a slower increase in Covid-19 cases in all seven countries.
Third, high-social-capital areas also exhibit a slower growth in excess deaths in Italy.
Fourth, individual mobility is reduced more strongly before the lockdown in Italian high-
social-capital areas. Fifth, we provide suggestive evidence that the role of social capital
is reduced when national lockdowns are enforced, as the differences in mobility between
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Our findings contribute to the current literature evolving around the Covid-19 pandemic,
individual behavior and containment policies. Engle et al. (2020) and Painter and Qiu
(2020) show that the impact of restriction orders in the US is stronger in democratic-
leaning counties. On the macro level, Frey et al. (2020) show that countries with demo-
cratically accountable governments introduced less stringent lockdowns, but were more
effective in reducing geographic mobility at the same level of policy stringency. Born et
al. (2020) show that Sweden – the only European country without a lockdown – did not
behave much differently from other European countries in terms of crisis dynamics. They
conclude that “voluntary social restraint goes some way in resolving the lockdown puzzle”.
Our study complements these macro studies by providing within-country evidence and
pointing to social capital as a key driving force behind this social restraint.
There are two projects looking at the role of social capital and mobility. Durante et al.
(2020) investigate the relationship between social capital and mobility for Italy using
similar data. We show that social capital only induces differential mobility responses
before the lockdown when controlling for local economic conditions. This finding is in line
with evidence by Borgonovi and Andrieu (2020), who show a positive correlation between
social capital and early mobility reductions for US counties.
More generally, our findings contribute to the literature on the importance of social capital
for society. Apart from well-established positive economic, social and political implica-
tions (see, e.g., Glaeser et al., 1996; Goldin and Katz, 1999; Guiso et al., 2004; Knack
and Keefer, 1997; Nannicini et al., 2013; Tabellini, 2010), we add another dimension by
showing social capital’s important impact on health during medical crises. This is in line
with the study by Klinenberg (1999), arguing that a lack of social capital was related to
the high mortality rate during the 1995 Chicago heat wave.
In the light of possible future Covid-19 waves, our findings have important implications for
policymakers when deciding on the relaxation of containment policies. As regional turnout
is easily observable, local policy makers can take this proxy into account when determining
the strictness of local containment policies, trading off the economic consequences of a
lockdown against infection risk.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the data. In
Section 3, we present within-country evidence on the spread of Covid-19 across seven
European countries. In Section 4, we zoom in on the case of Italy, providing further
supportive evidence on mortality and mobility and validate that our main results are
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2 Data
We use publicly available data on health and social capital from seven European countries
that publish the daily number of total Covid-19 infections at fine-grained geographical
levels. In the following, we briefly describe the variables used in the empirical analysis.
More information and detailed data sources are documented in Appendix Table A.1.
Appendix Table A.2 provides the corresponding descriptive statistics.
Geographical level. We compile measures of the spread of Covid-19 and social cap-
ital at the finest geographical level available for each country. We refer to this unit of
observation as “area” throughout the paper. Areas have different names across countries,
but mostly refer to the NUTS3 definition of the European Union (see Appendix Table
A.3).3 We refer to the higher NUTS1 geographical level as regions.
Outcomes. For all countries, we obtain the daily number of Covid-19 cases since
the early phase of the outbreak. The respective country samples start when more than
90% of all NUTS3 areas in a country have registered at least one official case. Our
main outcome variable is the log cumulative number of confirmed Covid-19 infections
per 100,000 inhabitants within an area on a given day. Appendix Figure A.1 shows the
evolution of cumulative Covid-19 cases per 100,000 inhabitants at the national level across
countries.
For Italy, we additionally use data on the number of excess deaths at the municipality
level, which is finer than the area (province) level. Excess mortality measures the number
of deaths per day relative to the same day in the previous year. The evolution of daily
excess mortality at the national level until mid-April 2020 is plotted in Appendix Figure
A.2.
We also acquired proprietary data on daily individual movements in Italy from the technol-
ogy firm Teralytics. The data contain the number of journeys within and across provinces
based on changes in cell phone locations. Appendix Figure A.3 plots the number of weekly
journeys per capita at the national level.
Social capital. We operationalize social capital by voter turnout in the 2019 Euro-
pean Parliament election. Political participation is a frequently-used and well-established
measure of social capital, or civicness (Putnam, 1993, 2000). An extensive literature doc-
uments that political participation is a strong correlate of pro-social preferences and the
willingness to contribute to public goods (see, e.g., Bolsen et al., 2014; Dawes et al., 2011;
3 In the Netherlands (municipality level) and Austria (district level), we have data on even finer levels.
The NUTS system is based on existing national administrative subdivisions. The average population
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Fowler, 2006; Fowler and Kam, 2007; Jankowski, 2007). Turnout is unlikely to be driven
by other economic and legal factors and should have little to no measurement error (Guiso
et al., 2004). In the context of our study, we can use data from the same election in most
countries. For Switzerland, we use data on turnout at the last national elections in 2019.
As a sensitivity check, we use two alternative measures of social capital proposed in the
literature for the case of Italy: blood donations per capita (Guiso et al., 2004; Putnam,
1993) and historical literacy rates (Tabellini, 2010) (see Section 4.3).
Controls. We test the sensitivity of our results to potential confounders for the case
of Italy by controlling for the share of white-collar workers, the share of the population
older than 65 years, the share of college-educated individuals, the number of hospitals per
capita, log population, log GDP per capita, and the population density. See Section 4.3
for results, and Tables A.1 and A.2 for more details on the variables.
Timing of events. The timing of the Covid-19 outbreak and policy responses differ
across countries. Moreover, the adopted policy measures vary in strictness. While Italy
enforced a strict and long lockdown, Sweden has not adopted a lockdown so far. We
highlight the most important events in each country in Appendix Table A.4.
Lag of responses. Any change in behavior or policy will affect the number of Covid-19
cases with a lag. First, there is the incubation time, which is the time from the infection
until the appearance of first symptoms. Second, there is the confirmation time, which is
the time between the first symptoms and the confirmation of the case. Naturally, both
periods differ across individuals, time and countries. For incubation time, we follow the
WHO and assume a duration of 5 days (Lauer et al., 2020). There is much less evidence on
confirmation time. We assume that the confirmation time is 7 days, using the reported
median duration from a study by the official German health agency RKI (Heide and
Hamouda, 2020). In total, we conclude that any behavioral change will affect Covid-19
cases after around 12 days.
3 Cross-country results on Covid-19 cases
3.1 Descriptive evidence
In a first step, we investigate the descriptive pattern of the spread of Covid-19 and its
relation to social capital across countries. We dichotomize social capital into high- (above-
regional-median turnout) and low-social-capital (below-regional-median turnout) areas for
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Notes: This figure shows the ratio of cumulative Covid-19 cases per capita in high- vs. low-social-capital
areas. The sample is divided at the median of turnout at the NUTS1 region level. Areas with a value
above the median are defined as high-social-capital areas and those below as low-social-capital areas.
The blue lines plot the population-weighted average of the regional ratios over time. The solid black line
marks the date of the national lockdown, the dashed black line the date of the national lockdown plus
an incubation period of 12 days.
low-social-capital areas within each region and calculate the population-weighted average
ratio across regions to obtain the national ratio.
Figure 1 plots the cumulative per-capita Covid-19 cases in high-social-capital areas relative
to low-social-capital areas over time. Across all countries, we see that the virus initially
is more prevalent in high-social-capital areas. The initially high level is to be expected
as people in areas with a high level of social capital have been shown to have closer
social and economic connections, which should exacerbate the spread of the virus initially
when information on the severity of the virus and appropriate behavior are incomplete.
Starting from this high initial level, we then see a sharp decline in the ratio. In Italy,
for instance, high-social-capital areas initially exhibit about three times more cases per
capita relative to low-social-capital areas. Over time, the differential drops until high-
and low-social-capital areas have almost equally many cases per inhabitant. Strikingly,
the decline starts before national lockdown policies could have been effective due to the
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a role. The Swedish case without a lockdown is the prime example.
3.2 Empirical model
While Figure 1 presents simple correlations over time, we suggest the following more
rigorous empirical model to systematically study the evolution of the relationship between




βddated · SocCapa + γa + ωrd + εard. (1)
Our main outcome variable ln cumcasesard is the log cumulative number of cases per
100,000 inhabitants in area a within region r on day d. The logarithmic model accounts
for the exponential growth of the virus. The variable SocCapa is our measure of social
capital, defined as turnout in the European Parliament election of 2019, normalized by its
country-specific standard deviation. Hence, a one-standard-deviation increase in turnout
(social capital) affects the number of cumulative cases per 100,000 inhabitants measured
on day d by approximately 100 × βd%.
The indicator variable dated is set to one for the respective day, which runs from the first
until the last day, daymax, for which we observe the number of Covid-19 cases. We start
the sample when more than 90% of all NUTS3 areas have registered at least one official
case. Indicator variable γa captures area fixed effects, which account for time-invariant,
area-specific factors. Given area fixed effects γa, we normalize coefficients β1 to zero in all
countries, such that all other βd coefficients measure the effect of social capital relative
to this reference day. Loosely speaking, the empirical model (1) investigates the slope of
the country-specific patterns shown in Figure 1. The set of dummy variables ωrd captures
NUTS1-region-specific day fixed effects and, hence, flexibly accounts for potential policy
responses at the regional level and region-specific dynamics in the spread of the virus. We
cluster standard errors at the area level.
The β coefficients compare the evolution of areas with a higher turnout to areas with a
lower turnout over time and associate the differences in log cases with the level of social
capital. Area A might have an earlier outbreak than area B and consequently be on
a different point of the outbreak curve. We assess the sensitivity of our results to this
potential bias by adding weeks-since-outbreak fixed effects to the baseline model. This set
of fixed effects implicitly synchronizes the outbreak dates of the areas by accounting for
the average pattern of an outbreak across areas. As information about Covid-19 spreads
quickly, it is however possible that outbreak patterns change over time. To allow for
these additional dynamics, we interact weeks-since-outbreak fixed effects with calendar-
day fixed effects (dated × weekssinceoutbreakad) and assess whether our estimates are
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B.2 shows that estimates barely change.
Our identifying assumption is that no other factor correlated with social capital system-
atically affects growth rates of Covid-19 cases. We conduct various sensitivity checks to
assess whether the assumption is likely to be violated. First, we control directly for the
most obvious confounders, for instance GDP per capita, education or population density
(each interacted with day fixed effects). We also interact these covariates with weeks-
since-outbreak fixed effects to test whether the potential confounder led to differential
growth rates between the date of the outbreak and our sample start. Second, we use
historical proxies for social capital that are less likely to be correlated with contempora-
neous confounders. We conduct all these tests for the case of Italy in Section 4.3 of the
paper. Last, we analyze excess deaths and mobility patterns for Italy. While the concept
of Covid-19 cases is not defined before the outbreak, such that we cannot test for parallel
pre-trends, the same is not true for excess mortality and mobility. Our results in in Sec-
tions 4.1 and 4.2 show that high- and low-social-capital areas did not differ systematically
with respect to these outcomes before the outbreak.
3.3 Estimation results
Figure 2 visualizes the β coefficients from equation (1). Across all countries, we see
a similar pattern: high-social-capital areas exhibit a slower growth in cumulative cases
than low-social-capital areas. This reduces the cases they accumulate over the considered
periods by between 12% (Germany) and 32% (Italy). Results are significant at the 95%
level for Italy, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany, and at the 90% level for Sweden.
Countries with a loose (the Netherlands) or no lockdown (Sweden) show effects which are
in the ballpark of Italy.
Below, we show that results are not driven by potentially confounding variables, such as
GDP, educational attainment or population density. Neither are the results sensitive to
the choice of our proxy for social capital (see Section 4.3 and Figure 5).
Overall, we interpret the consistent pattern obtained from independent analyses of seven
countries as strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that social capital plays an impor-
tant role in slowing down the spread of the virus.
In terms of dynamics, Figure 2 shows that areas with high social capital exhibit a slower
growth in Covid-19 cases in the early phase of the pandemic. Importantly, this occurs
before the lockdown could have had an effect. It is exactly during this initial phase that
we expect the impact of social capital to be strongest, as responsible individual behavior
such as reducing mobility and practicing voluntary distancing is the only means to flatten
the curve. The case of Sweden, which did not enact a lockdown, corroborates this claim.






















VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
Figure 2: Effect of social capital on the spread of Covid-19 cases
(a) Italy

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: The figure presents the differential evolution of the relationship between cumulative Covid-19
infections per 100,000 inhabitants and social capital across time. The estimates are based on on the
model outlined in equation 1 (see Appendix table C.1 for the point estimates). All values are normalized
at the date of the first observation. The first dashed line marks the date of the national lockdown,
the second dashed line the date of the national lockdown plus 12 days to account for incubation plus
confirmation time. Since there was no official lockdown in Sweden, no dashed lines are displayed in panel
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capital areas stabilizes and remains constant thereafter.4 This suggests that there is no
additional effect of social capital once lockdowns are in place. Below, we use mobility
data to provide further evidence in support of the claim that socially responsible behavior
in low- and high-social capital areas converges after a lockdown (see Section 4.2).
4 The Italian Case: Mortality, Mobility and Sensi-
tivity
In this section, we zoom in on the Italian case. We use this example to show that our
results are robust to various conceptual and econometric concerns. We present additional
evidence on excess mortality and on the mobility patterns of individuals, supporting our
hypothesis that social capital is an important factor driving the spread of the virus.
We singled out Italy for four reasons. First, it was the first country in Europe to be hit
by the virus. Hence, government and citizens were more surprised by and unprepared for
the severity of the epidemic than other European countries. The Italian case, in turn,
influenced all other countries’ populations and policymakers. Second, Italy is one of the
few countries to report data on excess mortality at the municipality level, which is another
important outcome, and has conceptual advantages over the number of cases. Third, we
were able to collect mobility data at the province level for Italy. As a consequence, we can
investigate how social capital directly affects individual behavior, which is key to validate
the mechanism behind our hypotheses. Fourth, research on social capital has oftentimes
focused on Italy, such that there are well-established historical measures of social capital
which can be used to corroborate our findings.
4.1 Excess mortality
If higher social capital slows down the spread of Covid-19 cases, we would also expect to
see an effect on the number of Covid-19-related deaths. Looking at mortality is clearly
important in its own right. In the absence of effective medication, it is also insightful as
the number of deaths should depend less on testing capacities, which might in turn be
endogenous to social capital.5 Our preferred measure of mortality is the number of local
excess deaths, defined as the difference in mortality between 2020 and 2019. We prefer
this measure over official Covid-19 deaths for three reasons. First, and in contrast to
the number of Covid-19-cases, we observe excess mortality already before the start of the
pandemic. This enables us to evaluate the common trend assumption as in a standard
4This convergence is also depicted in Appendix Figure B.1, which plots the daily social capital effect
relative to the effect on the last sample day.
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Figure 3: Effect of social capital on excess deaths in Italy
national
lockdown


































































































Notes: The outcome variable is the log number of excess deaths per 100,000 inhabitants (additional deaths
in 2020 compared to 2019) from February 1st to April 15th. The estimates are based on the estimation
model outlined in equation 2 (see Appendix table C.2 for the point estimates). The dark (light) blue
area corresponds to the 90% (95%) confidence interval.
difference-in-difference model and test for pre-treatment differences between high- and
low-social-capital municipalities. Second, official Covid-19 mortality is only published
at the regional level in Italy, while excess mortality is available at the municipality level.
Third, the official numbers are likely to underestimate the true increase in mortality, since
a substantial number of people died without being tested (Ciminelli and Garcia-Mandicó,
2020).
In order to study the impact of social capital on mortality, we transform our baseline




βddated · SocCapm + γm + ωpd + εcpd. (2)
Now, our outcome variable is the log cumulative excess deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in
municipality m located in province p on day d. As we are able to exploit variation at the
municipal level, we can also include more fine-grained province-by-day fixed effects, ωpd.
Figure 3 shows that by mid-April, a one standard deviation increase in turnout is signifi-
cantly associated with 7% fewer accumulated excess deaths. Reassuringly, mortality be-
fore the pandemic evolved in parallel between high- and low-social-capital municipalities,
which lends support to our identifying assumption. Results are also robust to controlling
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The observed dynamics corresponds well with the pattern observed in Figures 1 and 2.
In early March, the number of excess deaths in high-social-capital areas increases slightly,
which is in line with the hypothesis that areas with a higher social capital are more
connected socially and economically, such that the virus can initially spread faster. We
then see a sharp turning point around the day of the national lockdown. This trend
break cannot be driven by the lockdown due to the incubation time and the duration
of the disease before it leads to a fatality. Instead, we find that excess mortality drops
in high-social-capital areas about two to three weeks after the first community case was
discovered, which is in line with (preliminary) evidence that deaths tend to occur around
three weeks (21 days) after the infection (Yang et al., 2020). The effect of social capital
on excess deaths stabilized around 20 to 25 days after the lockdown.
4.2 Mobility effects
Next, we take a closer look at individual mobility, one of the main mechanisms through
which social capital might affect the spread of the virus. Moreover, mobility, being a
direct measure of individuals’ behavior, is immune to the concern of endogenous testing.
Hence, it can help us to check whether changes in individuals’ behavior are likely to drive
our effects. Using the number of weekly journeys per capita, as captured by data on cell
phone locations, as an outcome, we re-estimate equation (1) to see whether individuals’
mobility in high-social-capital areas evolves systematically differently over the course of
the Covid-19 outbreak in Italy.
We aggregate the empirical model given in equation (1) from the daily to the weekly level
to reduce noise and use the total number of journeys originating in area a and week w as
our outcome measure. Similar to the number of excess deaths, we observe mobility before
the outbreak, giving rise to a standard differences-in-differences design.
Figure 4 presents the mobility results. Up until the third week of February, we do not
detect significant differences in the number of journeys between high- and low-social-
capital areas. The flat pre-outbreak trends imply that our identifying assumptions holds.
After Italy experiences its first Covid-19 community case, around the end of the third
week of February, mobility in areas with higher social capital declines significantly over
the following two weeks. This differential between high- and low-social-capital areas
vanishes after the national lockdown is enforced. In terms of magnitude, we find that a
one-standard-deviation increase in turnout decreases mobility by 0.16 journeys per capita
in the first week of March. This translates to a 15% reduction relative to the average
pre-Covid mobility.
The dynamic pattern shown in Figure 4 is different from the findings by Durante et al.
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Figure 4: Effect of social capital on mobility in Italy







































Notes: The figure shows the estimation results of the impact of social capital on individuals mobility. They
are based on the estimation model outlined in equation 1 (see Appendix Table C.3 for point estimates).
The outcome variable captures the weekly number of journeys per capita. The estimates control for
the share of people above 65, the share of males, the share of white-collar workers, the share of college
graduates, the number of hospitals per 100,000 inhabitants, population density, log population, altitude,
the share of inhabitants living at the coast, an indicator for having an airport and log GDP per capita.
even after the lockdown. The reason for this difference is that our model controls for
NUTS1-by-day fixed effects and GDP. Appendix Figure B.4 shows that the inclusion of
both variables is important for the post-lockdown effect.6 NUTS1-by-day fixed effects are
important, since they account for regional policy responses and different regional outbreak
patterns. GDP per capita is an important control because mobility in high-income areas
is likely to be quite different from low-income areas after the lockdown, for example due to
different possibilities to work from home. In line with this reasoning, Engle et al. (2020)
show for the US that high-income counties reduce mobility more strongly following stay-
at-home-orders.
Overall, our results corroborate the implied mechanism of social capital reducing the
spread of Covid-19 through individual behavior. The used data, discussed in Section 2,
are only able to capture the quantity of mobility (the number of journeys undertaken) and
not the quality (what people travel for). It is, however, likely that social capital also affects
the quality of mobility. People in high-social-capital areas might, for example, additionally
reduce their contact to risk groups voluntarily and more quickly. As a consequence, the
mobility estimates are likely a lower bound of the overall behavioral effects which drive
the differential development of cases.
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4.3 Robustness
Confounders. Measures of social capital, like voter turnout, are likely to be correlated
with other, non-Covid-19-related characteristics. Hence, we have to make sure that the
observed relationship between Covid-19 cases and social capital is not driven by these
factors. Obvious confounders at the area level are (i) education (more skilled people
understand more quickly what is at stake); (ii) age (older people are more endangered
by the virus); (iii) income (higher-income groups can afford to reduce their labor supply
more); (iv) occupation type (white-collar workers can work from home more easily) (v)
population density (facilitates the spread of the disease); (vi) hospital density (better
medical infrastructure helps to fight the virus) and (vii) population size (economies of
scale might imply better infrastructure).
A straightforward test whether these confounders drive the observed differences is to
control for them in the empirical model. We do so by allowing for day-specific effects of
each control variable. Moreover, areas might differ in their infection curve even before
our sample start. For example, areas with a high GDP per capita might exhibit a sharper
increase in the beginning. We test the sensitivity of our estimates to this potential bias
by additionally interacting our control variables with the number of weeks since the local
outbreak.
Panel (a) of Figure 5 shows the resulting estimates. Magnitudes, dynamics and statistical
significance are very similar across specifications. The same is true when looking at excess
deaths (see Appendix Figure B.3). These results corroborate the independent role of social
capital in our main results.
Historical social capital measure. An alternative approach to address endogeneity
concerns is to make use of a historically predetermined measure of social capital. The
literature on social capital frequently studies the case of Italy, because there is large vari-
ation in social capital which can be attributed to historical origins (see, e.g., Nannicini
et al., 2013; Putnam, 2000). It is well established that culture, and thus also cultural
traits like social capital, are passed on from generation to generation and are thus quite
persistent over time (Alesina et al., 2013; Bisin and Verdier, 2000; Tabellini, 2008). Con-
sequently, historical institutions, which have shaped social capital in the past but have
long disappeared, still predict the level of social capital today.
Tabellini (2010) shows that 19th-century literacy rates are good predictors of social capital
across contemporaneous European regions. Following this rationale, we use the literacy
rates from Italy in 1821 as a proxy for social capital. The province-level data are reported
in Ciccarelli and Weisdorf (2018).7 The literacy rate is measured prior to the strong
7 As we operate at the NUTS3 level, we could not use the data in Tabellini (2010), which cover NUTS1
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Figure 5: Sensitivity tests for Italy
(a) Baseline model with controls




























































































baseline + controls x day + controls x weeks since outbreak
(b) Literacy rate in 1821 as social capital proxy





























































































(c) Blood donations per capita as social capital
proxy



























































































Notes: The figure shows the estimation results of the impact of social capital on the evolution of Covid-19
infections. They are based on the estimation model outlined in equation 1 and the outcome variable is
the log cumulative number of Covid-19 infections per 100,000 inhabitants. Estimates in Panel (a) control
for the share of people above 65, the share of white-collar workers, the share of college graduates, the
number of hospitals per 100,000 inhabitants, population density, log population, and log GDP per capita
(see Appendix Table C.4 for point estimates). In Panel (b) we use literacy rates in 1821 as our proxy for
social capital (see Appendix Table C.5 for point estimates). In Panel (c) we proxy for social capital with
the number of blood donations per capita in 2017 (see Appendix Table C.6 for point estimates).
economic divide between Northern and Southern Italy that emerged in the years before
the Italian unification in 1861 (Ciccarelli and Weisdorf, 2018). Panel (b) of Figure 5
shows that the result with this alternative measures of social capital is very similar to our
baseline estimates.
Alternative contemporaneous social capital measure. As a final test, we show
that our results are also robust to using a different contemporaneous social capital mea-
sure. Instead of turnout, we utilize another well-established measure of social capital,
namely the number of blood donations per capita in an area (see, e.g., Guiso et al., 2004;
Putnam, 1993). We obtain the number of whole blood and plasma donations per capita
at the province level from AVIS, the Italian association of blood donors. Panel (c) of
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5 Discussion
In this paper, we provide evidence from seven European countries that culture and social
capital have a considerable impact on the containment of Covid-19 and the number of
deaths. Social capital, long known to be related to favorable economic developments, can
thus unfold additional potential in times of (health) crises which call for collective action
and socially responsible behavior. The positive effects of social capital are likely to go
beyond health outcomes. Experience from the Spanish Flu demonstrates that the success
of virus containment directly relates to the size of the following economic downturn and
its recovery speed (Barro, 2020; Barro et al., 2020). Hence, we expect that higher social
capital also has an indirect positive effect on the economy during and after the crisis.
Our results have important implication for policymakers. During the current crisis, our
findings suggest that low-social-capital areas might need to consider stricter formal policies
to contain the virus. Since turnout rates are readily observable, they could be directly
targeted when designing the local policy response to Covid-19. The recent policy shift in
Germany that delegated more responsibility to the county level might be a good way to
allow for this regional flexibility, especially with the looming threat of a second outbreak
in the fall or winter.
In the longer run, investing in social capital formation is an important insurance against
similar future pandemics. The insights from our study mandate policymakers to invest
not only into the health system, but also into social capital formation to be well-prepared.
Possible points of departure are local community programs to increase social interactions,
which may carry over to increased cooperation and pro-social behavior (see, e.g., Fearon
et al., 2009). However, investments should not be limited to low-social-capital areas. This
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A Online Appendix: Data
The countries included in our study are Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the UK. We recover the total number of Covid-19 cases from the official
institutions in each country. We augment the data sets with information on social capital
and other regional characteristics. Appendix Table A.1 briefly describes the data for each
country separately. As in the main text we refer to each geographical unit as “area”.
Appendix Table A.2 shows summary statistics for all variables. Appendix Table A.3
summarizes the different geographical units for each country.
Table A.1: Definition of variables and data sources
year description source




2020 The total number of Covid-19 infections at the
province-day level. The numbers have been
published daily starting February 24th. We





cess deaths per 100,000
inhabitants
2020 The number of additional deaths recorded
from January 1st to April 15th 2020 compared
to the same period in 2019 at the municipality-
day level. We normalize this variable with
population numbers from ISTAT. The data
are available for 4,424 out of the roughly 8,000





2020 The number of journeys made per capita
based on mobile phone location at the day-
province level from January 2020 to March
2020. A journey ends when the use remains
in place for at least one hour. Short jour-
neys with a distance of less 2 kilometres are
not captured. We normalize this variable with






























2020 The total number of Covid-19 infections at
the district-day level. The numbers have been
published daily since March 11th, but historic
values are only reported from March 22nd on-
ward. We drop the four districts in the state
of Vorarlberg as they start reporting cases on
March 16th (results do not change when we in-
clude them). We impute occasionally missing
daily observations by linear interpolation. We
normalize this variable with population num-









2020 The total number of Covid-19 infections at
the county-day level. These numbers have
been published daily since January 28th. We
normalize this variable with population num-




tive Covid-19 cases per
100,000 inhabitants
2020 The total number of Covid-19 infections at
the municipality-day level. These numbers
have been published daily since February 27th.
We impute occasionally missing daily observa-
tions by linear interpolation. We normalize
this variable with population numbers from
Statistics Netherlands.
National Institute for





2020 The total number of Covid-19 infections at the
county-day level. These numbers have been
published daily since February 4th. We nor-





tive Covid-19 cases per
100,000 inhabitants
2020 The total number of Covid-19 infections at the
canton-day level. These numbers have been
published daily since February 25th. We im-
pute occasionally missing daily observations
by linear interpolation. We normalize this
variable with population numbers from the
Swiss federal statistical office.




























19 cases per 100,000 in-
habitants
2020 The total number of Covid-19 infections at the
Upper Tier Local Authority-day level. For
England, the data has been reported daily
since March 9th alongside historical values at
the Upper Tier Local Authority (UTLA) level.
Scotland andWales only publish daily updates
at the NHS Health Board level, spanning sev-
eral UTLAs, starting at March 1st and March
5th respectively. We normalize this variable
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Panel B – Independent Variables
Italy: turnout 2019 Turnout to the 2019 European Parliament






2017 Whole blood and plasma donations per capita
as reported by AVIS, the Italian association of
voluntary blood donors. This variable is only
available for 103 of the 107 provinces (Belluno,
Gorizia, Imperia and Lucca are missing).
AVIS
Italy: literacy rate 1821 The literacy rate for the total population (men
and women combined) in 1821. The data are
only available in the 1911 province boundaries.
We drop the modern provinces of Bolzano,
Trento, Gorizia and Trieste since they were
not part of Italy in 1911. We also exclude the
modern provinces of Varese, Frosinone, Rieti,
Pescara, Latina, Nuoro and Enna because it
is not straightforward to match the historical
data to the new jurisdictions.
Ciccarelli and Weisdorf
(2018)
Austria: turnout 2019 Turnout to the 2019 European Parliament




Germany: turnout 2019 Turnout to the 2019 European Parliament




Netherlands: turnout 2019 Turnout to the 2019 European Parliament
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Table A.1 continued
year description source
Sweden: turnout 2019 Turnout to the 2019 European Parliament




Switzerland: turnout 2019 Turnout to the 2019 national parliament elec-
tion held in October 2019 at the canton level.
Swiss Federal Statisti-
cal Office
UK: turnout 2019 Turnout to the 2019 European Parliament
Election held at the end of May 2019 at the
ward level. We aggregate this number to the
corresponding geographical unit at which the
infections are reported.
House of Commons Li-
brary
Panel C – Additional Controls for Italy
hospitals per 100,000
inhabitants
2019 The number of hospitals normalized with pop-




2011 The share of the population that has com-




2017 The share of working population that is em-
ployed in a white-collar sector.
OECD
GDP per capita 2017 Value added per inhabitant at current prices. ISTAT
taxable income per
capita
2018 The municipal tax base of the national income
tax divided by the number of inhabitants.
Italian Fiscal Agency
share old 2011 The share of the population that is older than
65 years of age.
Census (ISTAT)
population density 2019 The number of inhabitants per square kilome-
tre.
ISTAT
altitude 2019 The population-weighted mean of altitude. ISTAT
share male 2011 The share of the male population. Census (ISTAT)
share coastal 2019 The share of the population that lives at the
coast.
ISTAT
airport dummy 2019 A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the
province has at least one airport.
ISTAT
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Table A.2: Summary statistics
mean p25 p75 sd min max N
Austria: district level
turnout 0.59 0.52 0.66 0.08 0.43 0.71 94
population (in 100,000) 0.94 0.44 0.99 1.93 0.02 18.97 94
Germany: county level
turnout 0.61 0.57 0.64 0.05 0.48 0.74 401
population (in 100,000) 2.07 1.04 2.42 2.48 0.34 37.54 401
Italy: province level
turnout 0.56 0.50 0.65 0.11 0.34 0.70 107
blood donations per capita 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.12 103
literacy rate in 1821 0.25 0.16 0.35 0.11 0.09 0.54 69
population (in 100,000) 5.64 2.35 6.22 6.17 0.84 43.42 107
population density (in 1000/km2) 0.27 0.11 0.28 0.38 0.04 2.63 107
GDP per capita (in 1,000e) 23.51 16.95 28.25 6.66 12.89 48.69 107
hospitals per 100,000 inhabitants 1.79 1.30 2.25 0.69 0.47 4.00 107
share white-collar 0.34 0.31 0.37 0.04 0.25 0.47 107
share old 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.02 0.18 0.29 107
share college-educated 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.16 107
share male 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.00 0.47 0.49 107
share coast 0.27 0.00 0.49 0.30 0.00 0.96 107
airport 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 107
altitude (in 100 meter) 2.16 0.85 3.11 1.71 0.05 7.10 107
Netherlands: municipality level
turnout 0.42 0.38 0.47 0.07 0.26 0.80 355
population (in 100,000) 0.49 0.21 0.50 0.72 0.01 8.63 355
Sweden: county level
turnout 0.54 0.52 0.55 0.03 0.50 0.59 21
population (in 100,000) 4.92 2.45 3.64 5.73 0.60 23.77 21
Switzerland: canton level
turnout 0.41 0.38 0.43 0.06 0.32 0.63 26
population (in 100,000) 3.29 0.73 4.10 3.52 0.16 15.21 26
UK: upper tier local authority level
turnout 0.36 0.33 0.40 0.05 0.23 0.54 171
population (in 100,000) 3.92 2.10 4.96 2.87 0.09 15.69 171
Italy: municipality level
turnout 0.60 0.52 0.71 0.14 0.12 1.00 4424
population (in 100,000) 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.31 0.00 13.79 4424
population density (in 1000/km2) 0.32 0.05 0.32 0.59 0.00 7.78 4424
taxable income per capita (in 1,000e) 13.26 10.93 15.30 3.11 4.53 35.45 4424
hospitals per 100,000 inhabitants 0.87 0.00 0.00 5.94 0.00 235.81 4424
share old 0.29 0.25 0.32 0.06 0.11 0.69 4424
share college-educated 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.27 4424
Notes: Blood donations per capita are missing for 4 (Belluno, Gorizia, Imperia and Lucca) out of 107
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Table A.3: Geographical units across countries




Germany County(Kreis) 401 States (Bundesländer) 16
Italy Province(Province) 107 groups of Regions (Regioni) 5
Netherlands Municipality(Gemeente) 355 Land (Landsdeel) 4
Sweden County (Län) 21 Land (Landsdelar) 3














Notes: This table provides an overview about the different geographical units within each country. With
the exception of Austria and the Netherlands, all "areas" correspond to the NUTS3 regions. The col-
umn NUTS1 refers to the name of the NUTS1 region, except for Switzerland where the NUTS1 region
corresponds to the whole country. Hence, we are using the the NUTS2 region for Switzerland.











Italy Jan. 30th Feb. 23th Mar. 4th Mar. 9th
Austria Feb. 25th Mar. 10th Mar. 10th Mar. 16th
Germany Jan. 28th Mar. 8th Mar. 16th Mar. 23nd
Netherlands Feb. 27th Mar. 12th Mar. 15th Mar. 23rd
Sweden Jan. 31st Mar. 11th - -
Switzerland Feb. 25th Feb. 28th Mar.13th Mar. 16th
UK Jan. 29th Mar. 23rd Mar. 18th Mar. 23rd
Notes: This table displays the timeline of the onset of Covid-19 in each country and the respective policy
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Italy UK Germany Switzerland
Netherlands Austria Sweden
Notes: The graph shows the development of the pandemic for each country over time expressed as the
infections per 100,000 inhabitants.





























































































Notes: The graph shows the number of excess deaths in Italy between January 1st and April 15th per
100,000 inhabitants. Excess deaths are defined as the difference in reported deaths between 2020 and
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Notes: The graph shows the journeys per capita in Italy between January and March 2020 based on
mobile phone location data. The first dashed line corresponds to the discovery of the first Covid-19
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B Online Appendix: Additional Results



































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: This figure shows the percentage change in the coefficient on our measure of social capital relative
to the coefficient we capture at the last day of our estimation window ((βd/βdmax) − 1). Negative values
therefore indicate that the coefficient is smaller compared to the one on the last day of the window and
positive ones that it is larger. The solid black line marks the date of the national lockdown, the dashed
black line the date of the national lockdown plus an incubation + confirmation time of 12 days. These
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Figure B.2: Robustness: Effect of social capital on the spread of Covid-19 cases
(a) Italy




























































































baseline + weeks since outbreak FE + weeks since outbreak x date FE
(b) United Kingdom
























































































baseline + weeks since outbreak FE + weeks since outbreak x date FE
(c) Germany
























































































baseline + weeks since outbreak FE + weeks since outbreak x date FE
(d) Switzerland






















































































baseline + weeks since outbreak FE + weeks since outbreak x date FE
(e) Netherlands


























































































baseline + weeks since outbreak FE + weeks since outbreak x date FE
(f) Austria

















































































































































































baseline + weeks since outbreak FE + weeks since outbreak x date FE
Notes: This graph shows alternative specifications for the results reported in Figure 2 (see Appendix
Table C.1 for the point estimates). The light-blue line reports the baseline results in Figure 2. The
blue line includes additional weeks-since-outbreak fixed effects to control for potential differences arising
from differential onset dates. The black line includes a set of weeks-since-outbreak - day fixed effect that
additionally controls for differential trends not only due to the onset of the pandemic but also to the day
we are observing these values. The first vertical dashed line marks the date of the national lockdown in
each country. The second vertical dashed line corresponds to the date of the national lockdown plus 12
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Figure B.3: Effect of social capital on excess deaths with controls
national
lockdown


































































































without controls with controls
Notes: The graph shows the the log number of excess deaths per 100,000 inhabitants (additional deaths
in 2020 compared to 2019) from January 1st to April 15th based on specification 2 (see Appendix Table
C.2 for point estimates). The controls include the share of people above 65, the share of college graduates,
the number of hospitals per 100,000 inhabitants, population density, log population, and log income per
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Figure B.4: Robustness: Effect of social capital on mobility








































baseline without log GDP
without region-day FE without log GDP and region-day FE
Notes: The graph shows the number of journeys per capita. The controls include the share of people
above 65, the share of males, the share of white-collar workers, the share of college graduates, the number
of hospitals per 100,000 inhabitants, population density, log population, altitude, the share of inhabitants
living at the coast, a dummy for having an airport and log GDP per capita. The shaded areas represent
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C Online Appendix: Regression results
Table C.1: Effect of social capital on the spread of cumulative Covid-19 cases
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A – Italy
turnout x 10mar2020 -0.018 (0.062) -0.055 (0.079) -0.081 (0.100)
turnout x 11mar2020 -0.079 (0.104) -0.130 (0.113) -0.146 (0.125)
turnout x 12mar2020 -0.159 (0.109) -0.192 (0.121) -0.218 (0.129)
turnout x 13mar2020 -0.275 (0.124) -0.288 (0.134) -0.293 (0.134)
turnout x 14mar2020 -0.341 (0.129) -0.338 (0.132) -0.342 (0.131)
turnout x 15mar2020 -0.335 (0.140) -0.359 (0.139) -0.358 (0.138)
turnout x 16mar2020 -0.275 (0.143) -0.281 (0.144) -0.245 (0.134)
turnout x 17mar2020 -0.258 (0.150) -0.283 (0.154) -0.254 (0.149)
turnout x 18mar2020 -0.265 (0.156) -0.278 (0.154) -0.290 (0.155)
turnout x 19mar2020 -0.276 (0.166) -0.266 (0.163) -0.273 (0.163)
turnout x 20mar2020 -0.302 (0.162) -0.277 (0.154) -0.269 (0.152)
turnout x 21mar2020 -0.288 (0.165) -0.253 (0.154) -0.247 (0.152)
turnout x 22mar2020 -0.308 (0.166) -0.292 (0.154) -0.278 (0.149)
turnout x 23mar2020 -0.297 (0.166) -0.270 (0.154) -0.253 (0.148)
turnout x 24mar2020 -0.285 (0.167) -0.260 (0.156) -0.242 (0.152)
turnout x 25mar2020 -0.285 (0.172) -0.245 (0.158) -0.250 (0.158)
turnout x 26mar2020 -0.292 (0.171) -0.241 (0.157) -0.249 (0.157)
turnout x 27mar2020 -0.340 (0.173) -0.284 (0.158) -0.296 (0.158)
turnout x 28mar2020 -0.354 (0.171) -0.296 (0.155) -0.302 (0.156)
turnout x 29mar2020 -0.351 (0.174) -0.298 (0.158) -0.289 (0.155)
turnout x 30mar2020 -0.331 (0.171) -0.275 (0.155) -0.265 (0.152)
turnout x 31mar2020 -0.325 (0.171) -0.263 (0.153) -0.248 (0.150)
turnout x 01apr2020 -0.320 (0.170) -0.251 (0.151) -0.246 (0.148)
turnout x 02apr2020 -0.322 (0.170) -0.252 (0.152) -0.255 (0.149)
turnout x 03apr2020 -0.335 (0.171) -0.265 (0.154) -0.272 (0.153)
turnout x 04apr2020 -0.336 (0.172) -0.268 (0.155) -0.272 (0.156)
turnout x 05apr2020 -0.368 (0.174) -0.298 (0.159) -0.288 (0.158)
turnout x 06apr2020 -0.380 (0.174) -0.311 (0.159) -0.302 (0.157)
turnout x 07apr2020 -0.380 (0.174) -0.303 (0.156) -0.296 (0.155)
turnout x 08apr2020 -0.408 (0.175) -0.329 (0.158) -0.323 (0.157)
turnout x 09apr2020 -0.405 (0.175) -0.329 (0.158) -0.326 (0.156)
turnout x 10apr2020 -0.408 (0.175) -0.335 (0.159) -0.336 (0.157)
turnout x 11apr2020 -0.404 (0.176) -0.334 (0.160) -0.334 (0.159)
turnout x 12apr2020 -0.409 (0.177) -0.334 (0.163) -0.327 (0.161)
turnout x 13apr2020 -0.409 (0.177) -0.337 (0.162) -0.335 (0.162)
turnout x 14apr2020 -0.410 (0.177) -0.329 (0.161) -0.327 (0.160)
turnout x 15apr2020 -0.412 (0.178) -0.331 (0.161) -0.325 (0.160)
turnout x 16apr2020 -0.410 (0.178) -0.333 (0.162) -0.328 (0.160)
turnout x 17apr2020 -0.403 (0.177) -0.330 (0.162) -0.328 (0.160)
turnout x 18apr2020 -0.406 (0.177) -0.335 (0.163) -0.334 (0.161)
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Table C.1 continued
(1) (2) (3)
turnout x 20apr2020 -0.403 (0.177) -0.332 (0.164) -0.335 (0.163)
turnout x 21apr2020 -0.401 (0.177) -0.319 (0.161) -0.323 (0.160)
turnout x 22apr2020 -0.399 (0.178) -0.318 (0.161) -0.315 (0.160)
turnout x 23apr2020 -0.400 (0.178) -0.322 (0.162) -0.320 (0.160)
turnout x 24apr2020 -0.400 (0.178) -0.325 (0.163) -0.324 (0.162)
turnout x 25apr2020 -0.398 (0.178) -0.327 (0.163) -0.325 (0.162)
turnout x 26apr2020 -0.398 (0.178) -0.321 (0.165) -0.320 (0.164)
turnout x 27apr2020 -0.403 (0.178) -0.330 (0.165) -0.334 (0.165)
turnout x 28apr2020 -0.404 (0.178) -0.321 (0.163) -0.327 (0.162)
turnout x 29apr2020 -0.403 (0.179) -0.322 (0.163) -0.319 (0.161)
turnout x 30apr2020 -0.405 (0.179) -0.328 (0.163) -0.325 (0.162)
turnout x 01may2020 -0.404 (0.179) -0.330 (0.164) -0.330 (0.163)
turnout x 02may2020 -0.406 (0.179) -0.335 (0.165) -0.333 (0.163)
turnout x 03may2020 -0.406 (0.179) -0.330 (0.166) -0.330 (0.166)
turnout x 04may2020 -0.405 (0.179) -0.333 (0.167) -0.338 (0.166)
turnout x 05may2020 -0.405 (0.179) -0.324 (0.165) -0.333 (0.164)
turnout x 06may2020 -0.405 (0.180) -0.325 (0.165) -0.324 (0.163)
turnout x 07may2020 -0.403 (0.180) -0.328 (0.165) -0.325 (0.164)
turnout x 08may2020 -0.399 (0.179) -0.326 (0.165) -0.326 (0.164)
turnout x 09may2020 -0.396 (0.179) -0.326 (0.165) -0.324 (0.163)
turnout x 10may2020 -0.392 (0.178) -0.318 (0.166) -0.318 (0.165)
turnout x 11may2020 -0.390 (0.178) -0.320 (0.165) -0.324 (0.165)
turnout x 12may2020 -0.389 (0.178) -0.308 (0.163) -0.320 (0.163)
turnout x 13may2020 -0.388 (0.178) -0.307 (0.162) -0.308 (0.161)
turnout x 14may2020 -0.387 (0.178) -0.310 (0.162) -0.310 (0.161)
turnout x 15may2020 -0.387 (0.178) -0.312 (0.163) -0.314 (0.162)
turnout x 16may2020 -0.388 (0.178) -0.315 (0.163) -0.316 (0.162)
turnout x 17may2020 -0.388 (0.178) -0.312 (0.164) -0.313 (0.164)
turnout x 18may2020 -0.387 (0.177) -0.314 (0.164) -0.320 (0.164)
turnout x 19may2020 -0.387 (0.178) -0.301 (0.161) -0.318 (0.162)
province FE yes yes yes
NUTS1 x day FE yes yes yes
weeks-since-outbreak FE no yes no
weeks-since-outbreak x day FE no no yes
mean 4.645 4.645 4.652
observations 7,681 7,681 7,627
Panel B – The UK
turnout x 14mar2020 -0.002 (0.019) -0.007 (0.019) -0.004 (0.021)
turnout x 15mar2020 -0.022 (0.029) -0.029 (0.030) -0.033 (0.031)
turnout x 16mar2020 -0.044 (0.035) -0.050 (0.036) -0.062 (0.038)
turnout x 17mar2020 -0.060 (0.040) -0.062 (0.041) -0.084 (0.046)
turnout x 18mar2020 -0.055 (0.045) -0.056 (0.046) -0.083 (0.049)
turnout x 19mar2020 -0.067 (0.049) -0.054 (0.050) -0.075 (0.054)
turnout x 20mar2020 -0.060 (0.054) -0.040 (0.057) -0.045 (0.060)
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Table C.1 continued
(1) (2) (3)
turnout x 22mar2020 -0.096 (0.057) -0.072 (0.060) -0.082 (0.062)
turnout x 23mar2020 -0.101 (0.062) -0.071 (0.063) -0.086 (0.068)
turnout x 24mar2020 -0.106 (0.065) -0.076 (0.066) -0.102 (0.071)
turnout x 25mar2020 -0.130 (0.066) -0.098 (0.067) -0.123 (0.072)
turnout x 26mar2020 -0.144 (0.067) -0.109 (0.067) -0.120 (0.071)
turnout x 27mar2020 -0.145 (0.067) -0.118 (0.067) -0.120 (0.071)
turnout x 28mar2020 -0.150 (0.068) -0.120 (0.068) -0.125 (0.072)
turnout x 29mar2020 -0.151 (0.070) -0.121 (0.069) -0.125 (0.074)
turnout x 30mar2020 -0.153 (0.071) -0.124 (0.069) -0.136 (0.075)
turnout x 31mar2020 -0.155 (0.072) -0.126 (0.071) -0.138 (0.076)
turnout x 01apr2020 -0.159 (0.073) -0.130 (0.071) -0.142 (0.077)
turnout x 02apr2020 -0.165 (0.073) -0.137 (0.071) -0.142 (0.076)
turnout x 03apr2020 -0.176 (0.073) -0.149 (0.072) -0.148 (0.077)
turnout x 04apr2020 -0.179 (0.073) -0.153 (0.071) -0.151 (0.076)
turnout x 05apr2020 -0.178 (0.073) -0.152 (0.071) -0.150 (0.076)
turnout x 06apr2020 -0.182 (0.073) -0.156 (0.071) -0.161 (0.077)
turnout x 07apr2020 -0.187 (0.073) -0.161 (0.072) -0.162 (0.076)
turnout x 08apr2020 -0.187 (0.073) -0.161 (0.072) -0.161 (0.076)
turnout x 09apr2020 -0.190 (0.073) -0.166 (0.072) -0.162 (0.076)
turnout x 10apr2020 -0.192 (0.073) -0.168 (0.072) -0.165 (0.077)
turnout x 11apr2020 -0.196 (0.073) -0.174 (0.072) -0.167 (0.077)
turnout x 12apr2020 -0.198 (0.074) -0.175 (0.073) -0.169 (0.077)
turnout x 13apr2020 -0.199 (0.073) -0.177 (0.072) -0.176 (0.077)
turnout x 14apr2020 -0.203 (0.073) -0.180 (0.072) -0.174 (0.076)
turnout x 15apr2020 -0.205 (0.073) -0.182 (0.073) -0.176 (0.076)
turnout x 16apr2020 -0.204 (0.074) -0.181 (0.073) -0.173 (0.077)
turnout x 17apr2020 -0.207 (0.074) -0.183 (0.073) -0.181 (0.078)
turnout x 18apr2020 -0.206 (0.074) -0.181 (0.073) -0.181 (0.078)
turnout x 19apr2020 -0.206 (0.074) -0.181 (0.073) -0.180 (0.078)
turnout x 20apr2020 -0.209 (0.074) -0.183 (0.074) -0.183 (0.078)
turnout x 21apr2020 -0.209 (0.074) -0.183 (0.073) -0.178 (0.077)
turnout x 22apr2020 -0.210 (0.075) -0.184 (0.074) -0.179 (0.078)
turnout x 23apr2020 -0.210 (0.075) -0.184 (0.074) -0.182 (0.078)
turnout x 24apr2020 -0.210 (0.075) -0.184 (0.074) -0.185 (0.079)
turnout x 25apr2020 -0.211 (0.075) -0.184 (0.074) -0.186 (0.079)
turnout x 26apr2020 -0.211 (0.075) -0.184 (0.075) -0.185 (0.079)
turnout x 27apr2020 -0.211 (0.076) -0.183 (0.075) -0.180 (0.079)
turnout x 28apr2020 -0.210 (0.076) -0.183 (0.075) -0.177 (0.078)
turnout x 29apr2020 -0.209 (0.076) -0.182 (0.075) -0.174 (0.079)
turnout x 30apr2020 -0.209 (0.076) -0.182 (0.075) -0.179 (0.079)
turnout x 01may2020 -0.210 (0.076) -0.183 (0.075) -0.184 (0.080)
turnout x 02may2020 -0.208 (0.076) -0.181 (0.075) -0.182 (0.079)
turnout x 03may2020 -0.208 (0.076) -0.181 (0.075) -0.182 (0.079)
turnout x 04may2020 -0.208 (0.076) -0.180 (0.075) -0.175 (0.079)
turnout x 05may2020 -0.207 (0.076) -0.179 (0.075) -0.171 (0.078)
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Table C.1 continued
(1) (2) (3)
turnout x 07may2020 -0.206 (0.076) -0.179 (0.075) -0.179 (0.080)
turnout x 08may2020 -0.205 (0.076) -0.179 (0.076) -0.182 (0.080)
turnout x 09may2020 -0.205 (0.076) -0.178 (0.076) -0.180 (0.080)
turnout x 10may2020 -0.204 (0.076) -0.177 (0.076) -0.179 (0.080)
turnout x 11may2020 -0.204 (0.076) -0.175 (0.076) -0.169 (0.079)
turnout x 12may2020 -0.203 (0.076) -0.174 (0.076) -0.166 (0.079)
turnout x 13may2020 -0.202 (0.076) -0.174 (0.076) -0.165 (0.079)
turnout x 14may2020 -0.202 (0.076) -0.177 (0.076) -0.177 (0.080)
turnout x 15may2020 -0.202 (0.076) -0.177 (0.076) -0.181 (0.080)
turnout x 16may2020 -0.202 (0.076) -0.177 (0.076) -0.179 (0.080)
turnout x 17may2020 -0.203 (0.077) -0.177 (0.076) -0.178 (0.080)
turnout x 18may2020 -0.204 (0.077) -0.177 (0.076) -0.168 (0.079)
turnout x 19may2020 -0.203 (0.077) -0.177 (0.076) -0.165 (0.079)
upper tier local authority FE yes yes yes
NUTS1 x day FE yes yes yes
weeks-since-outbreak FE no yes no
weeks-since-outbreak x day FE no no yes
mean 4.387 4.387 4.390
observations 11,527 11,527 11,484
Panel C – Germany
turnout x 15mar2020 0.015 (0.022) 0.015 (0.022) 0.004 (0.024)
turnout x 16mar2020 0.027 (0.032) 0.032 (0.032) 0.024 (0.034)
turnout x 17mar2020 0.028 (0.039) 0.034 (0.039) 0.016 (0.042)
turnout x 18mar2020 0.021 (0.041) 0.038 (0.041) 0.025 (0.044)
turnout x 19mar2020 0.017 (0.043) 0.031 (0.042) 0.014 (0.046)
turnout x 20mar2020 0.041 (0.045) 0.060 (0.044) 0.048 (0.046)
turnout x 21mar2020 0.029 (0.044) 0.048 (0.043) 0.030 (0.045)
turnout x 22mar2020 0.020 (0.044) 0.044 (0.043) 0.031 (0.045)
turnout x 23mar2020 0.014 (0.044) 0.042 (0.044) 0.023 (0.046)
turnout x 24mar2020 0.018 (0.044) 0.052 (0.044) 0.036 (0.046)
turnout x 25mar2020 0.011 (0.045) 0.052 (0.046) 0.039 (0.047)
turnout x 26mar2020 0.012 (0.047) 0.057 (0.047) 0.040 (0.048)
turnout x 27mar2020 -0.002 (0.047) 0.047 (0.047) 0.029 (0.049)
turnout x 28mar2020 -0.007 (0.048) 0.043 (0.048) 0.024 (0.049)
turnout x 29mar2020 -0.013 (0.048) 0.037 (0.048) 0.021 (0.050)
turnout x 30mar2020 -0.016 (0.048) 0.035 (0.048) 0.022 (0.050)
turnout x 31mar2020 -0.021 (0.049) 0.032 (0.049) 0.019 (0.051)
turnout x 01apr2020 -0.030 (0.049) 0.025 (0.049) 0.011 (0.051)
turnout x 02apr2020 -0.037 (0.049) 0.019 (0.050) 0.004 (0.051)
turnout x 03apr2020 -0.041 (0.050) 0.015 (0.050) -0.001 (0.051)
turnout x 04apr2020 -0.046 (0.050) 0.010 (0.050) -0.002 (0.052)
turnout x 05apr2020 -0.050 (0.050) 0.006 (0.051) -0.007 (0.052)
turnout x 06apr2020 -0.052 (0.051) 0.006 (0.051) -0.007 (0.052)
turnout x 07apr2020 -0.058 (0.051) 0.001 (0.051) -0.014 (0.052)























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
Table C.1 continued
(1) (2) (3)
turnout x 09apr2020 -0.066 (0.051) -0.004 (0.052) -0.020 (0.052)
turnout x 10apr2020 -0.069 (0.051) -0.006 (0.052) -0.022 (0.053)
turnout x 11apr2020 -0.073 (0.052) -0.010 (0.052) -0.021 (0.053)
turnout x 12apr2020 -0.077 (0.052) -0.015 (0.053) -0.026 (0.054)
turnout x 13apr2020 -0.079 (0.052) -0.016 (0.053) -0.029 (0.054)
turnout x 14apr2020 -0.080 (0.053) -0.016 (0.053) -0.031 (0.054)
turnout x 15apr2020 -0.085 (0.053) -0.020 (0.053) -0.038 (0.054)
turnout x 16apr2020 -0.089 (0.053) -0.023 (0.053) -0.038 (0.054)
turnout x 17apr2020 -0.092 (0.053) -0.027 (0.053) -0.040 (0.055)
turnout x 18apr2020 -0.095 (0.053) -0.029 (0.054) -0.040 (0.055)
turnout x 19apr2020 -0.096 (0.053) -0.031 (0.054) -0.043 (0.055)
turnout x 20apr2020 -0.098 (0.053) -0.032 (0.054) -0.046 (0.055)
turnout x 21apr2020 -0.102 (0.054) -0.035 (0.054) -0.050 (0.055)
turnout x 22apr2020 -0.103 (0.054) -0.036 (0.054) -0.054 (0.055)
turnout x 23apr2020 -0.107 (0.054) -0.038 (0.054) -0.052 (0.055)
turnout x 24apr2020 -0.109 (0.054) -0.041 (0.054) -0.054 (0.055)
turnout x 25apr2020 -0.110 (0.054) -0.043 (0.054) -0.054 (0.056)
turnout x 26apr2020 -0.111 (0.054) -0.045 (0.055) -0.057 (0.056)
turnout x 27apr2020 -0.112 (0.054) -0.045 (0.055) -0.060 (0.056)
turnout x 28apr2020 -0.116 (0.054) -0.048 (0.054) -0.064 (0.055)
turnout x 29apr2020 -0.117 (0.054) -0.050 (0.054) -0.067 (0.056)
turnout x 30apr2020 -0.118 (0.054) -0.050 (0.054) -0.062 (0.055)
turnout x 01may2020 -0.120 (0.054) -0.053 (0.054) -0.065 (0.055)
turnout x 02may2020 -0.121 (0.054) -0.054 (0.054) -0.064 (0.056)
turnout x 03may2020 -0.122 (0.054) -0.055 (0.054) -0.067 (0.056)
turnout x 04may2020 -0.121 (0.054) -0.054 (0.054) -0.067 (0.056)
turnout x 05may2020 -0.121 (0.054) -0.054 (0.054) -0.067 (0.055)
turnout x 06may2020 -0.122 (0.054) -0.055 (0.054) -0.070 (0.055)
turnout x 07may2020 -0.122 (0.054) -0.054 (0.054) -0.064 (0.055)
turnout x 08may2020 -0.123 (0.054) -0.057 (0.054) -0.067 (0.055)
turnout x 09may2020 -0.123 (0.054) -0.057 (0.054) -0.067 (0.056)
turnout x 10may2020 -0.124 (0.054) -0.058 (0.054) -0.070 (0.055)
turnout x 11may2020 -0.124 (0.054) -0.058 (0.054) -0.071 (0.056)
turnout x 12may2020 -0.125 (0.054) -0.059 (0.054) -0.071 (0.055)
turnout x 13may2020 -0.124 (0.054) -0.058 (0.054) -0.072 (0.055)
turnout x 14may2020 -0.125 (0.054) -0.058 (0.054) -0.066 (0.055)
turnout x 15may2020 -0.126 (0.054) -0.060 (0.054) -0.069 (0.055)
turnout x 16may2020 -0.126 (0.054) -0.061 (0.054) -0.069 (0.056)
turnout x 17may2020 -0.126 (0.054) -0.062 (0.054) -0.072 (0.056)
turnout x 18may2020 -0.126 (0.054) -0.061 (0.054) -0.073 (0.056)
turnout x 19may2020 -0.126 (0.054) -0.062 (0.054) -0.073 (0.055)
county FE yes yes yes
NUTS1 x day FE yes yes yes
weeks-since-outbreak FE no yes no
weeks-since-outbreak x day FE no no yes























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
Table C.1 continued
(1) (2) (3)
observations 26,635 26,635 26,587
Panel D – Switzerland
turnout x 17mar2020 0.025 (0.041) 0.030 (0.059) 0.032 (0.084)
turnout x 18mar2020 0.016 (0.082) 0.022 (0.094) 0.014 (0.114)
turnout x 19mar2020 0.054 (0.087) 0.061 (0.099) 0.031 (0.127)
turnout x 20mar2020 0.081 (0.118) 0.086 (0.128) 0.070 (0.151)
turnout x 21mar2020 -0.015 (0.144) -0.027 (0.144) -0.018 (0.184)
turnout x 22mar2020 -0.035 (0.147) -0.048 (0.144) -0.049 (0.174)
turnout x 23mar2020 -0.049 (0.151) -0.062 (0.147) -0.095 (0.155)
turnout x 24mar2020 -0.048 (0.150) -0.067 (0.145) -0.076 (0.139)
turnout x 25mar2020 -0.073 (0.153) -0.091 (0.147) -0.104 (0.147)
turnout x 26mar2020 -0.099 (0.155) -0.120 (0.151) -0.128 (0.159)
turnout x 27mar2020 -0.106 (0.152) -0.127 (0.149) -0.124 (0.144)
turnout x 28mar2020 -0.107 (0.157) -0.126 (0.151) -0.135 (0.180)
turnout x 29mar2020 -0.112 (0.157) -0.132 (0.151) -0.135 (0.180)
turnout x 30mar2020 -0.116 (0.158) -0.136 (0.152) -0.168 (0.167)
turnout x 31mar2020 -0.115 (0.159) -0.137 (0.154) -0.138 (0.165)
turnout x 01apr2020 -0.130 (0.158) -0.152 (0.153) -0.138 (0.162)
turnout x 02apr2020 -0.130 (0.158) -0.153 (0.155) -0.157 (0.171)
turnout x 03apr2020 -0.129 (0.159) -0.152 (0.155) -0.129 (0.166)
turnout x 04apr2020 -0.138 (0.160) -0.148 (0.157) -0.165 (0.178)
turnout x 05apr2020 -0.136 (0.160) -0.145 (0.157) -0.162 (0.179)
turnout x 06apr2020 -0.133 (0.160) -0.143 (0.158) -0.168 (0.177)
turnout x 07apr2020 -0.135 (0.161) -0.147 (0.158) -0.132 (0.181)
turnout x 08apr2020 -0.142 (0.162) -0.154 (0.159) -0.126 (0.185)
turnout x 09apr2020 -0.143 (0.162) -0.156 (0.160) -0.152 (0.186)
turnout x 10apr2020 -0.151 (0.160) -0.164 (0.158) -0.160 (0.179)
turnout x 11apr2020 -0.158 (0.158) -0.169 (0.153) -0.186 (0.177)
turnout x 12apr2020 -0.153 (0.159) -0.164 (0.154) -0.183 (0.177)
turnout x 13apr2020 -0.154 (0.159) -0.166 (0.154) -0.173 (0.182)
turnout x 14apr2020 -0.164 (0.157) -0.174 (0.152) -0.176 (0.178)
turnout x 15apr2020 -0.159 (0.157) -0.170 (0.153) -0.177 (0.180)
turnout x 16apr2020 -0.157 (0.157) -0.167 (0.153) -0.166 (0.181)
turnout x 17apr2020 -0.159 (0.158) -0.169 (0.153) -0.169 (0.184)
turnout x 18apr2020 -0.159 (0.158) -0.163 (0.153) -0.192 (0.174)
turnout x 19apr2020 -0.157 (0.158) -0.161 (0.154) -0.190 (0.175)
turnout x 20apr2020 -0.157 (0.158) -0.161 (0.154) -0.169 (0.184)
turnout x 21apr2020 -0.158 (0.158) -0.160 (0.154) -0.172 (0.189)
turnout x 22apr2020 -0.159 (0.158) -0.162 (0.154) -0.175 (0.190)
turnout x 23apr2020 -0.156 (0.159) -0.158 (0.154) -0.160 (0.186)
turnout x 24apr2020 -0.144 (0.159) -0.146 (0.154) -0.168 (0.193)
turnout x 25apr2020 -0.144 (0.159) -0.148 (0.154) -0.176 (0.177)
turnout x 26apr2020 -0.143 (0.160) -0.147 (0.155) -0.174 (0.178)
turnout x 27apr2020 -0.143 (0.161) -0.147 (0.156) -0.151 (0.190)























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
Table C.1 continued
(1) (2) (3)
turnout x 29apr2020 -0.142 (0.162) -0.145 (0.157) -0.174 (0.196)
turnout x 30apr2020 -0.140 (0.162) -0.143 (0.157) -0.160 (0.191)
turnout x 01may2020 -0.141 (0.162) -0.143 (0.157) -0.169 (0.200)
turnout x 02may2020 -0.142 (0.163) -0.146 (0.158) -0.173 (0.181)
turnout x 03may2020 -0.142 (0.163) -0.146 (0.158) -0.173 (0.181)
turnout x 04may2020 -0.143 (0.164) -0.147 (0.158) -0.150 (0.193)
turnout x 05may2020 -0.143 (0.163) -0.146 (0.159) -0.174 (0.202)
turnout x 06may2020 -0.145 (0.163) -0.148 (0.158) -0.180 (0.200)
turnout x 07may2020 -0.143 (0.164) -0.146 (0.159) -0.164 (0.195)
turnout x 08may2020 -0.143 (0.164) -0.146 (0.159) -0.174 (0.204)
turnout x 09may2020 -0.143 (0.164) -0.148 (0.159) -0.174 (0.182)
turnout x 10may2020 -0.139 (0.164) -0.144 (0.159) -0.170 (0.182)
turnout x 11may2020 -0.140 (0.164) -0.144 (0.159) -0.146 (0.194)
turnout x 12may2020 -0.140 (0.164) -0.143 (0.159) -0.176 (0.203)
turnout x 13may2020 -0.139 (0.164) -0.143 (0.159) -0.177 (0.203)
turnout x 14may2020 -0.140 (0.164) -0.142 (0.158) -0.154 (0.196)
turnout x 15may2020 -0.140 (0.164) -0.143 (0.159) -0.166 (0.208)
turnout x 16may2020 -0.140 (0.164) -0.144 (0.159) -0.168 (0.183)
turnout x 17may2020 -0.140 (0.164) -0.144 (0.159) -0.169 (0.182)
turnout x 18may2020 -0.140 (0.164) -0.144 (0.159) -0.145 (0.194)
turnout x 19may2020 -0.140 (0.164) -0.144 (0.159) -0.172 (0.205)
canton FE yes yes yes
NUTS2 x day FE yes yes yes
weeks-since-outbreak FE no yes no
weeks-since-outbreak x day FE no no yes
mean 5.137 5.137 5.147
observations 1,554 1,554 1,512
Panel E – The Netherlands
turnout x 13mar2020 -0.013 (0.035) -0.021 (0.036) -0.026 (0.038)
turnout x 14mar2020 -0.042 (0.045) -0.059 (0.045) -0.072 (0.047)
turnout x 15mar2020 -0.028 (0.063) -0.034 (0.064) -0.039 (0.066)
turnout x 16mar2020 -0.016 (0.066) -0.019 (0.066) -0.023 (0.067)
turnout x 17mar2020 -0.041 (0.071) -0.044 (0.069) -0.050 (0.071)
turnout x 18mar2020 -0.014 (0.078) -0.014 (0.077) -0.018 (0.079)
turnout x 19mar2020 -0.081 (0.082) -0.063 (0.081) -0.064 (0.082)
turnout x 20mar2020 -0.102 (0.081) -0.084 (0.080) -0.092 (0.082)
turnout x 21mar2020 -0.127 (0.084) -0.111 (0.082) -0.118 (0.083)
turnout x 22mar2020 -0.149 (0.084) -0.135 (0.080) -0.139 (0.081)
turnout x 23mar2020 -0.161 (0.084) -0.147 (0.080) -0.149 (0.080)
turnout x 24mar2020 -0.172 (0.082) -0.161 (0.079) -0.161 (0.079)
turnout x 25mar2020 -0.166 (0.083) -0.157 (0.080) -0.160 (0.081)
turnout x 26mar2020 -0.167 (0.084) -0.163 (0.081) -0.162 (0.081)
turnout x 27mar2020 -0.199 (0.084) -0.197 (0.081) -0.196 (0.081)
turnout x 28mar2020 -0.212 (0.084) -0.208 (0.081) -0.207 (0.081)























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
Table C.1 continued
(1) (2) (3)
turnout x 30mar2020 -0.247 (0.083) -0.244 (0.080) -0.242 (0.080)
turnout x 31mar2020 -0.269 (0.085) -0.268 (0.081) -0.267 (0.082)
turnout x 01apr2020 -0.263 (0.084) -0.257 (0.080) -0.260 (0.081)
turnout x 02apr2020 -0.261 (0.083) -0.254 (0.080) -0.255 (0.080)
turnout x 03apr2020 -0.260 (0.083) -0.251 (0.080) -0.252 (0.080)
turnout x 04apr2020 -0.259 (0.083) -0.247 (0.080) -0.249 (0.080)
turnout x 05apr2020 -0.259 (0.083) -0.248 (0.080) -0.250 (0.080)
turnout x 06apr2020 -0.259 (0.084) -0.248 (0.081) -0.252 (0.081)
turnout x 07apr2020 -0.259 (0.084) -0.253 (0.081) -0.253 (0.081)
turnout x 08apr2020 -0.259 (0.084) -0.253 (0.081) -0.255 (0.081)
turnout x 09apr2020 -0.267 (0.085) -0.261 (0.081) -0.262 (0.081)
turnout x 10apr2020 -0.274 (0.085) -0.267 (0.081) -0.267 (0.082)
turnout x 11apr2020 -0.282 (0.085) -0.273 (0.082) -0.275 (0.082)
turnout x 12apr2020 -0.288 (0.085) -0.280 (0.082) -0.281 (0.083)
turnout x 13apr2020 -0.296 (0.086) -0.289 (0.083) -0.291 (0.083)
turnout x 14apr2020 -0.297 (0.086) -0.289 (0.083) -0.292 (0.084)
turnout x 15apr2020 -0.300 (0.086) -0.293 (0.083) -0.295 (0.083)
turnout x 16apr2020 -0.295 (0.087) -0.289 (0.083) -0.292 (0.084)
turnout x 17apr2020 -0.298 (0.087) -0.292 (0.084) -0.295 (0.084)
turnout x 18apr2020 -0.302 (0.087) -0.295 (0.084) -0.301 (0.084)
turnout x 19apr2020 -0.307 (0.087) -0.300 (0.084) -0.308 (0.084)
turnout x 20apr2020 -0.307 (0.087) -0.301 (0.084) -0.309 (0.084)
turnout x 21apr2020 -0.303 (0.086) -0.295 (0.084) -0.297 (0.084)
turnout x 22apr2020 -0.305 (0.086) -0.298 (0.083) -0.300 (0.084)
turnout x 23apr2020 -0.307 (0.087) -0.301 (0.083) -0.304 (0.084)
turnout x 24apr2020 -0.312 (0.087) -0.306 (0.083) -0.308 (0.084)
turnout x 25apr2020 -0.313 (0.087) -0.307 (0.084) -0.312 (0.084)
turnout x 26apr2020 -0.315 (0.087) -0.309 (0.084) -0.314 (0.085)
turnout x 27apr2020 -0.315 (0.087) -0.310 (0.084) -0.315 (0.085)
turnout x 28apr2020 -0.315 (0.087) -0.305 (0.085) -0.307 (0.085)
turnout x 29apr2020 -0.315 (0.088) -0.307 (0.084) -0.309 (0.085)
turnout x 30apr2020 -0.316 (0.088) -0.311 (0.084) -0.314 (0.085)
turnout x 01may2020 -0.318 (0.087) -0.313 (0.084) -0.315 (0.084)
turnout x 02may2020 -0.318 (0.087) -0.312 (0.084) -0.316 (0.085)
turnout x 03may2020 -0.317 (0.087) -0.312 (0.085) -0.317 (0.085)
turnout x 04may2020 -0.317 (0.087) -0.312 (0.085) -0.317 (0.085)
turnout x 05may2020 -0.317 (0.088) -0.308 (0.085) -0.310 (0.085)
turnout x 06may2020 -0.316 (0.088) -0.309 (0.085) -0.311 (0.085)
turnout x 07may2020 -0.314 (0.088) -0.309 (0.084) -0.312 (0.085)
turnout x 08may2020 -0.314 (0.088) -0.309 (0.084) -0.311 (0.085)
turnout x 09may2020 -0.314 (0.088) -0.308 (0.085) -0.313 (0.085)
turnout x 10may2020 -0.315 (0.088) -0.309 (0.085) -0.314 (0.085)
turnout x 11may2020 -0.311 (0.088) -0.306 (0.085) -0.311 (0.085)
turnout x 12may2020 -0.316 (0.088) -0.307 (0.085) -0.310 (0.086)
turnout x 13may2020 -0.316 (0.088) -0.309 (0.085) -0.310 (0.086)























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
Table C.1 continued
(1) (2) (3)
turnout x 15may2020 -0.317 (0.088) -0.311 (0.085) -0.313 (0.085)
turnout x 16may2020 -0.316 (0.088) -0.310 (0.085) -0.314 (0.086)
turnout x 17may2020 -0.315 (0.088) -0.310 (0.085) -0.314 (0.086)
turnout x 18may2020 -0.315 (0.088) -0.310 (0.085) -0.315 (0.086)
turnout x 19may2020 -0.316 (0.088) -0.306 (0.086) -0.310 (0.086)
municipality FE yes yes yes
NUTS1 x day FE yes yes yes
weeks-since-outbreak FE no yes no
weeks-since-outbreak x day FE no no yes
mean 4.531 4.531 4.531
observations 23,171 23,171 23,140
Panel F – Austria
turnout x 16mar2020 0.005 (0.086) 0.006 (0.085) 0.006 (0.085)
turnout x 17mar2020 -0.007 (0.102) -0.059 (0.109) -0.096 (0.120)
turnout x 18mar2020 0.033 (0.101) 0.039 (0.111) 0.040 (0.116)
turnout x 19mar2020 -0.050 (0.102) -0.045 (0.112) -0.044 (0.117)
turnout x 20mar2020 -0.087 (0.107) -0.082 (0.115) -0.081 (0.117)
turnout x 21mar2020 0.011 (0.117) 0.066 (0.122) 0.058 (0.121)
turnout x 22mar2020 -0.004 (0.119) 0.038 (0.123) 0.022 (0.121)
turnout x 23mar2020 -0.115 (0.122) -0.072 (0.125) -0.088 (0.122)
turnout x 24mar2020 -0.157 (0.120) -0.157 (0.120) -0.154 (0.122)
turnout x 25mar2020 -0.159 (0.122) -0.138 (0.122) -0.141 (0.124)
turnout x 26mar2020 -0.147 (0.124) -0.126 (0.124) -0.131 (0.125)
turnout x 27mar2020 -0.147 (0.123) -0.128 (0.123) -0.129 (0.123)
turnout x 28mar2020 -0.185 (0.128) -0.163 (0.127) -0.158 (0.128)
turnout x 29mar2020 -0.166 (0.130) -0.147 (0.129) -0.138 (0.130)
turnout x 30mar2020 -0.184 (0.133) -0.165 (0.132) -0.158 (0.132)
turnout x 31mar2020 -0.212 (0.133) -0.196 (0.134) -0.194 (0.135)
turnout x 01apr2020 -0.223 (0.134) -0.216 (0.133) -0.213 (0.135)
turnout x 02apr2020 -0.224 (0.136) -0.217 (0.135) -0.216 (0.137)
turnout x 03apr2020 -0.174 (0.129) -0.168 (0.130) -0.162 (0.130)
turnout x 04apr2020 -0.167 (0.132) -0.162 (0.132) -0.162 (0.133)
turnout x 05apr2020 -0.213 (0.140) -0.207 (0.139) -0.207 (0.140)
turnout x 06apr2020 -0.209 (0.142) -0.203 (0.141) -0.194 (0.141)
turnout x 07apr2020 -0.223 (0.143) -0.206 (0.141) -0.199 (0.140)
turnout x 08apr2020 -0.167 (0.136) -0.163 (0.135) -0.165 (0.137)
turnout x 09apr2020 -0.158 (0.135) -0.155 (0.134) -0.154 (0.135)
turnout x 10apr2020 -0.166 (0.134) -0.162 (0.133) -0.162 (0.134)
turnout x 11apr2020 -0.160 (0.133) -0.167 (0.133) -0.172 (0.134)
turnout x 12apr2020 -0.159 (0.134) -0.164 (0.134) -0.171 (0.135)
turnout x 13apr2020 -0.157 (0.134) -0.162 (0.134) -0.171 (0.135)
turnout x 14apr2020 -0.164 (0.134) -0.149 (0.132) -0.154 (0.133)
turnout x 15apr2020 -0.163 (0.134) -0.167 (0.132) -0.166 (0.134)
turnout x 16apr2020 -0.163 (0.135) -0.163 (0.133) -0.157 (0.135)























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
Table C.1 continued
(1) (2) (3)
turnout x 18apr2020 -0.169 (0.135) -0.183 (0.134) -0.186 (0.135)
turnout x 19apr2020 -0.170 (0.135) -0.181 (0.134) -0.185 (0.135)
turnout x 20apr2020 -0.172 (0.135) -0.183 (0.135) -0.187 (0.136)
turnout x 21apr2020 -0.169 (0.135) -0.159 (0.132) -0.160 (0.134)
turnout x 22apr2020 -0.170 (0.135) -0.176 (0.133) -0.175 (0.134)
turnout x 23apr2020 -0.169 (0.135) -0.171 (0.134) -0.169 (0.135)
turnout x 24apr2020 -0.173 (0.135) -0.174 (0.134) -0.174 (0.135)
turnout x 25apr2020 -0.174 (0.135) -0.189 (0.134) -0.190 (0.135)
turnout x 26apr2020 -0.173 (0.135) -0.184 (0.134) -0.187 (0.136)
turnout x 27apr2020 -0.179 (0.135) -0.190 (0.135) -0.195 (0.136)
turnout x 28apr2020 -0.179 (0.135) -0.170 (0.133) -0.170 (0.134)
turnout x 29apr2020 -0.180 (0.135) -0.186 (0.133) -0.184 (0.134)
turnout x 30apr2020 -0.181 (0.135) -0.182 (0.134) -0.180 (0.135)
turnout x 01may2020 -0.181 (0.135) -0.181 (0.134) -0.181 (0.135)
turnout x 02may2020 -0.181 (0.135) -0.196 (0.134) -0.198 (0.135)
turnout x 03may2020 -0.181 (0.135) -0.193 (0.135) -0.196 (0.135)
turnout x 04may2020 -0.184 (0.135) -0.196 (0.135) -0.199 (0.136)
turnout x 05may2020 -0.184 (0.135) -0.174 (0.133) -0.175 (0.134)
turnout x 06may2020 -0.187 (0.135) -0.193 (0.133) -0.190 (0.134)
turnout x 07may2020 -0.187 (0.135) -0.188 (0.133) -0.185 (0.134)
turnout x 08may2020 -0.188 (0.135) -0.189 (0.133) -0.188 (0.135)
turnout x 09may2020 -0.188 (0.135) -0.203 (0.134) -0.205 (0.135)
turnout x 10may2020 -0.188 (0.135) -0.199 (0.134) -0.203 (0.135)
turnout x 11may2020 -0.190 (0.135) -0.202 (0.135) -0.206 (0.136)
turnout x 12may2020 -0.190 (0.135) -0.182 (0.133) -0.184 (0.134)
turnout x 13may2020 -0.191 (0.135) -0.197 (0.133) -0.195 (0.134)
turnout x 14may2020 -0.192 (0.135) -0.194 (0.133) -0.191 (0.135)
turnout x 15may2020 -0.193 (0.135) -0.194 (0.134) -0.193 (0.135)
turnout x 16may2020 -0.193 (0.135) -0.208 (0.134) -0.213 (0.135)
turnout x 17may2020 -0.194 (0.135) -0.204 (0.134) -0.211 (0.135)
turnout x 18may2020 -0.196 (0.136) -0.207 (0.135) -0.212 (0.136)
turnout x 19may2020 -0.195 (0.135) -0.189 (0.133) -0.192 (0.135)
district FE yes yes yes
NUTS1 x day FE yes yes yes
weeks-since-outbreak FE no yes no
weeks-since-outbreak x day FE no no yes
mean 4.500 4.500 4.499
observations 5,794 5,794 5,762
Panel G – Sweden
turnout x 12mar2020 0.105 (0.208) 0.086 (0.197) 0.005 (0.196)
turnout x 13mar2020 -0.011 (0.130) -0.025 (0.130) 0.003 (0.207)
turnout x 14mar2020 0.003 (0.126) -0.011 (0.127) 0.054 (0.192)
turnout x 15mar2020 -0.005 (0.128) -0.037 (0.123) 0.000 (0.169)
turnout x 16mar2020 -0.126 (0.121) -0.125 (0.132) -0.199 (0.190)
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Table C.1 continued
(1) (2) (3)
turnout x 18mar2020 -0.149 (0.149) -0.148 (0.163) -0.117 (0.173)
turnout x 19mar2020 -0.143 (0.156) -0.127 (0.161) -0.087 (0.162)
turnout x 20mar2020 -0.153 (0.154) -0.081 (0.178) 0.005 (0.189)
turnout x 21mar2020 -0.166 (0.150) -0.094 (0.174) -0.027 (0.189)
turnout x 22mar2020 -0.161 (0.155) -0.094 (0.176) -0.060 (0.181)
turnout x 23mar2020 -0.166 (0.161) -0.091 (0.186) -0.138 (0.213)
turnout x 24mar2020 -0.183 (0.168) -0.108 (0.195) -0.160 (0.213)
turnout x 25mar2020 -0.197 (0.174) -0.124 (0.200) -0.154 (0.205)
turnout x 26mar2020 -0.201 (0.178) -0.105 (0.205) -0.177 (0.197)
turnout x 27mar2020 -0.228 (0.178) -0.111 (0.221) -0.097 (0.237)
turnout x 28mar2020 -0.225 (0.180) -0.108 (0.223) -0.095 (0.237)
turnout x 29mar2020 -0.225 (0.180) -0.101 (0.226) -0.103 (0.244)
turnout x 30mar2020 -0.267 (0.178) -0.156 (0.221) -0.194 (0.229)
turnout x 31mar2020 -0.270 (0.182) -0.160 (0.220) -0.183 (0.226)
turnout x 01apr2020 -0.291 (0.184) -0.181 (0.229) -0.189 (0.221)
turnout x 02apr2020 -0.302 (0.183) -0.172 (0.233) -0.247 (0.219)
turnout x 03apr2020 -0.301 (0.185) -0.179 (0.238) -0.201 (0.239)
turnout x 04apr2020 -0.300 (0.183) -0.179 (0.236) -0.200 (0.237)
turnout x 05apr2020 -0.297 (0.183) -0.165 (0.239) -0.175 (0.243)
turnout x 06apr2020 -0.300 (0.185) -0.189 (0.234) -0.215 (0.230)
turnout x 07apr2020 -0.324 (0.187) -0.213 (0.231) -0.226 (0.231)
turnout x 08apr2020 -0.325 (0.189) -0.215 (0.239) -0.217 (0.232)
turnout x 09apr2020 -0.319 (0.191) -0.204 (0.244) -0.226 (0.237)
turnout x 10apr2020 -0.327 (0.191) -0.240 (0.236) -0.260 (0.241)
turnout x 11apr2020 -0.336 (0.191) -0.249 (0.237) -0.273 (0.242)
turnout x 12apr2020 -0.346 (0.194) -0.249 (0.246) -0.256 (0.255)
turnout x 13apr2020 -0.352 (0.193) -0.274 (0.236) -0.275 (0.237)
turnout x 14apr2020 -0.351 (0.194) -0.272 (0.233) -0.267 (0.242)
turnout x 15apr2020 -0.348 (0.197) -0.267 (0.241) -0.259 (0.247)
turnout x 16apr2020 -0.352 (0.199) -0.266 (0.246) -0.269 (0.255)
turnout x 17apr2020 -0.351 (0.201) -0.284 (0.242) -0.303 (0.247)
turnout x 18apr2020 -0.353 (0.204) -0.286 (0.245) -0.301 (0.251)
turnout x 19apr2020 -0.353 (0.204) -0.283 (0.247) -0.283 (0.264)
turnout x 20apr2020 -0.353 (0.204) -0.288 (0.243) -0.273 (0.247)
turnout x 21apr2020 -0.363 (0.205) -0.299 (0.243) -0.273 (0.255)
turnout x 22apr2020 -0.365 (0.204) -0.301 (0.244) -0.279 (0.260)
turnout x 23apr2020 -0.362 (0.205) -0.295 (0.248) -0.263 (0.268)
turnout x 24apr2020 -0.363 (0.205) -0.302 (0.246) -0.323 (0.252)
turnout x 25apr2020 -0.360 (0.207) -0.298 (0.248) -0.317 (0.255)
turnout x 26apr2020 -0.360 (0.207) -0.296 (0.250) -0.288 (0.269)
turnout x 27apr2020 -0.357 (0.207) -0.298 (0.246) -0.264 (0.251)
turnout x 28apr2020 -0.359 (0.209) -0.300 (0.247) -0.251 (0.257)
turnout x 29apr2020 -0.361 (0.208) -0.301 (0.248) -0.280 (0.269)
turnout x 30apr2020 -0.361 (0.209) -0.298 (0.252) -0.261 (0.275)
turnout x 01may2020 -0.368 (0.209) -0.309 (0.250) -0.323 (0.256)
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Table C.1 continued
(1) (2) (3)
turnout x 03may2020 -0.368 (0.209) -0.308 (0.253) -0.304 (0.268)
turnout x 04may2020 -0.366 (0.212) -0.308 (0.252) -0.270 (0.258)
turnout x 05may2020 -0.366 (0.213) -0.308 (0.252) -0.256 (0.262)
turnout x 06may2020 -0.363 (0.214) -0.305 (0.254) -0.295 (0.277)
turnout x 07may2020 -0.362 (0.214) -0.302 (0.259) -0.272 (0.285)
turnout x 08may2020 -0.363 (0.214) -0.304 (0.259) -0.323 (0.264)
turnout x 09may2020 -0.361 (0.215) -0.302 (0.260) -0.324 (0.265)
turnout x 10may2020 -0.359 (0.216) -0.300 (0.263) -0.314 (0.276)
turnout x 11may2020 -0.363 (0.216) -0.306 (0.258) -0.277 (0.263)
turnout x 12may2020 -0.363 (0.215) -0.306 (0.258) -0.268 (0.268)
turnout x 13may2020 -0.366 (0.215) -0.310 (0.257) -0.311 (0.280)
turnout x 14may2020 -0.367 (0.215) -0.317 (0.259) -0.289 (0.286)
turnout x 15may2020 -0.366 (0.214) -0.325 (0.250) -0.344 (0.263)
turnout x 16may2020 -0.366 (0.215) -0.325 (0.250) -0.345 (0.263)
turnout x 17may2020 -0.364 (0.215) -0.323 (0.253) -0.338 (0.274)
turnout x 18may2020 -0.365 (0.216) -0.325 (0.249) -0.291 (0.264)
turnout x 19may2020 -0.366 (0.214) -0.326 (0.247) -0.286 (0.269)
county FE yes yes yes
NUTS1 x day FE yes yes yes
weeks-since-outbreak FE no yes no
weeks-since-outbreak x day FE no no yes
mean 4.058 4.057 4.040
observations 1,467 1,466 1,378
Notes: This table presents the regression results from our baseline model in equation (1). Standard
errors clustered at the area level in parenthesis. Columns (2) and (3) add weeks-since-outbreak and
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Table C.2: Effect of social capital on excess deaths
(1) (2)
turnout x 02feb2020 -0.008 (0.012) -0.010 (0.013)
turnout x 03feb2020 0.009 (0.016) 0.005 (0.016)
turnout x 04feb2020 0.001 (0.018) 0.001 (0.019)
turnout x 05feb2020 0.013 (0.020) 0.015 (0.021)
turnout x 06feb2020 -0.002 (0.021) -0.000 (0.022)
turnout x 07feb2020 -0.003 (0.021) -0.004 (0.022)
turnout x 08feb2020 -0.003 (0.022) -0.003 (0.023)
turnout x 09feb2020 0.008 (0.024) 0.003 (0.025)
turnout x 10feb2020 0.012 (0.024) 0.010 (0.024)
turnout x 11feb2020 -0.000 (0.024) -0.001 (0.024)
turnout x 12feb2020 -0.005 (0.024) -0.000 (0.025)
turnout x 13feb2020 0.003 (0.025) 0.010 (0.025)
turnout x 14feb2020 0.007 (0.025) 0.015 (0.026)
turnout x 15feb2020 0.008 (0.025) 0.017 (0.026)
turnout x 16feb2020 -0.009 (0.026) -0.002 (0.027)
turnout x 17feb2020 -0.014 (0.026) -0.010 (0.027)
turnout x 18feb2020 0.010 (0.028) 0.015 (0.029)
turnout x 19feb2020 0.013 (0.027) 0.017 (0.028)
turnout x 20feb2020 0.002 (0.028) 0.006 (0.029)
turnout x 21feb2020 0.013 (0.028) 0.019 (0.029)
turnout x 22feb2020 0.015 (0.029) 0.015 (0.029)
turnout x 23feb2020 0.011 (0.029) 0.017 (0.029)
turnout x 24feb2020 0.005 (0.029) 0.007 (0.030)
turnout x 25feb2020 0.008 (0.029) 0.012 (0.030)
turnout x 26feb2020 0.000 (0.030) -0.000 (0.031)
turnout x 27feb2020 -0.004 (0.030) -0.005 (0.031)
turnout x 28feb2020 0.002 (0.030) 0.001 (0.031)
turnout x 29feb2020 -0.001 (0.030) -0.004 (0.031)
turnout x 01mar2020 0.013 (0.031) 0.007 (0.032)
turnout x 02mar2020 0.008 (0.031) 0.002 (0.031)
turnout x 03mar2020 0.010 (0.031) 0.000 (0.032)
turnout x 04mar2020 0.013 (0.032) 0.003 (0.032)
turnout x 05mar2020 0.015 (0.032) 0.004 (0.032)
turnout x 06mar2020 0.035 (0.032) 0.017 (0.033)
turnout x 07mar2020 0.046 (0.032) 0.028 (0.033)
turnout x 08mar2020 0.042 (0.032) 0.024 (0.033)
turnout x 09mar2020 0.025 (0.032) 0.009 (0.033)
turnout x 10mar2020 0.027 (0.032) 0.011 (0.033)
turnout x 11mar2020 0.027 (0.032) 0.014 (0.033)
turnout x 12mar2020 0.011 (0.033) 0.001 (0.034)
turnout x 13mar2020 0.012 (0.034) 0.001 (0.035)
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Table C.2 continued
(1) (2)
turnout x 15mar2020 0.000 (0.034) -0.008 (0.035)
turnout x 16mar2020 -0.000 (0.034) -0.012 (0.035)
turnout x 17mar2020 -0.005 (0.035) -0.013 (0.036)
turnout x 18mar2020 -0.009 (0.035) -0.011 (0.036)
turnout x 19mar2020 -0.018 (0.035) -0.022 (0.036)
turnout x 20mar2020 -0.036 (0.035) -0.039 (0.036)
turnout x 21mar2020 -0.041 (0.034) -0.045 (0.035)
turnout x 22mar2020 -0.046 (0.034) -0.051 (0.035)
turnout x 23mar2020 -0.058 (0.034) -0.061 (0.035)
turnout x 24mar2020 -0.049 (0.034) -0.051 (0.035)
turnout x 25mar2020 -0.059 (0.034) -0.060 (0.035)
turnout x 26mar2020 -0.065 (0.035) -0.062 (0.036)
turnout x 27mar2020 -0.057 (0.035) -0.055 (0.036)
turnout x 28mar2020 -0.055 (0.035) -0.051 (0.036)
turnout x 29mar2020 -0.061 (0.035) -0.059 (0.036)
turnout x 30mar2020 -0.067 (0.035) -0.061 (0.036)
turnout x 31mar2020 -0.067 (0.036) -0.060 (0.036)
turnout x 01apr2020 -0.077 (0.036) -0.068 (0.037)
turnout x 02apr2020 -0.081 (0.036) -0.069 (0.037)
turnout x 03apr2020 -0.081 (0.036) -0.069 (0.037)
turnout x 04apr2020 -0.078 (0.037) -0.062 (0.037)
turnout x 05apr2020 -0.074 (0.037) -0.061 (0.038)
turnout x 06apr2020 -0.078 (0.037) -0.064 (0.038)
turnout x 07apr2020 -0.091 (0.037) -0.075 (0.038)
turnout x 08apr2020 -0.088 (0.037) -0.068 (0.037)
turnout x 09apr2020 -0.080 (0.035) -0.060 (0.036)
turnout x 10apr2020 -0.092 (0.035) -0.072 (0.037)
turnout x 11apr2020 -0.088 (0.036) -0.063 (0.037)
turnout x 12apr2020 -0.093 (0.037) -0.070 (0.038)
turnout x 13apr2020 -0.086 (0.036) -0.063 (0.037)
turnout x 14apr2020 -0.075 (0.036) -0.049 (0.037)
turnout x 15apr2020 -0.071 (0.036) -0.046 (0.037)
controls x day FE no yes
municipality FE yes yes
province x day FE yes yes
mean 4.645 4.645
observations 140,362 140,362
Notes: This table presents the regression results from our excess mortality regression for Italy in equation
(2). Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Column (2) adds control variables
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Table C.3: Effect of social capital on mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
turnout x jan week 2 0.042 (0.036) 0.040 (0.035) -0.010 (0.025) -0.012 (0.023)
turnout x jan week 3 0.068 (0.044) 0.071 (0.043) 0.015 (0.028) 0.048 (0.025)
turnout x jan week 4 0.029 (0.040) 0.035 (0.039) -0.047 (0.029) -0.011 (0.026)
turnout x feb week 1 -0.030 (0.040) -0.026 (0.039) -0.043 (0.030) 0.015 (0.030)
turnout x feb week 2 -0.006 (0.041) 0.000 (0.040) -0.026 (0.036) 0.048 (0.030)
turnout x feb week 3 -0.032 (0.048) -0.032 (0.047) -0.037 (0.037) -0.021 (0.030)
turnout x feb week 4 -0.117 (0.079) -0.101 (0.081) -0.088 (0.067) -0.138 (0.060)
turnout x mar week 1 -0.156 (0.070) -0.156 (0.070) -0.119 (0.062) -0.196 (0.054)
turnout x mar week 2 -0.072 (0.154) -0.119 (0.165) -0.075 (0.097) -0.328 (0.113)
turnout x mar week 3 -0.005 (0.191) -0.058 (0.204) -0.006 (0.129) -0.299 (0.150)
turnout x mar week 4 -0.062 (0.204) -0.120 (0.217) -0.052 (0.142) -0.338 (0.153)
controls x week FE yes yes yes yes
log GDP per capita
x week FE yes no yes no
province FE yes yes yes yes
week FE no no yes yes
NUTS1 x week FE yes yes no no
mean 5.927 5.927 5.927 5.927
observations 1,248 1,248 1,248 1,248
Notes: This table presents the regression results from our baseline model in equation (1). Standard errors
clustered at the province level in parenthesis
Table C.4: Effect of social capital on the spread of Covid-19 cases with controls
(1) (2) (3)
turnout x 10mar2020 -0.018 (0.062) -0.081 (0.108) -0.114 (0.108)
turnout x 11mar2020 -0.079 (0.104) -0.124 (0.142) -0.167 (0.161)
turnout x 12mar2020 -0.159 (0.109) -0.295 (0.159) -0.255 (0.165)
turnout x 13mar2020 -0.275 (0.124) -0.397 (0.169) -0.341 (0.174)
turnout x 14mar2020 -0.341 (0.129) -0.482 (0.176) -0.397 (0.176)
turnout x 15mar2020 -0.335 (0.140) -0.513 (0.186) -0.449 (0.177)
turnout x 16mar2020 -0.275 (0.143) -0.416 (0.187) -0.335 (0.194)
turnout x 17mar2020 -0.258 (0.150) -0.405 (0.199) -0.388 (0.202)
turnout x 18mar2020 -0.265 (0.156) -0.448 (0.209) -0.428 (0.206)
turnout x 19mar2020 -0.276 (0.166) -0.418 (0.213) -0.380 (0.209)
turnout x 20mar2020 -0.302 (0.162) -0.449 (0.212) -0.395 (0.197)
turnout x 21mar2020 -0.288 (0.165) -0.420 (0.214) -0.341 (0.197)
turnout x 22mar2020 -0.308 (0.166) -0.448 (0.216) -0.389 (0.197)
turnout x 23mar2020 -0.297 (0.166) -0.440 (0.215) -0.370 (0.202)
turnout x 24mar2020 -0.285 (0.167) -0.407 (0.217) -0.350 (0.206)
turnout x 25mar2020 -0.285 (0.172) -0.416 (0.220) -0.354 (0.207)
turnout x 26mar2020 -0.292 (0.171) -0.421 (0.215) -0.363 (0.204)
turnout x 27mar2020 -0.340 (0.173) -0.466 (0.220) -0.406 (0.207)
turnout x 28mar2020 -0.354 (0.171) -0.469 (0.218) -0.396 (0.204)
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Table C.4 continued
(1) (2) (3)
turnout x 30mar2020 -0.331 (0.171) -0.428 (0.218) -0.369 (0.203)
turnout x 31mar2020 -0.325 (0.171) -0.416 (0.218) -0.353 (0.202)
turnout x 01apr2020 -0.320 (0.170) -0.397 (0.216) -0.326 (0.200)
turnout x 02apr2020 -0.322 (0.170) -0.402 (0.216) -0.342 (0.201)
turnout x 03apr2020 -0.335 (0.171) -0.408 (0.218) -0.342 (0.205)
turnout x 04apr2020 -0.336 (0.172) -0.403 (0.220) -0.332 (0.206)
turnout x 05apr2020 -0.368 (0.174) -0.449 (0.219) -0.389 (0.209)
turnout x 06apr2020 -0.380 (0.174) -0.456 (0.219) -0.397 (0.208)
turnout x 07apr2020 -0.380 (0.174) -0.454 (0.219) -0.379 (0.207)
turnout x 08apr2020 -0.408 (0.175) -0.490 (0.220) -0.404 (0.207)
turnout x 09apr2020 -0.405 (0.175) -0.488 (0.221) -0.414 (0.208)
turnout x 10apr2020 -0.408 (0.175) -0.495 (0.220) -0.420 (0.209)
turnout x 11apr2020 -0.404 (0.176) -0.493 (0.221) -0.416 (0.210)
turnout x 12apr2020 -0.409 (0.177) -0.496 (0.222) -0.418 (0.214)
turnout x 13apr2020 -0.409 (0.177) -0.499 (0.222) -0.422 (0.213)
turnout x 14apr2020 -0.410 (0.177) -0.501 (0.224) -0.406 (0.213)
turnout x 15apr2020 -0.412 (0.178) -0.504 (0.224) -0.407 (0.212)
turnout x 16apr2020 -0.410 (0.178) -0.502 (0.224) -0.414 (0.213)
turnout x 17apr2020 -0.403 (0.177) -0.497 (0.223) -0.412 (0.213)
turnout x 18apr2020 -0.406 (0.177) -0.501 (0.223) -0.417 (0.212)
turnout x 19apr2020 -0.403 (0.177) -0.500 (0.223) -0.413 (0.214)
turnout x 20apr2020 -0.403 (0.177) -0.503 (0.223) -0.420 (0.213)
turnout x 21apr2020 -0.401 (0.177) -0.501 (0.223) -0.398 (0.211)
turnout x 22apr2020 -0.399 (0.178) -0.501 (0.223) -0.395 (0.211)
turnout x 23apr2020 -0.400 (0.178) -0.498 (0.224) -0.400 (0.211)
turnout x 24apr2020 -0.400 (0.178) -0.498 (0.223) -0.400 (0.213)
turnout x 25apr2020 -0.398 (0.178) -0.498 (0.223) -0.406 (0.211)
turnout x 26apr2020 -0.398 (0.178) -0.499 (0.224) -0.402 (0.214)
turnout x 27apr2020 -0.403 (0.178) -0.504 (0.224) -0.412 (0.213)
turnout x 28apr2020 -0.404 (0.178) -0.504 (0.224) -0.392 (0.213)
turnout x 29apr2020 -0.403 (0.179) -0.503 (0.224) -0.388 (0.213)
turnout x 30apr2020 -0.405 (0.179) -0.506 (0.224) -0.400 (0.213)
turnout x 01may2020 -0.404 (0.179) -0.507 (0.224) -0.403 (0.214)
turnout x 02may2020 -0.406 (0.179) -0.509 (0.224) -0.413 (0.213)
turnout x 03may2020 -0.406 (0.179) -0.509 (0.225) -0.407 (0.216)
turnout x 04may2020 -0.405 (0.179) -0.508 (0.225) -0.412 (0.215)
turnout x 05may2020 -0.405 (0.179) -0.508 (0.225) -0.393 (0.214)
turnout x 06may2020 -0.405 (0.180) -0.508 (0.225) -0.390 (0.215)
turnout x 07may2020 -0.403 (0.180) -0.506 (0.225) -0.397 (0.214)
turnout x 08may2020 -0.399 (0.179) -0.500 (0.224) -0.394 (0.214)
turnout x 09may2020 -0.396 (0.179) -0.496 (0.224) -0.399 (0.212)
turnout x 10may2020 -0.392 (0.178) -0.492 (0.223) -0.392 (0.214)
turnout x 11may2020 -0.390 (0.178) -0.490 (0.223) -0.396 (0.212)























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
Table C.4 continued
(1) (2) (3)
turnout x 13may2020 -0.388 (0.178) -0.485 (0.222) -0.367 (0.212)
turnout x 14may2020 -0.387 (0.178) -0.483 (0.223) -0.372 (0.211)
turnout x 15may2020 -0.387 (0.178) -0.482 (0.223) -0.369 (0.212)
turnout x 16may2020 -0.388 (0.178) -0.483 (0.223) -0.380 (0.211)
turnout x 17may2020 -0.388 (0.178) -0.484 (0.223) -0.368 (0.214)
turnout x 18may2020 -0.387 (0.177) -0.482 (0.223) -0.371 (0.212)
turnout x 19may2020 -0.387 (0.178) -0.483 (0.223) -0.353 (0.213)
province FE yes yes yes
NUTS1 x day FE yes yes yes
controls x day FE no yes yes
controls x weeks-since-outbreak FE no no yes
Mean 4.645 4.645 4.645
Observations 7,681 7,681 7,681
Notes: This table presents the regression results from our baseline model including controls for Italy in
equation (1). Standard errors clustered at the province level in parenthesis. Columns (2) and (3) add






















VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
Table C.5: Effect of social capital on the spread of Covid-19 cases: literacy rates in 1821
(1)
literacy rate 1821 x 09mar2020 -0.010 (0.066)
literacy rate 1821 x 10mar2020 -0.043 (0.077)
literacy rate 1821 x 11mar2020 -0.048 (0.077)
literacy rate 1821 x 12mar2020 -0.061 (0.085)
literacy rate 1821 x 13mar2020 -0.081 (0.097)
literacy rate 1821 x 14mar2020 -0.079 (0.104)
literacy rate 1821 x 15mar2020 -0.142 (0.105)
literacy rate 1821 x 16mar2020 -0.180 (0.106)
literacy rate 1821 x 17mar2020 -0.219 (0.111)
literacy rate 1821 x 18mar2020 -0.272 (0.115)
literacy rate 1821 x 19mar2020 -0.303 (0.114)
literacy rate 1821 x 20mar2020 -0.293 (0.127)
literacy rate 1821 x 21mar2020 -0.315 (0.130)
literacy rate 1821 x 22mar2020 -0.319 (0.132)
literacy rate 1821 x 23mar2020 -0.335 (0.136)
literacy rate 1821 x 24mar2020 -0.317 (0.141)
literacy rate 1821 x 25mar2020 -0.319 (0.143)
literacy rate 1821 x 26mar2020 -0.336 (0.148)
literacy rate 1821 x 27mar2020 -0.339 (0.150)
literacy rate 1821 x 28mar2020 -0.347 (0.150)
literacy rate 1821 x 29mar2020 -0.350 (0.152)
literacy rate 1821 x 30mar2020 -0.333 (0.155)
literacy rate 1821 x 31mar2020 -0.332 (0.157)
literacy rate 1821 x 01apr2020 -0.322 (0.158)
literacy rate 1821 x 02apr2020 -0.318 (0.160)
literacy rate 1821 x 03apr2020 -0.319 (0.160)
literacy rate 1821 x 04apr2020 -0.330 (0.162)
literacy rate 1821 x 05apr2020 -0.380 (0.163)
literacy rate 1821 x 06apr2020 -0.382 (0.163)
literacy rate 1821 x 07apr2020 -0.375 (0.165)
literacy rate 1821 x 08apr2020 -0.389 (0.166)
literacy rate 1821 x 09apr2020 -0.386 (0.167)
literacy rate 1821 x 10apr2020 -0.384 (0.168)
literacy rate 1821 x 11apr2020 -0.380 (0.169)
literacy rate 1821 x 12apr2020 -0.381 (0.171)
literacy rate 1821 x 13apr2020 -0.381 (0.174)
literacy rate 1821 x 14apr2020 -0.388 (0.177)
literacy rate 1821 x 15apr2020 -0.390 (0.177)
literacy rate 1821 x 16apr2020 -0.381 (0.179)
literacy rate 1821 x 17apr2020 -0.376 (0.180)
literacy rate 1821 x 18apr2020 -0.375 (0.182)























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
Table C.5 continued
(1)
literacy rate 1821 x 20apr2020 -0.376 (0.183)
literacy rate 1821 x 21apr2020 -0.375 (0.183)
literacy rate 1821 x 22apr2020 -0.377 (0.184)
literacy rate 1821 x 23apr2020 -0.377 (0.184)
literacy rate 1821 x 24apr2020 -0.376 (0.185)
literacy rate 1821 x 25apr2020 -0.377 (0.187)
literacy rate 1821 x 26apr2020 -0.376 (0.187)
literacy rate 1821 x 27apr2020 -0.377 (0.187)
literacy rate 1821 x 28apr2020 -0.377 (0.186)
literacy rate 1821 x 29apr2020 -0.376 (0.187)
literacy rate 1821 x 30apr2020 -0.375 (0.187)
literacy rate 1821 x 01may2020 -0.376 (0.187)
literacy rate 1821 x 02may2020 -0.376 (0.187)
literacy rate 1821 x 03may2020 -0.375 (0.187)
literacy rate 1821 x 04may2020 -0.375 (0.187)
literacy rate 1821 x 05may2020 -0.374 (0.188)
literacy rate 1821 x 06may2020 -0.374 (0.188)
literacy rate 1821 x 07may2020 -0.372 (0.188)
literacy rate 1821 x 08may2020 -0.373 (0.188)
literacy rate 1821 x 09may2020 -0.373 (0.188)
literacy rate 1821 x 10may2020 -0.374 (0.188)
literacy rate 1821 x 11may2020 -0.374 (0.188)
literacy rate 1821 x 12may2020 -0.371 (0.187)
literacy rate 1821 x 13may2020 -0.371 (0.187)
literacy rate 1821 x 14may2020 -0.371 (0.187)
literacy rate 1821 x 15may2020 -0.371 (0.187)
literacy rate 1821 x 16may2020 -0.371 (0.187)
literacy rate 1821 x 17may2020 -0.372 (0.187)
literacy rate 1821 x 18may2020 -0.372 (0.187)
literacy rate 1821 x 19may2020 -0.371 (0.187)
province FE yes
NUTS1 x day FE yes
mean 4.647
observations 5,029
Notes: This table presents the regression results from our baseline model in equation (1). Standard errors






















VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
Table C.6: Effect of social capital on the spread of Covid-19 cases: blood donations per
capita
(1)
blood donations per capita x 10mar2020 -0.075 (0.037)
blood donations per capita x 11mar2020 -0.158 (0.052)
blood donations per capita x 12mar2020 -0.129 (0.061)
blood donations per capita x 13mar2020 -0.168 (0.063)
blood donations per capita x 14mar2020 -0.136 (0.060)
blood donations per capita x 15mar2020 -0.109 (0.064)
blood donations per capita x 16mar2020 -0.142 (0.061)
blood donations per capita x 17mar2020 -0.152 (0.067)
blood donations per capita x 18mar2020 -0.156 (0.069)
blood donations per capita x 19mar2020 -0.146 (0.068)
blood donations per capita x 20mar2020 -0.167 (0.068)
blood donations per capita x 21mar2020 -0.193 (0.070)
blood donations per capita x 22mar2020 -0.187 (0.069)
blood donations per capita x 23mar2020 -0.191 (0.068)
blood donations per capita x 24mar2020 -0.196 (0.069)
blood donations per capita x 25mar2020 -0.162 (0.074)
blood donations per capita x 26mar2020 -0.142 (0.075)
blood donations per capita x 27mar2020 -0.135 (0.077)
blood donations per capita x 28mar2020 -0.134 (0.077)
blood donations per capita x 29mar2020 -0.148 (0.078)
blood donations per capita x 30mar2020 -0.163 (0.077)
blood donations per capita x 31mar2020 -0.157 (0.080)
blood donations per capita x 01apr2020 -0.161 (0.079)
blood donations per capita x 02apr2020 -0.168 (0.079)
blood donations per capita x 03apr2020 -0.167 (0.079)
blood donations per capita x 04apr2020 -0.165 (0.079)
blood donations per capita x 05apr2020 -0.183 (0.080)
blood donations per capita x 06apr2020 -0.180 (0.082)
blood donations per capita x 07apr2020 -0.182 (0.082)
blood donations per capita x 08apr2020 -0.190 (0.084)
blood donations per capita x 09apr2020 -0.194 (0.084)
blood donations per capita x 10apr2020 -0.192 (0.085)
blood donations per capita x 11apr2020 -0.192 (0.085)
blood donations per capita x 12apr2020 -0.192 (0.086)
blood donations per capita x 13apr2020 -0.191 (0.085)
blood donations per capita x 14apr2020 -0.192 (0.085)
blood donations per capita x 15apr2020 -0.193 (0.085)
blood donations per capita x 16apr2020 -0.192 (0.086)
blood donations per capita x 17apr2020 -0.193 (0.086)
blood donations per capita x 18apr2020 -0.195 (0.086)























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
Table C.6 continued
(1)
blood donations per capita x 20apr2020 -0.197 (0.085)
blood donations per capita x 21apr2020 -0.194 (0.085)
blood donations per capita x 22apr2020 -0.193 (0.086)
blood donations per capita x 23apr2020 -0.193 (0.086)
blood donations per capita x 24apr2020 -0.189 (0.088)
blood donations per capita x 25apr2020 -0.188 (0.089)
blood donations per capita x 26apr2020 -0.188 (0.089)
blood donations per capita x 27apr2020 -0.189 (0.089)
blood donations per capita x 28apr2020 -0.191 (0.089)
blood donations per capita x 29apr2020 -0.193 (0.089)
blood donations per capita x 30apr2020 -0.193 (0.089)
blood donations per capita x 01may2020 -0.194 (0.089)
blood donations per capita x 02may2020 -0.195 (0.090)
blood donations per capita x 03may2020 -0.195 (0.090)
blood donations per capita x 04may2020 -0.195 (0.090)
blood donations per capita x 05may2020 -0.195 (0.090)
blood donations per capita x 06may2020 -0.195 (0.090)
blood donations per capita x 07may2020 -0.196 (0.090)
blood donations per capita x 08may2020 -0.195 (0.090)
blood donations per capita x 09may2020 -0.195 (0.090)
blood donations per capita x 10may2020 -0.194 (0.090)
blood donations per capita x 11may2020 -0.194 (0.089)
blood donations per capita x 12may2020 -0.194 (0.090)
blood donations per capita x 13may2020 -0.195 (0.089)
blood donations per capita x 14may2020 -0.196 (0.090)
blood donations per capita x 15may2020 -0.197 (0.090)
blood donations per capita x 16may2020 -0.197 (0.090)
blood donations per capita x 17may2020 -0.197 (0.090)
blood donations per capita x 18may2020 -0.197 (0.090)
blood donations per capita x 19may2020 -0.196 (0.090)
province FE yes
NUTS1 x day FE yes
mean 4.628
observations 7,393
Notes: This table presents the regression results from our baseline model in equation (1). Standard errors
clustered at the province level in parenthesis
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